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Abstract.
 
 
Towards a Philosophy of Instant Rhythm and Generative Theory. 
 
The research project considers a particular notion of rhythm as philosophic con-
cern. Being largely  drawn through the work of Emmanuel Levinas, it is perhaps 
most especially operative as a response, in fact, to his key 1947 work 'Exis-
tence and Existents' (the reluctance to name Levinas himself or indeed any 
other person or persons within the text functioning, however, as a denial of as-
similatory  propensity and the performance thereby of a particularly Levinasean 
concern with the procedure of ethical non/responsiveness to difference).
Functioning as the repeated movement between incomprehension and ration-
alisation, in fact, rhythm is here played out in relation to the !dialogic" moment 
within the condition of reading, as itself a process of exchange for an interpret-
ing subject with both an !original" text"s author and with a reader"s reader, as it 
were, that yet takes place within the solitary, albeit !possessed", status of a 
reading subjectivity (so that the textual voice could conceivably be allowed, in 
essence, an alternating presentation of Self and ventriloquizing Other). 
Such consideration, moreover, being afforded particular emphasis in relation to 
the condition of the 'instant', as itself a musically oriented (rhythmic) concern, 
and its emergence in relation to various Levinasean preoccupations - most no-
tably perhaps, the Saying and Said, Otherness, prayer and testament, the Hy-
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postasis and the il y a - as well as themes that we might identify as inevitably 
informing the theoretical - Self, difference, listening, utterance, reading, ascrip-
tion, presence, generation etc. The overarching intention of the work being to 
establish an interactive flow between such concerns that functions at the same 
time as both assessment or mapping, and realisation. The project ultimately  ex-
isting as an effectuation of the very condition or conditions that it seeks to de-
termine and describe. 
Additionally, of course, in so doing the project seeks to postulate an aesthetic 
underpinning for the theoretical, arguably providing agency for the ethical mo-
ment of the text, and challenging the Levinasean conception of an essentially 
non-ethical aesthetic. In Levinasean thought the fundamental significance of 
ethics lays with a responsiveness to the primordial call for acknowledgement of 
the irreducible difference of the non-I, preceding the ontological and rejecting 
the possibility  of aesthetic immanence in the pursuit of a righteous mode of ex-
istence. The preoccupation with the dispute between ethics and aesthetics be-
ing grounded, as a consequence, in the desire for distance or distinction, with 
art"s !otherwise" resonance being held to constitute a rhythmic deceit that is pre-
clusive of an authentic alterity, and therefore preclusive of a genuine ethical po-
tential. 
The contention here, however, proposes an already extant aesthetic propensity 
in relation to ethics that, in the application of the same to the theoretical text as 
indeed the primary focus of the project itself, points to a presence that em-
braces, as well as being embraced by, the condition of the epistemic (the aes-
thetic, in relation to such, being worked via Levinasean/Blanchotian conceptions 
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of the il y a, in fact, as it might be furled through a textual condition of Being, 
and operative through video as moments of, or moments of witness to, incom-
prehension or independent intentionality, presence in absence, fascination with-
out beginning, end or future, and the condition of !here" as !nowhere"). Denying 
in the same movement theory"s persistent inclination as overarching schema in 
relation to practice, and coextensively  indicating the very particular nature of 
ethical emergence within the text.
Lawrence Sullivan. 
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DVD tracks.
 
Each track precedes a text with which it maintains a particular relation. Such a 
relation, however, is not illustrative but constitutive of the first part of an aes-
thetic moment (the second part being realised within the theoretical condition of 
the text). The contiguous nature of the relation, moreover, means that the tracks 
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(!Back Chat" and !Exchange"), and could therefore be viewed, in theory, at any 
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The essays that follow may be read in any order. 
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Between You and Me
Card Room, Chelsea College of Art & Design, November 2007.
3 minutes 9 seconds.
Disc 1 track 1. Please press play.
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Music and Prayer.
Foreword.
The essays which follow are a series of prayers. Equally, they are music. These 
lines, similarly, are prayer and music.1  But on what grounds might we make 
such a claim?
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1 The definition of music here largely pursues a notion of the same as organisation of noise (see 
J. Attali, Noise: The Political Economy of Music, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1985), whilst allowing for a more formal conception that determines music as a man-made aural 
phenomenon arranged for the purpose of experiential enrichment through particular forms of 
engagement - performance, dance, listening etc. (see J. Levinson, Music, Art and Metaphysics: 
Essays in Philosophic Aesthetics, Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press, 1991). Such a 
reading should be framed, however, in relation to a consideration of the aural that embraces the 
condition of silence as a sounding concern (following John Cage"s view that posits the impossi-
bility of absolute silence within existence, and which is here taken to encompass the cognitive - 
including processes of discursive thought). It acknowledges, moreover, the influence of contin-
gent determinants - such as !code", !network" (J. Attali, Noise: The Political Economy of Music) 
and !social context" (J.J. Nattiez, Music and Discourse: Towards a Semiology of Music, Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), and arrives at the conception (again following Cage) 
that all sound (including sounding silence) has musical potential.                                                     
The definition given to !musicality" may appear an even greater formalist reading, of course, 
given its emphasis upon rhythm in this instance as indication of musical status (which could ap-
pear an alignment with pre-modernist conceptions of melody, rhythm, harmony etc. as intrinsic 
properties of musical sounding). Though it should in fact be noted that rhythm here (as genera-
tive movement, between dumbfoundedness and rationalisation) is engendered, less conven-
tionally perhaps, at the point of reception (with listening, as creative occurrence, structuring 
such a condition) rather than the same being extraneously appointed as metric !beat" with the 
coextensive imposition of a temporal grid.                                                                                        
In proposing that all sound has musical potential, however, it should also be acknowledged that 
argument exists for the divergence of music and sound-art, with the latter being determined in 
relation to an aesthetic that is in fact preclusive of the conditions of music and musicality. The 
issue then becoming one of effective distinction.                                                                     
Andy Hamilton suggests two musically oriented positions, in fact, that function in relation to a 
!universalist" perspective (the universalist position being an assertion of music as the only 
sounding art). !Non-universalism", which, rather obviously, denies such a view and argues for a 
clear distinction between music and sound-art (Hamilton"s own position positing a largely tonal 
musical characteristic and nascent category of non-musical sound-art), and !avant-garde uni-
versalism", which calls, conversely, for an expansion of musical definition to incorporate all 
sound. Similarly, he distinguishes two modes of sound-art that seek withdrawal from a he-
gemonic musical status. Namely, !documentary sound-art" and !non-documentary sound-art" 
(see A. Hamilton, Aesthetics & Music, London and New York, Continuum International Publish-
ing Group, 2007). The former could simply be deemed the capture of sound through framing or 
field recording, the latter being the fabrication of an environment, or indeed field itself, for the 
production of sound (drawing it closer, it might be argued, to installation art rather than music).     
in allowing, however, for the legitimacy of calls for an alternative aesthetic, the reading here, it     
Music effects a !channelization of noise"2 and might be allowed an organisation 
of the disorganised (as indeed text might be allowed the organisation of 
thought"s !noise").3  An attempt to control the unknown, the unknowable. Music 
thereby existing as an attempt to negotiate a position in relation to difference (if 
we posit noise as a particular manifestation of such difference), which locates it 
as both Scapegoat (in its containment of the !horror" of noise) and act of Prayer 
(in its attempt to access the Otherwise made manifest in the condition of 
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should yet be said, of course, is pointedly worked through a notion of the need (following Levi-
nas) for coextensive relations between sound and music in order to arrive at a sense of the ex-
traneous (see footnote 3, p. 12). In contradistinction to the views, therefore, that insist upon 
sound"s distance from the regulatory propensity of the compositional Notenbild, the suggestion 
is that the score, or similar organisational structure, is in fact necessary since it elicits the condi-
tion of !surplus". And surplus implies the !more than" that is the context of difference. Levinas 
himself using the term !envers"  in relation to such thinking, to denote the !other side", as it were, 
and, more literally, the notion of !toward" that marks the essential turn of his writing (see Is It 
Righteous to Be? Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas, ed. Jill Robbins, Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2001).                                                     
2 J. Attali, Noise: The Political Economy of Music, p.26.
3 Given that music is framed here then as an organisation of noise, it could be argued that noise 
is, of course, the condition of sound as disorder and chaos. In allowing that to be the case, 
however, it should be noted that such a reading also carries an inherent danger of a too readily 
presumed polarity.                                                                                                                
Rather, in admitting the disorganised status of noise and the organised status of music, it might 
be understood that each concern also bears within itself the condition of the other. The negative 
(if it can be so described) essence of noise is always a constitutive part of the positive essence 
of music. And noise carries continuously, in its mutative inclinations, the musical propensity for 
order. So that as Jacques Attali asserts “[c]atastrophe is inscribed in order, just as crisis is in-
scribed in development. There is no order that does not contain disorder within itself, and un-
doubtedly there is no disorder incapable of creating order” (J. Attali, Noise: The Political Econ-
omy of Music, p.34).                                                                                                                          
Noise, it might then be said, is the sounding of a chaos and non-sense that writes itself through 
the order of music, its rupturing proclivities at the same time signalling, or indeed organising, an 
interdictory relation to an accepted meaning and the facilitation of potential new meaning. The 
presentation of noise within music, or indeed as music, constituting the presencing, as it were, 
within the now of the non-apprehensible, which continuously gives way to, or matures into (as 
the event of the recurring instant), a unique knowing that is itself the consequence of the posi-
tioning or contingency of subjective listening.                                                                               
In so conceiving of matters then, it may appear that such a view precludes the modernist read-
ing of fixed subjectivity or identity, whilst perhaps advancing the postmodernist concern with 
representation of the non-representable and the unfixed or multiple. Yet it could also be argued 
that even within such a context a notion of consensual meaning may be said to take place 
within the very move to define the heterogeneous. So that the extent of postmodernist destabili-
sation might itself be thrown into question. In A Speech for Noise, Salomé Voegelin posits the 
noise).4  Music might then be read as an !offering" (the condition of Scapegoat 
equating with Sacrifice) of difference to difference (the specific relation here, in 
the light of such thinking, being that text, as an organising or organised con-
cern, is made available to another whose interpreting agencies, in turn, cannot 
be specifically anticipated). 
Prayer as music becomes then a vehicle of containment and correspondence. 
But in what sense, and particularly in what sense here, is it correspondence? 
Prayer exists, after all, in a variety of modes - as supplication, praise, confes-
sion and so on. And it addresses a variety of possible recipients - deity, spirit, 
the deceased - each of which, of course, might be determined as an absolute 
exteriority. Or it is the inculcation of particular attitudes within the praying sub-
ject themselves.
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view, further, that postmodernism “queries the nominalism and homogeneity of those who par-
ticipate in the meaning making process” but does not question “the possibility of meaning mak-
ing per se”, going on to suggest that whilst noise (or sound) could offer meaning and value 
through context and association within postmodern discourse, it needs also to be framed “sim-
ply and unstoppably” as always itself. Always in its own right without recourse to a meta-
discourse for evaluation of its perception. (S. Voegelin, A Speech for Noise, 
http://www.salomevoegelin.net/listening_to_noise....html, accessed December 2010).                    
And whilst being sympathetic to such a view, the inclination here, in fact, as might be under-
stood through the notion of coextensive relations already outlined, would be that the realisation 
of difference (accepting that the condition of noise might be read as a particular embodiment of 
the same), or the realisation of difference as an ethical concern in Levinasean terms at least, is 
actually dependent upon the proximity of a fixed meta-discourse in order to facilitate the possi-
bility of inflected reading, a reading of the otherwise, a reading of the !trace". Alterity (noise) 
cannot be framed in terms of polar opposition or it could be thought and then thematised. The 
movement to determine meaning through designation being always undermined, as it were, by 
the difference which overflows such determination. That is not to deny the notion, of course, of 
the possibility that “[n]oise forces the sonic discourse !outward"”, and “foregrounds the contin-
gent subjectivity of its perception.” (S. Voegelin, A Speech for Noise). It is simply to suggest, 
rather, that it might do so through a systemic listening. Noise needing the ascriptive, it could be 
argued, in order to exist beyond it.             
4 The notions of Scapegoat and Sacrifice being drawn through Attali"s observations of the same 
in Noise, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985. pp. 21-45 (and for further consid-
eration of the Scapegoat and Sacrifice here, see also !The Music of the Il y a", pp. 115-131).
In addition to which, the notion of prayer (as well as the perhaps more conten-
tious notion of music) is played out here through text, or more pointedly the 
theoretical text, eliciting a further sense of the otherwise in terms of the reader, 
or Reader. So the question to then be asked is to whom do we write? Who are 
You?
 
And additionally, of course, we might consider the position of the Reader in rela-
tion to the theoretical process which makes of interpreting subject both reader 
and writer. The theoretical prompting a !turning" as a matter of course in the 
process of !facing" as transition from interpreter as reader to interpreter as 
writer. The focus of !facing" shifting from the author of a source text (whilst ac-
cepting that even within such a context there are further shifts of facing as we 
engage with various intertextual readings) to a reader of the interpreting text.
In fact, we could perhaps align the notion of theoretical interpreter with that of 
father confessor. That is, inasmuch as the act of interpretation (especially in 
terms of the theoretical) is an act of intercession whereby a subject attempts to 
make available for another the !confession" of a first (or initial Other), we might 
determine a sense within which an interpreting subject is therefore to be read as 
vessel or conduit for a particular !message" conveyed from one condition of dif-
ference to another. Such action itself arguably becoming a further confession, 
however, in the interpreting process. Could we ever interpret, after all, without 
including something of the Self within our interpretation (and isn"t a priest"s in-
tercession, in fact, the interpretive moment therefore as both inevitable act of 
self-revelation as well as relaying agency?)?
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So here then, we are both confessor and confessed. The change in attitude be-
ing predicated upon the moment of interpretation in relation to which we are re-
ceiver or giver. You are both interpreted and recipient of interpretation, meaning 
that equally You are also confessed and confessor. Confession existing as a 
moment of Sacrifice, wherein interpretation of difference is offered to difference. 
Your words being the words of a death-bed confession (since all authors are, 
conceivably, !dead") offered through our offices in prayer, or music, to the You 
that is always absolute alterity, absolute Other.
15
This is a hesitation before beginning. Or before re-beginning. It might be expe-
rienced as a moment of indolence, a moment of gathering up. A reflection. 
16
Back Chat (extract)
Artist"s home, North London, August 2003.
3 minutes 44 seconds (of 23 minutes approximately).
Disc 1 track 2. Please press play.
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The Art of Pre-facing.
A Prayer.
This is a preface. A preface might make us both uneasy and joyful. Uneasy in its 
authoritarian assertions, and joyful in its (and the following text"s) inability to ef-
fect the same. Uneasy, because prefacing or pre-facing, functioning as over-
ture, is generally taken as an indication of that which will come later (ostensibly 
having knowledge, as it were, prior to the event), but may equally be under-
stood as deception since it invariably comes into being as a consequence 
rather than anticipation of an already extant text. And joyful because we might 
apprehend it as simulacrum, or witness, of the shifting and inconclusive nature 
of the work it prefigures (and therefore as happy sign of impotent authority). To 
frame the condition of writing, or prefacing more particularly (though we would 
argue that all writing essentially exists as preface in any case), as a moment of 
either !Aufhebung" or !inconclusion" may, however, be inaccurate.1  Perhaps we 
could allow, rather, that the two positions are concurrent.
Of course, a preface is generally  delivered through a prior knowledge of that 
which it precedes (whether preface and text are by the same author or not) and 
it would appear ill advised or ill mannered to conceive of writing a preface in fact 
without having at least some knowledge of the work to which it attends. But 
such a course must inevitably  then constitute the preface, the !saying before-
18
1 !Aufhebung" being “a relationship between two terms where the second at once annuls the first 
and lifts it up into a higher sphere of existence” (as determined by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak in 
the Translator!s Preface in J.Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. G.C. Spivak, Baltimore and Lon-
don: The John Hopkins University Press, 1976. p. xi), and is derived through a reading of the 
work of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, which posits it as a very specific conception of sublation 
or sublimation.
hand",2 as therefore a pretense or fiction (since its presentation would invariably 
suggest a specific primary moment within a linear temporal unfolding).
The notion of !Aufhebung" attempts the accommodation of such a process, 
however, seeking the integration of the preface into the body of the text as 
though both were part of the same living entity. Or we could perhaps view it as a 
process of re-integration in filial terms, whereby the preface engendered by the 
parent text is recovered by the same and so becomes justified.3 That would be, 
however, to too forcibly locate the text as authority, and potentially preclude an 
ethicality aimed at the obviation of such a condition.
We might therefore determine the preface (and, to repeat the notion, allow that 
any given text is a preface since it must function as antecedent event in relation 
to subsequent readings) as a movement that, to borrow from the condition of 
musicality, might be divided between processes of interpretation and perform-
ance. Where, however, are we to locate the notion of !performativity" here (or in 
relation to text per se)? Some interpretations (naturally) would emphasise the 
condition of musicality  as analytic interpretation that in turn elicits performance. 
It may perhaps be more appropriate, however, in thinking of the theoretical  to 
suggest that the conditions are virtually simultaneous and that musicality as a 
movement between incomprehension and comprehension is a (rhythmically) 
performative process of interpretation. 
19
2 G.C. Spivak, Translator!s Preface in J.Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. x. Taken from the defini-
tion in the Oxford English Dictionary.
3 Ibid. p. xi. Spivak here drawing on one of Derrida"s structural metaphors.
The event of theoretical interpretation is, however, a process of continuous be-
coming, and emphasises its condition of performativity, it could be said, through 
its unique status. That is, as with any musical performance, every interpretation 
or reading is new. Even in repetition or replication by  the same author there is a 
unique status that attaches to the same. A reading changes from moment to 
moment (instant to instant) because, as beings in the world, we change. And 
prefacing, it might be allowed, in its application to the unique moment as it is 
followed by another and another and so on, constitutes a bearing witness to the 
process of such change. 
And in the movement from one subject to another in interpretation, moreover, 
we might discern perhaps most especially the very particular paradox of dis-
semination as it is played out in terms of the non/relation between readings oc-
curring in the moment to moment. To engage with such a process, in fact, is to 
effectively assimilate and relinquish (or grasp and un-grasp) in virtually the 
same instant, since the assimilatory condition is countered by the condition of 
the !new". Such a notion of constant !becoming" also bringing into question the 
condition of !originality" in a source text, which is itself effectively a network of 
traces (as with all texts) and equally in a constant state of becoming. So that a 
sense of the !original" work is perhaps a fallacy.
This means, however, that in the movement of reading the !original" or source 
text, as theoretical !first" (each text becoming an !original" or first for a subse-
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quent text), is always an !original in repetition".4  The consequence of which is 
that the imported original (co-opted into the text) remains identical with itself 
only by differentiating from itself, constituting, in fact, a specific presence in ab-
sence:
  
[T]he original text, then, exists only as a !moment" of such an hermeneutical 
!becoming" within its history of reception and interpretation; it [the original text] is 
in no way preceding the process of !becoming" of this hermeneutical history. As 
far as that goes, an hermeneutical identity is only in and as being-different-from-
itself [...]. Eventually, this concept of hermeneutic repetition is therefore dialecti-
cal, precisely because with it, sense and meaning of an !original text" exist only 
as the !Other than itself", only in difference from itself [...].5
And in returning to the particular concern with preface, it might then be apposite 
to suggest that the pertinent condition of prefacing (and the condition of prefac-
ing as it affects all texts) is its propensity to bleed into, or infiltrate, a subsequent 
text or texts as spectral presence - whilst also allowing that the production of a 
theoretical text is also always a !continuation" of a previous text or texts, and is 
therefore itself an already !possessed" work. In effect, such text is always both 
inside and outside an ongoing concern (the final word never being achievable), 
and always therefore !present" to subsequent readings without knowledge of 
how such readings might function. Pre-facing is, therefore, anticipation of the 
un-anticipatable, an awareness of its own being-to-be without knowledge of the 
extraneous influence that renders it otherwise. A  bearing witness to the author-
ising moment that loses authority.
21
4  W. Lutterfelds, Subjektivitat - ein Wissenschaftsdefizit der Kulturwissenschaften Die Dialektik 
von Text und Interpretation als Wiederholung des Gleichen, Manuskrkript Passau, p. 4, quoted 
and translated in G. Sedlmayr, Breaking Through the Closure: Deconstruction and the Ethical 
Reading of Literature, Passau, 2006. (accessed July 2007) 
htpp://www.gradnet.de/papers/pomo02.papers/breaking.htm.  p. 6.  
5  Ibid. p. 7. 
A reader may like to consider his/her interpretive activity as a production of light. 
A clarity. An apprehension of exteriority through interiority. In the same instant, 
however, it is also a withdrawal that signals the unique status of the Self. We 
might recognise then that participation is also an absenting.
22
In Flight
Home of Felicity Dowding, North West London, September 2007.
3 minutes 33 seconds.
Disc 1 track 3. Please press play.
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Light Music.
A Prayer.
Of all the arts, music is perhaps generally regarded as the most definitively  ab-
stract. A particular view holding it to be absolutely devoid of extraneous influ-
ence, referring only to itself, and existing, in fact, as pure !sensation". Such a 
condition being claimed, additionally, for the status of the aesthetic par excel-
lence:
The way in which in art the sensible qualities which constitute an object do not 
lead to an object and are in themselves is the very event of sensation qua sen-
sation, the esthetic event. We can also call it the musicality of sensation, for in 
music this way a quality can divest itself of all objectivity - and consequently of 
all subjectivity - seems completely natural.1
So that all art, though perhaps music most especially, even when structured as 
!representation", has a propensity for self-referral. And such self-referral, in its 
emphasis of !presence", would appear a condition of hermetic closure, of exclu-
sion. So that !the message is the presentation, but it presents nothing; it is, that 
is, presence".2
But such a condition, for all that, cannot exist in absolute terms. Isn"t the !pres-
entation of nothing" not a presentation, after all, of something? And isn"t a fur-
ther sense of !bearing witness" operative here also? Music is, of course, a bear-
24
1 E. Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. A. Lingis, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 
1978. p. 47.
2 J-F. Lyotard, Newman, The Instant in The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, trans. G. Bennington 
and R. Bowlby, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988. p. 81.
ing witness to its own self contained status and to the impossibility of represent-
ing presence beyond its own status, but in the assertion of non-
acknowledgement is there not additionally, in fact, a converse sense yet of ac-
knowledgement?3
The assertion in !Existence and Existents" is that the aesthetic event realises a 
context within which !musical sound is no longer a noise... enter[ing] into rela-
tions and syntheses that no longer have anything in common with the order of 
objects".4  But isn"t such a process simply  a forgetting, with the implication that 
forgetting is a forgetting of something? Forgetfulness always being attended by 
the !trace" or residue of that which it forgets. And is it therefore inappropriate to 
suggest that music is in fact unable to !unburden" itself of that from which it 
emerges - namely, noise? And isn"t it, rather, that in its organising condition mu-
sic cannot do otherwise than intimate its origins?
And would it then be impossible to align music with light in terms of its con-
ceivably !revelatory" status? That is, whilst music may not be possessed of the 
seemingly appropriative dimension of light, it yet facilitates not only a !sense" of 
extraneous difference, it also makes possible a similar grasping of distance or 
interval in the resistance of anonymous existence.
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3 The thought here relating to Jacques Derrida"s conception of what might be termed the !im-
possibility of alterity"s acknowledgment" without a pre-extant !sense" of the same. 
4 E. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 47.
To understand such thought we could perhaps consider the condition of light 
more fully. Light is held to be contiguous in fact with the emergence of sense (or 
indeed, sensation), and gives rise to the condition of appropriation:
Sense is that by which what is exterior is already adjusted to and refers to what 
is interior...  Sense is permeability for the mind... Or, we can say, it is luminosity. 
For we can speak of vision and light wherever there is sensible or intellectual 
apprehension... Light makes objects into a world, that is, makes them belong to 
us. Property constitutes the world: through the light the world is given and 
apprehended.5
Yet such apprehension, however, is not necessarily  authorising or unremittingly 
acquisitive in its occurrence. Granted, it could be argued that light, in privileging 
sight, makes objects into a world, and a world that is possessed or to be pos-
sessed. But light also proffers distance, the recognition of which facilitates the 
consideration that a relation with objects might in fact be an engagement with-
out compromise. 
So that whilst accepting that the condition of intentionality which gives rise to 
sense may establish a connectivity  with the !outside" (an !enveloping of the exte-
rior by  the inward, which is the very  structure of the cogito and of sense"),6 
wherein the same could be read as a specific continuity  of Self, the knowledge 
formulated as a consequence of light must in fact also constitute an interval it-
self in relation to an exteriority, since thought (as knowledge) could equally be 
allowed a displacement or remove from that which is thought about:
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5 E. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 40.
6 Ibid. p. 41.
[T]hough it tends unambiguously towards an object, knowing is essentially a 
way of being on the hither side of being. It is a way of relating to events while 
still being able to not be caught up in them. 7
Even the thought of Selfhood instills a distance, so that !a subject is never one 
with the idea it can have of itself".8 Always then, and contiguous with its condi-
tion of advance, the thought occurs that thought is simultaneously a moment of 
retreat, of detachment, from being. And equally, therefore, a rhythmic play be-
tween grasping and un-grasping.
Light, we might say, both detains us within being whilst also maintaining an in-
terval for us in relation to the same. And considered in relation to the possibility 
informing this text (that light might be framed as a condition of music) how are 
we to then determine the function of musicality? In fact, we might contend that 
rather than existing beyond, or at a remove from, the condition of objectivity, 
music actually  exists as representation of difference, or an intimation of differ-
ence, that both refers to a condition of the otherwise and (through its emphasis 
of self presence) the impossibility of doing the same. At work within the condi-
tion of music is then a movement between witnessing of difference and a wit-
nessing of the impossibility of witnessing. 
To what does music then connect us? In fact we might say  that music is the or-
ganising principle that we apply to the condition that we sense beyond knowl-
edge. Such a condition we may contend, moreover, being that of the il y a or 
there is, a manifestation of exteriority that we sense through noise (albeit noise 
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7 Ibid. p. 42.
8 E. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 42.
that may be of our own making) but comprehend or even seek to control, as we 
have suggested, through music. Music functioning as appropriative knowledge 
that is both a revelatory instrument of difference and a facilitator of organisation 
(and therefore distance) in relation to the same. A bridge between order and 
chaos. 
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A reader is invited to remember to forget. And, in forgetting, to remember. The 
musical orientation of the text means that as with processes of musical recep-
tion, wherein uncertainty gives way to rationalisation, reading becomes a reflex-
ive attempt to comprehend, or indeed recollect, the significance of incompre-
hensible immediacy.
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The Silence of Sound. 
A Prayer.
Listen. There is no such thing as silence.1 Or rather, there is audible silence and 
there is absolute silence (the latter being the silence of death, which is effec-
tively unknowable since it constitutes the beyond of lived experience).2  So that 
perhaps the real distinction is to be found in terms of intentionality. Sound that 
seeks the ear, and sound that reaches the ear through chance, randomness, 
accident or even imagination. 
To so consider silence is to posit it as ‘sounding’, and therefore, in fact, as being 
on the side of life. Silence existing as a world of sounds:
At my house, you hear the boat sounds, the traffic sounds the neighbours quar-
reling, the children playing and screaming in the hall, and on top of it all the 
pedals of the piano squeak. There is no getting away from life.3
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1 Such a postulation deriving, of course, from John Cage. The view originating from a visit in 
1951 to an anechoic chamber at Harvard University in order to ‘hear’ silence, where he “literally 
expected to hear nothing.” Instead, he heard two sounds, one high and one low. He was told 
that the first was his nervous system and the other his blood circulating. This was a major reve-
lation that was to affect his compositional philosophy from that time on. And it was from this ex-
perience that he decided that#silence#defined as a total absence of sound did not exist. "Try as 
we may to make a#silence, we cannot," he wrote.#"One need not fear for the future of music."#(J. 
Cage, Experimental Music in Silence, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1973. p. 13).
2 In Aporias, Jacques Derrida makes the point that ‘my death’ can never in fact be  subject to an 
experience that would be properly be my own, or that ‘I’ (as sentient being) could be account-
able for (J. Derrida, Finis in Aporias, California: Stanford University Press, 1993. pp. 1-42). So 
that whilst death may befall us, we cannot, as the people we are, ever truly know it. And in link-
ing the condition with silence, composers like John Cage, amongst others, would claim that the 
same is similarly a condition beyond comprehension. The position that we might propose here, 
however, is one that suggests the possibility of an inflected receipt of the absolute through the 
apprehensible. A trace of the absolute condition of silence through the occasion of its absence. 
3 J. Cage, Lectures on Something in Silence, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1973. p. 
135.
The same, moreover, locates such silence within the condition of duration or 
time (the notion of silence as death of course being determined as outside, in-
deed out of, time),4  so that existence, throughout its temporal mode of being, 
could be deemed a cacophony of sound. From the technologically facilitated 
radiographic revelations of noise produced by changes in the atomic structure 
of exploding gases, and photo-acoustic spectroscopic recordings enabling 
audio receipt of naturally  occurring phenomena (flowering buds for example), to 
the subjective noise of our own corporeal states of being (breathing, heartbeat 
and so on) and even (extending the notion to the imaginary conditions of, for 
example, interior dialogue) the reverberations of our own thought processes,5 
living is replete with sound. Such that sound cannot be evaded whilst perhaps 
(in aligning a particular form of silence not only with an absolute exteriority, but 
also with a condition of desirability) being the one thing from which we would 
like to be able to withdraw.
 
And yet, to so frame the relation between sound and silence is also to acknowl-
edge that silence may in fact exist as a presence in absence within sound, in-
asmuch as death constitutes a presence in absence within life (death occurring 
as perhaps the ultimately inflected condition of being).6  Such apprehension de-
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4 The status of death therein representing the condition of absolute exteriority which is akin to 
the absolute alterity of the Other, and by extension the absolute difference of the divine - and 
signals the sense of the infinite within the finite.
5  Such notions of cognitive ‘interior sound’ embracing, even, the various degrees of deafness or 
hearing impairment. 
6 A condition to which Derrida points in Aporias, suggesting moreover that a reversal of the posi-
tions of life and death, wherein death is generally considered as subordinate to life, is reversed, 
or simply made redundant (J. Derrida, Finis in Aporias, pp. 1-42). Similarly in Sigmund Freud, 
the death instinct is posited as the most emphatic life force, or that life force is in fact always 
itself a compelling movement towards death (see for example S. Freud, Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle V in On Metapsychology: The Theory of Psychoanalysis, London: Penguin Books, 
1991. pp. 311-312).
termining, moreover, a sense within which death imposes, as it were, the condi-
tion of life upon us, and situates us within a ‘here’ as a position from which we 
might formulate an indirect reading of the ‘not-here’ or, indeed, death itself.7
In relation to which it could be said that the sounds which determine our exis-
tence within life are actually compelled through an unattainable, or incompre-
hensible, absolute silence. Such unattainableness obliging our engagement in 
the world with sound, whilst allowing in turn that we are conversely in coexten-
sive relation always (an awareness without knowledge) with the possibility  of 
the same absolute silence, in fact, through our very immersion in sound. A no-
tion of polarities thereby being precluded since both conditions are able to at 
once be independent and yet continuously interwoven.
 
In respect of which (and backtracking a little), we should then perhaps say that 
two essential notions of silence are in fact extant - albeit that one is extraneous 
to existence - a tangible sense of being’s silence (the sounding condition of 
which pertains to an ‘outer’ mode of un/intentional listening and an ‘inner’ sub-
jective mode of un/intentional listening) and an intangible sensing of death’s, or 
outside being’s, absolute silence. The two, however, may be regarded as over-
lain or even merged, the intimation of the otherwise manifesting itself as the 
‘presenting’ shadow of being’s resonant silence (and in framing the il y a as 
manifestation of permeating alterity  within being, moreover, we might argue that 
the same is at once an extraneous/intrinsic condition that is filled out, that we 
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7 That is not, however, to seek to align the notion of an indirectly ‘inferred’ outside (as we might 
perhaps seek to do with a Levinasean model of difference) with the Heideggerean conception of 
‘being-towards-death". Heidegger’s notion arguably inclining towards the already apprehended 
and the polar, Levinas’s towards the always un-apprehended or indeed un-apprehensible and, 
albeit somewhat perversely, the contiguous.
each fill out, with a sounding silence that simultaneously both alerts us to the 
desired condition of the infinite beyond, and to our own corporeal status that is 
itself mired within existence).
 
And in focusing upon the condition of music in relation to such thoughts, we 
might by extension then concede that music and silence are each suffused with 
the other, and that the rhythmic structure that underpins all music could in fact 
be read as a vibratory movement between sound and silence (whilst emphasis-
ing again that it is not a question of polarities or binarisms, since each is already 
written through by the other. It is, rather, a question of comprehending that each 
is present to the other, that silence as nothingness is yet a ‘somethingness’, and 
that it is not simply a precondition for sound but is already filled with sound).8 
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8 Jacques Attali and Walter Zimmerman, amongst others, indicate two conditions of silence in 
relation to music, in fact. One is a socially subjective silence imposed by an authorising !musi-
cality" (an imposition of the organising law which is both protective and prescriptive) and the 
other, the sense of which takes precedence here, is a silent music that is permitting of noise (or 
acknowledges the constitution of music within noise). So that silence, in relation to such a view, 
structures a space that is in fact replete with sound (given that silence is, in any case, an im-
possibility). And we might even determine it therefore as a space of sounding (or silent sound-
ing) within sound. Moreover, it is the sounding of the peripheral, the marginalised, the disorgan-
ised. A sounding within music of the otherwise.                                                                                
But more than silence being the sounding of the extraneous, in fact, it is the sounding of the 
Self, since listening within such a context facilitates the apprehension of one"s own process and 
location of engagement. Through listening we hear ourselves as part of the apprehended ter-
rain, part of the soundscape. We might even say that we listen to our listening selves.                  
Silence may therefore be regarded as the space within which listening gathers a movement 
from non-sense to rationalisation. And silence might then be framed as a space that marks the 
emergence of meaning and, indeed, language (which itself leads, of course, to the production of 
the text). Such emergence must, however, also mark silence as a space of doubt and contesta-
tion, since the striving for orientation and meaning (which, aligned with notions of birth and de-
cay in the instant, must continuously be re-worked or re-constructed since doubt consistently 
overwhelms assertion) is always personal and contingent, with imagination providing the only 
support for subjective meaning.                                                                                               
Such doubt, it should also be noted of course, is also the source of and for an ethical reading of 
silence, since the assimilatory propensity that attends the notion of an all-embracing condition of 
musical sound (including sounding silence) is continuously undermined by the process of a im-
mersive listening, as “an infinite field of innovation” (Salomé Voegelin, Pondering a Paradox: 
The Seduction of Noise, http://www.salomevoegelin.net/Home.html. Accessed December 2010), 
promoting at all turns a series of complex and consistently changing possibilities. 
Of course, the apprehension of silence within music has, historically, largely de-
termined the same as a supplementary or subordinate condition to the essential 
condition of sound. Silence as a process of ‘rest’ may have long been consid-
ered as fundamentally  important to the production of composition. Silence may 
have marked the transitional movement from one musical moment to the next 
via ‘caesura’, a deliberate pause. And silence may have delineated the begin-
ning and/or end of a work. But silence, for all that, has most regularly been ap-
prehended as the secondary moment in musical production, its real significance 
being read through its mode of facilitation only (that, despite the fact that music 
theory has also long acknowledged that silence could be read as more than a 
simple discontinuity of sound - inasmuch as silence is ‘present’, for example, 
within the condition of a sustained ‘fermata’, the holding of a note or rest for 
longer than its usual duration, or an extremely delicate ‘pianissimo’ or soft play-
ing. So that we might consequently then speak of a music of the ‘not yet’, or ‘no 
longer’, apprehensible, or indeed of the silently resonant).
 
But that is not, however, to deny a continuous development, throughout the 
twentieth century and twenty-first century thus far, of appreciation within music 
for the meaningfulness of silence.9 The concern with such leading to the formu-
lation of very  particular ways of thinking through the relation, and which could in 
their turn be applied to conceptions of metaphysics, hermeneutics and the theo-
retical. In relation to which, we might then restate the proposition here that there 
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9  In relation to which we might look, for example, to composers as diverse as those from the 
Second Viennese School, Alban Berg, Anton Webern and Arnold Schoenberg, to those of the 
New York School, Morton Feldman and John Cage preeminently. The interests here, of course, 
being most especially determined in relation to Cage’s conceptions of silence, or the non-
silence of silence, as well as perhaps the condition of silence as ‘imaginary’ noise as it might be 
read through the work of composers like Dieter Schnebel or Mauricio Kagel. 
is, within existence, no such thing as silence. Or that there is a sounding si-
lence, and that such silence contains the trace, or intimation, of an exterior ab-
solute silence. But how, more precisely, to understand such a condition both in 
its musical formation and as metaphysical and theoretical concern?
We might begin by observing that the determination of a ‘sounding silence’ in 
music (or the notion to which we allude here initially) could be read in particular 
relation to the immediate consequence of an encounter with ‘white paintings’,10 
themselves functioning as !airports for shadows and dust... [as] mirrors of the 
air."11 In effect, a locus or context for the apprehension and configuration of the 
unobserved. Or, indeed, the extraneous. The implication being that without a 
point of realisation, as it were, the extraneous can never in fact be counte-
nanced. So in that regard we might say that white paintings reveal the un-
apprehended within our, and their, environment, just as the ‘bidden’12  condition 
of music becomes the context or vehicle for unbidden sound, or indeed a 
sounding silence (the grasping of which also operates, to emphasise the point, 
as facilitating agent for the ‘sensing’ of another layer of exteriority  - an outside 
that exists as pure absence - inasmuch as sounding silence could be said to 
presage an absolute silence without our in fact having any knowledge of the 
same).
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10 The reference, of course, is to John Cage’s encounter with Robert Rauschenberg’s works of 
the same name in 1951, which Cage felt gave validation or permission for his production of ‘si-
lent’ music. 
11 J. Cage, The Charles Elliot Norton Lectures I - VI, Boston: Harvard University Press, 1990. p. 
26.
12 A bidden condition of music refers both to the sounding of music and/or to the object or situa-
tion facilitating such sounding - extending from the context within which such sound might 
emerge (including notation and instrumentation) to the environment within which it might reso-
nate (concert hall etc.). 
 In effect, the artifact (or indeed aesthetic event) here proceeds as a point of 
summons. It draws into consciousness the otherwise ignored (and into an 
inflected sensing of the unknowable). Such a  determination of art thereby  ren-
dering the same as incantatory, and as a specific conduit for difference - whilst 
understanding that it yet functions as a mouthpiece for the realisation of differ-
ence without itself being ‘different’.13 
The employment of the mouth as metaphor, moreover, asserts a particular ap-
positeness in relation to the conditions of sound and silence, whilst also drawing 
attention to the possibility of another mode, it could be said, of extraneous 
‘sounding silence’. That is, in approaching the nature of the same we might then 
consider the contrapuntal nature of the relation (between sound and silence) as 
a ‘breathing’, the decay of sound into a silence that exists between inhalation 
and exhalation (such moments functioning as two points within a single event), 
with such concern invoking a condition of listening focused upon a “sounded 
vacancy”14  that is of the inward (a listening to ourselves) rather than the extra-
neously ambient. Though each concern themselves still, it should be said, with 
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13 A notion that we might link to the Kantian notion of the experience of the artifact in relation to 
the sublime as the experience of the experience. 
14 C. Lunberry, Remembrance of Things Present: Steven Foster!s Repetition Series Photo-
graphs, Morton Feldman!s Triadic Memories, Online Paper, University of North Florida. p. 19. 
2004 (accessed July 2008). The essay was delivered as a lecture on April 7, 2004, at the Mi-
chael Lord Gallery in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in conjunction with Steven Foster"s exhibition of 
photographs from his series Repetition, and Louis Goldstein"s performance of Morton Feld-
man"s Triadic Memories (1981), which was to take place the following evening on the campus of 
the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. 
the exteriority of sound (and remain concurrent within the process of 
listening).15
 
Worked through the condition of the il y a, moreover, we might posit the notion 
of the !universal absence",16  indeed universal silence, as yet !an absolutely un-
avoidable presence. It is not the dialectical counterpart of absence, and we do 
not grasp it through a thought. It is immediately there... Nothing responds to us 
but this silence".17  In its essence, of course, such silence, such sounding si-
lence, is pure Being (though we might contend that it is also in fact a non/
manifestation or non/referral to pure difference).18  Its realisation, however, is of 
our own making (framed as aesthetic construct), inasmuch as we conceivably 
create its sounding within the space of insomnia (in order to attempt to ‘fix’ the 
sensing of an otherwise - whilst accepting that it can never in fact be given to 
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15 The difference in mind being something like the distinction between the notion of extraneous 
silence in John Cage’s work (3’ 44”, or Waiting for example), which refers to the sounding si-
lence of ambient noise, and the extraneous silence in Morton Feldman’s work (Triadic Memories 
for example), which refers to a ‘breathing’ silence that, in its emphasis upon the meaningfulness 
of the relation between somethingness and nothingness, foregrounds the very condition of lis-
tening (or effectively perhaps the condition of listening to ourselves listening in order that we 
might hear that which is not there). 
16 E. Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. A. Lingis, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 
1978. p. 52. 
17 Ibid.
18 Of course, in Levinas the il y a is a term of reference for the anonymous, insistent ‘sensation’ 
of Being, and not for a condition of alterity - and cannot in that sense therefore be grounded in 
relation to any notion of ethicality (if we allow that ethicality is grounded in relation to an ac-
knowledgement of difference). The view here, however, to reiterate the point, is that the il y a 
may yet constitute a vehicle of or for an alterity, or an exteriority, or even a witnessing of the 
same, whilst simultaneously existing as pure Being. Such a perspective linking to the concep-
tion of the folding through of sound by silence. 
conceptuality).19  Its noisy emanations the consequence of listening to, or for, 
our listening selves.20
 
So that in allowing for an interior sounding (operative in terms of imagination 
and memory - which also embrace an ambient exteriority  - as well as physio-
logical occurrence) we hear within the condition of absence all that might soni-
cally bleed into such a vacuum, and ourselves encountering the same. And in 
effect, we may thereby create the sounding of an exteriority  which not only 
gives presence to the il y a, or there is, but in the assertion of the same allows 
(without our having knowledge that it does so) for an intimation through inflec-
tion of the absolutely un-apprehensible. 
And transposed to the condition of text, we might then contend that text, includ-
ing this text, is emergent in relation to silence, or, that is, emergent in relation to 
the silence of white space (indeed, the space of the il y a). Such space consti-
tuting an ocean of ‘sounding silence’ that works its way into, around and 
through the structure of sentences, of words, of letters. Or in effect, posits the 
text as a moment, or rather moments, in the continuity of the white page. The 
space between words, between sentences or paragraphs, constituting a 
39
19 The thinking here overlaps with the Levinasean conceptions of Otherwise than Being and 
perhaps more especially the Kantian theory of The Critique of Judgement, both of which ac-
knowledge that the attempts to apprehend difference, in terms of Otherness or the Sublime, can 
only meet with failure. And yet such attempts are, for all that, conditions of attestation to an ex-
teriority. So that in the process of assigning a signifier for absence, or a signifier for the absence 
of a signifier, we are arguably led to the sensation of difference through a reflective adduction of 
the impossibility of knowing such difference. The recurring moment of the instant being, moreo-
ver, the agency through which the viability of such a process is sustained.  
20 We might also make the argument that insomnia, as a condition of ‘altered state’, is the aes-
thetic agent that facilitates the notion of a sounding il y a as itself aesthetic construct. And in that 
sense, we could perhaps conceive of insomnia as equivalent to the ‘White Paintings’ of 
Rauschenberg, as a specific agency for revelation.
charged space, as a precondition for the emergence of meaning, and into which 
meaning, or meanings, bleed constantly, since meaning is derived through the 
play between words, without however achieving definitive status. Such 
‘espacement"21 is replete with soundings that are the result of !diacritical realiti-
es",22  or !a certain inexhaustibility [of meaning] that cannot be classed in the 
categories of richness, intentionality, or a horizon".23  The process of dissemina-
tion operative within such a context constituting an attempt to reveal a contin-
gency of meaning and, in addition, the sounding of misapprehension or 
‘dumbfoundedness’.24  Dissemination representing not only a referral to the dis-
tribution of unlimited meaning, but also to the loss or dissipation of meaning. So 
that we might say that ![d]issemination opens out the play of surplus and lack 
within signification with no prospect of stabilizing or closing it".25  Indeed, the 
term must itself remain equivocal in order that such a perspective be main-
tained. The application of meaning to dissemination being a restriction of the 
very same process. 
So that white space then, the space of sounding silence, exists as a point of 
dissemination, as a point of resistance to the condition of meaningful intent 
40
21 J. Derrida, Différance in Margins of Philosophy, trans. A. Blass, Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 1985. pp. 3-27. ‘Espacement’ being a term employed by Derrida, though borrowed 
from the description given by Stéphane Mallarmé of the typographic structuring within his own 
poetry.
22 J. Derrida, Dissemination, trans. B. Johnson, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1983. p. 
250.
23 Ibid.
24 ‘Dissemination’ being the Derridean term for the inclination within a text to resist the une-
quivocal meaning, and to furnish rather, a continuous potentiality of interpretation. !Dumbfound-
edness" being the term employed by Lyotard to denote the moment of initial encounter with the 
aesthetic (J-F. Lyotard, Presence in The Language of Art History, ed. S. Kemall and I. Gaskell, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. pp. 26-27).
25 L. Kramer, Classical Music and Postmodern Knowledge, California: University of California 
Press, 1995. p. 12.
within the text. A sounding silence that is contiguous with the sonic stridency of 
the text. A sounding silence that seeks to undermine the designatory assertions 
of the text at every opportunity, and generatively  projects the condition of the 
new at every instant. Within any text, within any word, in fact, alternative mean-
ings surface continuously (and are extant in the ‘between’ of the white space), 
whether consciously or subconsciously, whether desired or undesired, whether 
the product of textual contingency or associative reading. Every  text, we might 
say therefore, differing from itself and thereby precluding an authorising inter-
pretation, so that it could be allowed ![t]he text constantly goes beyond... [any] 
representation by the entire system of its resources and its own rules". 26
Here then, we might understand that a distinction is to be drawn between condi-
tions of dissemination and polysemy.27  Dissemination concerning itself with the 
play of meanings as infinite openness, polysemy with the status of the same as 
circumscribed horizons and conditions of closure. The difference between the 
two (textual dissemination and discursive polysemy) being !precisely difference 
itself, an implacable difference."28  Wherein the process of dissemination cannot 
be embraced by the polysemous. Or rather, the condition of dissemination can-
not be made to give way to a totalising, definitive perspective. Instead,
the text is no longer the expression or representation (felicitous or otherwise) of 
any truth that would come to diffract or assemble itself in the polysemy of litera-
41
26 J. Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. G. C. Spivak, Baltimore and London: John Hopkins Uni-
versity Press, 1976. p.101.  
27 The conception that of course underpins so much of Derrida’s thinking about the condition of 
the text.
28 J. Derrida, Dissemination, p. 351.
ture. [And i]t is this hermeneutic concept of polysemy that must be replaced by 
dissemination. 29
The ‘presence’ then, of a sounding silence, or white space, constitutes a !non-
theme of the spacing that relates the different meanings to each other."30 ‘Mean-
ings’ being shaped here via processes, for example, of the associative, the allu-
sive and the grammatical (elisions, liaisons, games etc.). Whilst the white space 
(in a further split with the condition of thematisation) also harbours the sense of 
!phonemic differentials"31  and the !formal, phonic, or graphic ‘affinities’ that do 
not have the shape of a word."32 So that in effect, in addition to the potential for 
multiple and/or equivocal meanings that pulse in the space of silence within the 
text (in opposition to a ‘sanctioned’ interpretation, which might effectively be al- 
lowed a ‘solidification’ of meaning whilst also existing in an interpretive context 
as the second part of a musically inclined receipt), a material condition of the 
text is also constantly  facilitating a slipping of definition’s leash, or a promulga-
tion of the ‘unbidden’ within the condition of apprehension, through its approach 
to the ear or eye of a reader (though we should note that any  eruption of differ-
ence here is also dependent upon the !fixed’ or ‘organising’ status of an inter-
preting text as the object or space against which difference might come into be-
ing - in the same way that the sounding silence of music is rendered through its 
proximity to a ‘sanctioned’, and ‘sanctioning’, entity, be it a musical score, 
sounded notes, a concert hall etc.).
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29 Ibid. p. 262.
30 Ibid. p. 252.
31 G. Stewart, Reading Voices: Literature and the Phonotext, California: University of California 
Press, 1990. p.7. A term used by Stewart to describe the play of text in silent reading. 
32 J. Derrida, Dissemination, p. 255.
The white space of the text, we might say, is therefore a space of nothing (or 
nothing as ‘something’). It signifies a !null-site"33 within which silence sounds. It 
could, however, also be considered as the ‘presenting’ of the il y a as the essen-
tial condition of Being and the bearing witness to the otherwise of Being. The 
(instant) positing of Self within the same (the move to writing?), as an uptake of 
Being, as the event of hypostasis, establishing a vibrating rhythm within exis-
tence as an apprehending movement between a sounding silence and the inti-
mation of an absolute silence (which may itself be aligned with a condition of 
absolute exteriority or that which is otherwise than Being). 
In effect, we might say that the condition of such space within the text, is then 
the condition of Saying that must affect the Said of any text.34  Saying existing 
as a moment of ethically inclined interruption to the imperialist proclivities of the 
text as a condition of the Said. And yet, the relation of the two is inexorably, and 
necessarily, interwoven. The ethical nature of such a condition being played out 
in the musical overlay of the same (wherein we might infer an alignment of Say-
ing’s openness with ‘sounding silence’, and Said’s closure with ‘prescribed 
sound’ or indeed ‘ prescribed music’). That is, in foregrounding a notion of the 
text, and the theoretical text most specifically, as a point of both musical recep-
tion and musical production, we might determine a continuous repetition of the 
Said’s ‘unsaying’. But how more precisely to understand this?
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33 E. Levinas, Otherwise than Being: Or Beyond Essence, trans. A. Lingis, Pittsburgh: Du-
quesne University Press, 1998. p. 8. !Null-site" constituting an !extraction" or withdrawal from 
essence that is yet an immersion in the same in order to effect such a remove. It could perhaps 
in effect be deemed a !site of non-site".  
34 E. Levinas, Otherwise than Being: Or Beyond Essence, pp. 5-9. The Saying and Said existing 
as the ethical moment in language before meaning has ‘settled’ (Saying) and the authorising 
moment in language when determination has been applied (Said).
In fact, the condition of language is such that its movement towards definition of 
an ethical status must overwhelm and assimilate in the same process the very 
essence it seeks to treat ethically. Whilst the consequence of its perpetually 
‘amphibological"35 mode of existence, wherein it is always !already scepticism",36 
means that it must also function consistently as a mechanism for the undoing of 
its own designatory propensities. The analogy consistently used, of course, is 
that of the thread with a series of knots along its length, where such knots might 
be seen as Saying’s continuous interruption of the continuity of the Said’s onto-
logical thread.37
Configured then in terms of a musical orientation, it might be presumed that 
rhythm is to be constituted here in relation to a movement between the assimila-
tory and non-assimilatory. That may, however, be to assign too precisely a con-
dition of polarity. Rather, we should perhaps regard the condition of the text, 
hinged upon the process of ‘reading’, as both a point of receipt (musical recep-
tion consisting of dumbfounded apprehension followed by rationalisation) and a 
process of production (identified as performance, and the subsequent availabil-
ity of the text for another’s interpretation). The notion of rhythm constituting a 
repeated movement into the Being of sounding silence or white space, wherein 
the initial concern lays with an experiencing of, and bearing witness to, the first 
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35 !Amphibology" being a figure of speech which could be construed in two distinct senses. And 
as Robert Eaglestone indicates, !Amphibology, the name for a figure of speech, is used [in Levi-
nas, and particularly the Levinas of Otherwise than Being] as a metaphor to describe the condi-
tion of all language... Levinas advances by using linguistic terms as metaphors for language." 
(R,Eaglestone, Ethical Criticism; Reading After Levinas, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1997. p. 140).
36 E. Levinas, Otherwise than Being: Or Beyond Essence, p. 170.
37 The metaphor used by Levinas consistently in Otherwise than Being: Or Beyond Essence, p. 
25, p. 105, pp. 165-171.
moment (in reading) of incomprehension. The second part of each moment then 
becoming a sifting and determining that congeals into the designatory.38  And as 
designation it becomes available for another’s reading (or, indeed, perform-
ance). 
Of course, in framing the condition of the aesthetic we might then consider its 
viability as a method of evocation. Given that art has on occasion been framed 
as that which cannot Say, as that which speaks only  of its essential condition 
(with such a notion being applied most especially  perhaps in terms of music).39 
The condition of art embracing essence as a ‘verb’ and ‘noun’ function (simply 
perhaps, the assertion of the ‘what it is’ and ‘what it does’ condition of essence), 
which ostensibly  precludes the possibility  of Saying, of an opening to difference, 
and identifies it, rather, with the status of the Said.40  Art effectively being under-
stood here as the thing in itself and nothing more, with a particular example be-
ing the condition of the resounding cello which, whilst some might purport to find 
it as a soul !complaining or exulting in the depth of sounds",41  could be more 
properly understood as simply !the essence of the cello, a modality of essence, 
[which] is temporalised in the work." 42
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38 We might even posit the ‘maturation’ of an instant as such a movement from incomprehen-
sion to rationalisation.
39 The consideration here being read of course through a Levinasean perspective.
40 The ‘noun’-function and ‘verb’-function of the Said and art in Levinas, are examined by Robert 
Eaglestone in Ethical Criticism: Reading After Levinas, in which he proposes that a contradiction 
exists in the Levinasean approach to the aesthetic, and that rather than presenting a simple 
resounding of the Said, the aesthetic is composed of an interactive Saying and Said - pro-
pounded through Levinas’s understanding of language in general, the use of and appeal to lit-
erature in Otherwise than Being: Or Beyond Essence, and the same text’s own potential ‘liter-
ary’ status. And whilst endorsing Eaglestone’s view, the suggestion here is that a condition of 
Saying may yet be realisable within the aesthetic through an acceptance, albeit perversely, of its 
own status within the Said.
41 E. Levinas, Otherwise than Being: Or Beyond Essence, p. 41. With reference to Iannis Xe-
nakis’s work Nomos Alpha for Unaccompanied Cello.
42 Ibid.
Such a perspective denying to the aesthetic the possibility of a transcendent 
propensity, whilst allowing a revelatory turn to the same in relation to Being 
(though such, in its ontological status, cannot be opened to the otherwise of its 
own condition).43  And yet that may be to misrepresent the ethical potential that 
underwrites the characteristic of ‘bearing witness’ within the aesthetic. And it 
may be to miss the ethical nature that, despite itself, informs, as silence within 
sound, the designatory. So that in suggesting that Saying must !spread out and 
assemble itself into essence, posit itself, be hypostatized, become an eon in 
consciousness and knowledge, let itself be seen, undergo the ascendency of 
being",44  we might look to Saying as an aesthetic act of bearing witness, as a 
passive acceptance or indeed endurance, of responsibility to make known our 
own state of incomprehension and to convey (to bear) such non-apprehension 
to another. Of course, we must then bear witness to the impossibility of Saying’s 
enduring exteriority, since it can only  be borne through the designatory (and we 
must also then bear witness to our own inevitable propensity for failure). 
That means, for example, that the theoretical here prompts a process of listen-
ing, as ‘musically oriented’ incomprehension become creative fabrication (as 
acknowledgement of dumbfoundedness), become determination, become as-
sertion. A movement from opening to closure (the maturation of the instant). A 
listening as a condition of receipt that in turn becomes a compositional process 
that facilitates opening (and the repetition of the process) within another. With 
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43 The notion of art as an essence, of course, referring to its condition of being, is a shift from 
Levinas’s earlier position which presented art as ‘monstrous’, and unable to reveal any condition 
of Being whatsoever. 
44 E. Levinas, Otherwise than Being: Or Beyond Essence, pp. 43-44.
art, as an act of reception, embracing or occupying thereby both the pulsating 
white space of sounding silence and the text’s solidification of the same into a 
rationalised position, which then becomes itself a designatory concern or ‘score’ 
available to another’s reading. The reflexive determinacy  informing such be-
coming operative, moreover, as an acknowledgement of the ‘otherwise voicing’ 
which could both surface or be lost, and our own inadequacy in representing 
the same.   
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A reader might seek the violence of thematisation. It is  only through the asser-
tion of the same that a reader!s reader may approach an inflected difference of 
signification.
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Fifth Seal (extract)
Saint Martin"s Church, Ealing, West London, March 2009.
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Rhythm and the Instant.
A Prayer.
In its rhythmic proclivity, the instant structures a unique moment, it might be 
said, that comes into existence and passes without specific recourse to a past 
or future. Existing within a state of !waiting and forgetting"1 - a primordial waiting 
that is not a waiting for something, and a primordial forgetting, of Self, that might 
be deemed a renunciation of ipseity.2  But should a notion of the unique event, 
as the instant"s condition of the continuously !present presenting", really be al-
lowed a rhythmic condition when rhythm is perhaps more widely understood as 
the repetition, or even perhaps underlining, of substance (sounds, events, ob-
jects etc.), both within and across the flow of time? Or might we understand the 
notion of the same somewhat differently? And how precisely is it to then be de-
termined within a metaphysical context?
In fact, rhythm has a largely pejorative application within !Reality and its 
Shadow", that determines its occurrence in relation to the art object as an im-
posing presence that absorbs subject interest and distracts from the !proper" 
sense of engaged responsibility for difference. And whilst the notion of rhythm is 
therein determined as a pointedly aesthetic condition, its extended application 
renders a negative !aestheticised" potential to the prosecution of Being within 
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1 E. Levinas, The Servant and her Master in The Levinas Reader, ed. S. Hand, Oxford: Black-
well Publishing Ltd, 1989. p. 151.
2 The word !ipseity" comes from the Latin !ipse", meaning !self". In Levinas, the self's enjoyment 
of itself, as a condition of elemental pleasure, is a pleasure at being in the world.
the metaphysical. So that as the essential condition of existence, in fact, rhythm 
could be said to generally determine a loss of initiative and selfhood:
Rhythm represents a unique situation where we cannot speak of consent, as-
sumption initiative or freedom, because the subject is caught up and carried 
away by it. The subject is part of its own representation. It is so not even despite 
itself for in rhythm there is no longer a oneself, but rather a sort of passage from 
oneself to anonymity. 3
Such rhythmic absorption then, precipitating a condition that is characteristic of 
the aesthetic state of mind, wherein !consent... is inverted into a participation"4 
or a !reversal of power into participation".5
!Participation" signalling here a relinquishment of authorial responsibility  and an 
abandonment more widely of self-interestedness. With such a condition repre-
senting a passive deferral, it could be argued, to difference. Though as sug-
gested, such difference is determined as a departure from the ethically inclined 
notion of alterity that encompasses the trace of the absolute, and indicates 
rather an openness to the condition of the mythic and subjugation of !oneself to 
a force".6  For whilst the condition of difference as exteriority may appear redo-
lent of the exteriority occurring in the encounter with another, it is here (as an 
!aestheticised" condition) presumed a different mode of exteriority, and perhaps 
a false mode of transcendence (and ethicality). So that !participation", in an 
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3 E. Levinas, Reality and its Shadow in The Levinas Reader, pp. 132-133.  
4 Ibid. p. 132. !Participation" being a term derived from the ethnologist Lucien Levy-Bruhl, who 
linked the expression to !primitive" mentality"s mystical belief in supernatural forces, with such 
belief in its affective relation to collective representation having a transitive influence whereby a 
mode of thought is structured that is indifferent to any law of contradiction.  
5 Ibid. p. 133.
6 E. Levinas, Levy-Bruhl and Contemporary Philosophy in Entre Nous: Thinking of the Other, 
trans. M.B. Smith and B. Harshav, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. p. 47.
alignment with the apprehension of the il y a, might best be understood within 
such a context as !the destruction of categories which had hitherto been used to 
describe the feelings evoked by !the sacred"".7  
Such a notion of participation then, is moreover a divestment of substantivity, 
the mergence with difference representing an assimilatory propensity that in its 
union with the !wrong" difference (in relation to a reading of the il y a) precludes 
the notion of God, or any sense of the !beyond", and consigns the depersonal-
ised subject to existence without exit.8 
Yet the thought occurs that complete separation, as an ethical movement 
wherein a subject !maintains itself in existence all by itself, without participating 
in the Being from which it is separated",9 is an impossibility. Indeed the expres-
sion !a break from participation"10 as a condition of ethical realisation, is an in-
advertent acknowledgement that separation is not sustainable (inasmuch as 
!break" implies a return) and, we might argue, is only ethically sustainable as a 
consequence of the rhythmic movement between merger and separation (mak-
ing merger, perhaps perversely, a necessary prerequisite for ethicality). In rela-
tion to which, it is also perhaps worth noting that there may be an equally un-
ethical tendency that could attach to the condition of separation in its potential 
for the assertion of an !egological I... [which integrates] all beings as subordi-
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7 E. Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. A. Lingis, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 
1978. p. 55.
8 Ibid. p. 56.
9 E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. A. Lingis, Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1969. p. 58.
10 Ibid.
nate moments of the same"11 (leading to the possibility that ethics, in fact, could 
be more properly  countenanced as !a break from the break from participa-
tion"12).
So that we are left to wonder about the real locus of ethics within such a con-
text. Or at least the extent to which merger or assimilation might constitute a 
necessary, and indeed rhythmic, violence. But how then to understand a condi-
tion of !necessary" or !good" violence? A relation of assimilation and distance? 
Perhaps through the notion of the recurring instant as birth or rebirth, we might 
in fact pursue a sense of the same in relation to the developmental processes 
of the newborn (with the notion of retreat into the feminine !dwelling" within be-
ing, representing a retreat into the maternal).13
And with the mother/infant paradigm we might, in fact, allow an overarching 
schema for the notion of ethical responsiveness to difference. And in the play 
between maternal !attunement"14  and infantile sensations of omnipotence, we 
might determine a condition of ethicality that allows for both separation and as-
similation. That is, we might discern a potentiality wherein the sense of ethical 
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11 A. Peperzak, To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, Indiana: 
Purdue University Press, 1993. p. 49
12 J. Robbins, Altered Reading: Levinas and Literature, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1999. p. 88.
13 See page 134, footnote 1, for further analysis of the relation between !maternity", !dwelling" 
and !the feminine". 
14 !Attunement" being a key phrase as used by Daniel Stern (see D.N. Stern, The interpersonal 
World of the Infant: A View from Psychoanalysis and Developmental Psychology, London: Kar-
nac Books Ltd., 1985).
relations is a connection without compromise, a !holding"15  without encroach-
ment, a relation without fusion, where ![m]aternity which is a bearing par excel-
lence, bears even responsibility  for the persecuting by the persecutor". 16  The 
relation of separation/attachment facilitating a subjective independence that 
promotes the endurance of existence. 
And in making such a postulation, moreover, we might frame a metaphysical 
context that facilitates subjective movement between conditions of motherhood 
and infancy without the same being in any sense merged, so that a given sub-
ject continuously swaps position with difference, becoming by turns him/herself, 
it could be said, newborn and mother (with such being played out in the textual 
!turn" from the facing of source to the facing of reader - the !retreat" into dwelling 
within being conceivably suggesting subjective birth within the context of an 
original text, whilst maternal accommodation is signalled via the comportment 
towards the reader).17  But how to understand the notion of ethicality informing 
the same?
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15 !Holding" being the expressive phrase used by D.W. Winnicott to describe the caring relation 
between subjects that is developed from infancy (see D.W. Winnicott, Holding and Interpreta-
tion: Fragment of an Analysis, New York: Grove Press, 1986).
16 E. Levinas, Otherwise than Being: Or Beyond Essence, trans. A. Lingis, Pittsburgh: Du-
quesne University Press, 1998. p. 75. It should be noted, of course, that the reading of the ma-
ternal, and indeed the feminine, within Levinas, could perhaps be most appropriately framed as 
trope rather than essentialist positioning, or even essentialist positioning as trope. See footnote 
1, page 134, however, for a fuller consideration of such issues.
17 And it should perhaps be emphasised that the concerns here are perspectival. That is, the 
ethicality that might be attached to either the position of the infant or the position of the mother 
(though never at the same time) is in fact afforded via an exterior view - the reading of ethicality 
in one position automatically rendering a converse reading to the other. So we could say that, 
by extension, rhythm as movement between such positions is therefore in this instance an ex-
ternally imposed condition.
In fact, with the whole situation being set in train via the advent of the recurring 
instant - repeatedly introducing the subject as infant-becoming-mother-
becoming-infant etc. (a cyclical rebirth in the instant) - it could be contended that 
both !positions" (of infant and mother) are themselves informed by a sense of 
ethicality  (as well as non-ethicality), depending of course upon the way in which 
they might be read. Such ethicality  being readily apparent in terms of the ma-
ternal receptivity  towards the child, of course, which proceeds via a notion of 
attunement - so that the infant is, at least for a time, unaware of its own particu-
lar dependence, and feels itself rather the author of a reality that corresponds to 
its own needs. The same arguably  being necessary for the developmental well 
being of the child:
The communication to the baby is “Come at the world creatively, create the 
world; it is only what you create that has meaning for you.” Next comes: “the 
world is in your control.” From the initial experience of omnipotence the baby is 
able to begin to experience frustration, and even to arrive one day at the other 
extreme from omnipotence, having a sense of being a mere speck in the uni-
verse... Is it not from being God that human beings arrive at the humility proper 
to human individuality? 18
So that the maternal attitude towards the child is then, in an ethical context, 
necessarily one of facilitation, and takes place without any sense of, or desire 
for, reciprocity  (other than in the witnessing of the developmental well-being of 
the infant). 
In terms of the child, however, the ethical moment, if it can be so allowed, oc-
curs somewhat differently. Here, the relation moves from a condition of disre-
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18 D.W. Winnicott, Communication between Infant and Mother, and Mother and Infant, Com-
pared and Contrasted in Babies and Their Mothers, ed. C. Winnicott, R. Shepherd and M. 
Davis, London: Free Association Books, 1987. pp. 100-101.
gard (on the part of the infant) to one of wilful violence (albeit a condition of 
imaginary violence), wherein the ability  of the object (mother) to survive such 
destructive intent provides a condition of reassurance for the child as well as a 
definite sense of exteriority (which could be allowed an ethical proclivity  in its 
preclusion of the assimilatory). So that we could frame the developmental proc-
ess of the infant as being a movement from a synthesizing and narcissistic pro-
pensity determining the world as an extension of the self, to an ethical (albeit 
violently achieved) sense of separateness, that posits an !other-than-me" status 
of the world and objects within the world (the precise condition of ethicality at-
taching to the same being an acknowledgement through distance of another"s 
real and independent existence). A subject, it could be argued, says to the ob-
ject
“I destroyed you”, and the object is there to receive the communication. From 
now on the subject says: “Hullo object!” “I destroyed you.” “I love you.” “You 
have value for me because of your survival of my destruction of you.” “While I 
am loving you I am all the time destroying you in (unconscious) fantasy.” Here 
fantasy begins for the individual. 19
 
And in emphasising the condition of fantasy in relation to the notion of violence 
(in the facilitation of ethicality), moreover, and noting the perhaps somewhat 
surprising paradox that allows imagination to exist as facilitator of the real, it is 
also worth stressing the position of creativity  here as bridge between self and 
other, between interiority and exteriority. The creative impulse (embracing no-
tions of aestheticism embodied within symbolisation and play) driving subjective 
!constructive-destructive" engagement with the world in such a way that it be-
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19  D.W. Winnicott, The Use of an Object and Relating through Identifications in Playing and Re-
ality, London: Brunner-Routledge, 1991. p. 90 
comes a joy-based encounter, with !the core sense of creativeness that perme-
ates transitional experiencing... [being] reborn on a new level in object usage".20 
So that it could be claimed that an aesthetic condition, far from being a condi-
tion of false potentiality, is actually a primary  underpinning of the formation of 
ethical relations (and that such relations are then grounded within a much less 
passive mode of existence than the notion of !relation without relations" would 
ever appear to countenance).
 
In signalling a notion of subject relations with the world, moreover, it could be 
allowed that a different focus shifts the perspective from the encounter with an 
object to that with the wider environment, which, in its same ability to resist de-
structive intent, structures a boundary and space within which destructiveness 
might in fact be tempered and symbolised. Reality  becoming that which may 
frustrate but also reassures through its innate capacity for endurance:
[I]n fantasy things work by magic: there are no brakes on fantasy, and love and 
hate cause alarming effects. External reality has brakes on it, and can be stud-
ied and known, and, in fact, fantasy is only tolerable at full blast when objective 
reality is appreciated well. The subjective has tremendous value but is so alarm-
ing and magical that it cannot be enjoyed except as a parallel to the objective. 21
And if the same is framed in terms of the parent/child relationship  it could con-
ceivably be argued that the condition of the maternal therein occupies a dou-
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20 M. Eigen, The Area of Faith in Winnicott, Lacan and Bion in International. Journal of 
Psycho-Analysis 62, Psychoanalytic Electronic Publishing, 1981. p. 415. Object-use 
could be framed as the development, by Winnicott, of his own notion of the !transitional object", 
which posits an entity as !bridge" between self and other, between self and world, functioning as 
neither me nor not me, or yet both and neither (the child"s toy - a teddy bear or blanket for ex-
ample - is often apprehended as the child"s first transitional object).
21 D.W. Winnicott, Primitive Emotional Development in Through Paediatrics to Psychoanalysis, 
London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1975. p. 153.
bled position inasmuch as it may in fact facilitate processes of both appropria-
tion and retreat. Or perhaps the same could be described as !object mother" 
and !environment mother". As an object, the mother is acquiescent in terms of 
the !violence" visited by the infant, but as environment she imposes a limit upon 
the propensity for such violence.22
So we have then two positions, mother and infant, that in themselves move be-
tween modes of responsiveness to difference, as well as being positions that 
are continuously and alternately  taken up by subject and other (in relation to an 
extraneous perspective).23 A  subject being effectively !reborn" in the instant and 
maturing into a condition of motherhood that gives birth to the next instant, with 
conditions of attunement and participation eliciting particular (and perspectival) 
moments of ethicality. But how then to understand the notion of rhythm within 
such a context? And its specific application in terms of the theoretical?
Rhythm occurs here, in fact, as a moment that is constituted through the in-
stant"s recurrent uptake of Being (as well as the movement between positions of 
assimilation/non-assimilation that uptake facilitates). Such !positing" of self 
structuring the body, moreover, as event rather than substantive, and the con-
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22 Winnicott refers to such in speaking of the development of the capacity for concern (in The 
Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment, New York: International Universities 
Press, 1965), having also previously spoken of something similar (the !mother of quiet times" 
and the !mother of excited times") in an earlier work (Through Paediatrics to Psycho-Analysis). 
23 In another work from 1967, Winnicott in fact posited a triangular relation between child, object 
and environment as itself equivalent to the triadic relation between child, mother and father. 
Such a relationship framing a model of the family unit that locates mother as soft holding envi-
ronment and father as resilient framing environment (see postscript, D.W.Winnicott, Psychoana-
lytic Explorations, eds. C. Winnicott, R. Shepherd & M. Davis, London: Karnac Books, 1971). 
The intention here however, is to pursue the dyadic whilst allowing that there is movement both 
within terms of the child"s position and within terms of the mother"s, which may in turn preclude 
the possibility of fixed polarities. 
tinuous transformation of event into an existent. So that !”position” is not to be 
heard simply  as a noun, but as a verb  in the process of nominalization".24  Such 
an event, however, which is the instant as the present !presenting", and within 
which is constituted the assumption by an entity of its own condition of being, is 
yet nevertheless a state of compulsion. The condition of positing being a re-
sponse to a summons - albeit a summons to which a subject has no idea that 
he/she is actually responding (the thought being here that the !call" more usually 
associated with the !commanding" presence of difference which demands that 
an !I" account for itself, and which is part of the intrinsic relationality which leads 
to language, could be considered as already extant, in fact, prior to the specific 
encounter with alterity  within the world, emerging as an antecedent to subjective 
realisation but also as itself the point of insistence for the same, whilst remain-
ing beyond the comprehension of unwittingly  responsive subjectivity). So that 
the condition of uptake, the condition of positing, we could say, might be read as 
a movement that bears already a !seeded" subjective responsibility  for differ-
ence. 
In framing the same as a condition of the !generative", however, (which we 
would seek to so do) it is important to appreciate that such !seeding", whilst sig-
nalling an (unknowing) anticipation of alterity, does not dictate the exact nature 
of subject comportment in relation to difference (or not in the way that the spe-
cific encounter with another is presumed to instigate a condition of passive, and 
ultimately  enthralled, receptivity), which of its own accord pursues an improvisa-
tory mode of being within the world that is yet a comportment !towards". So that 
such comportment therefore retains a potentially violent, albeit instinctive, !pre-
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24 R. Bernasconi, Foreword in E. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. xii.
sumption" (and albeit that the same may itself actually  represent a !good vio-
lence" in any case), and passive or indifferent unknowingness (albeit that un-
knowingness within such a context cannot exist in absolute terms since com-
portment here, as preparedness, implies instinctual pre-knowledge).
And to understand the same more fully, or perhaps the ethical implications of 
the same more pointedly, it is then worth recapitulating something of the event 
constituted by !position" (or, indeed, the Hypostasis). Position representing the 
moment of !hereness", the moment that !precedes every act of understanding, 
every horizon and all time".25  It is, moreover, the expression of consciousness 
as origin, and the facilitation of body as event. The spirituality of the body laying 
not with its ability to give expression to the inward but rather, through being pos-
ited, its realisation of the condition necessary for inwardness. So that ![i]t does 
not express an event; it is itself this event".26  But the eruption of coenesthesis, 
the sense of self as body  which elicits in the uprising of the generative instant a 
contiguity  with the world (corresponding to the infant"s initial self-perception), is 
also, it could be said, simultaneously  countered by the invasive condition of !in-
stantaneous maturity",27  itself obliging an inverted apprehension of an !other-
wise". 
That is, whilst the process of !maturation" constitutes a return of the present to 
itself, wherein the !I" recognises that it is !riveted to itself",28  and is encumbered 
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25 E. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 68.
26 Ibid. p. 70.
27 Ibid. p. 78.
28 Ibid. p. 79.
always and only with itself (with such awareness, of course, underscoring the 
!horror" of the il y a - inasmuch as the self is compelled to acknowledge its own 
condition of containment or stricture within being) it also could be said to facili-
tate a comprehension of exteriority (akin to the infantile recognition of differ-
ence), since isolation must imply a preclusion from !something else". Such an 
apprehension, which we might then contend is the essence of maturational de-
velopment in the instant, constitutes therefore both withdrawal from, and (indi-
rect or inflected) acknowledgement of, difference (and is an approach to differ-
ence that constitutes an ethical modality  in its positing of instinctive awareness 
without knowledge or assumption). The notion of the generative instant thereby 
determining a recurrent !un/knowledge" that is continuously  both apprehension 
and non-apprehension. Both of which, moreover, could be construed (depend-
ing upon the perspective from which they are viewed) as ethical and/or unethi-
cal.
And framed in terms of the theoretical text we might, in respect of such thinking, 
locate the condition, or conditions, of difference at two particular points in rela-
tion to our own position as interpreting subject - original or source text and 
reader (of our interpretation of such source text). In relation to which the theo-
retical is generatively !compelled" into existence on the one hand, and antici-
pates (without absolute knowledge) the condition of receptive difference (repre-
sented by a reader/interpreter) on the other. The notion, moreover, of a genera-
tive rhythm obliges a recurring movement between such positions, with the 
condition of reading (or, that is, our own reading as both passive receipt and 
designatory interpretation) functioning as hinge between the two.
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In allowing for each position, additionally, we might perhaps trace a notion of the 
realisation of !good violence" in the turn from original/source text to reader. That 
is, the reader (of our interpretation) becomes the means by which the original 
text, violently assimilated through our reading, is !rehabilitated" (or allowed to 
endure or become otherwise again) through a new reading"s propensity  for in-
terpretation in its turn (an insistent trace of difference being facilitated through 
the inflected formulation of its approach).
 
So that, perhaps somewhat paradoxically, the presentation of interpretation to 
the reader must then, in order to exist ethically, pursue a comportment of !impe-
rialist assertion" in language that emphasises its thematising proclivity. Such is 
the case because in so doing an inversion takes place wherein the appropriat-
ing condition of language is interrupted through alterity"s ability to !overflow" any 
condition of the designatory, and the other therefore remains other still in rela-
tion to the definitions of otherness that we might seek to apply. Here then, a fa-
cilitation of difference through non-facilitation, wherein the notion of !being to-
wards" indicates a duplicity  of meaning, an inversion of difference, where the 
!other" side can never be understood as !this" side, but remains always as the 
side that !may be".29 Language, in its designatory propensity, becoming the pre-
cise vehicle for alterity  since it proffers a means of inflection that marks !non-
indifference against the differential procedures of signification".30  The !iterability" 
of language and the text, the condition of essential recurrence informing the 
mark, functioning here moreover as a rhythmic intensification of the ethically in-
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29 K. Ziarek, Inflected Language: Towards a Hermeneutics of Nearness, Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1994. p. 76.
30 Ibid. p. 77.
clined grasping/ungrasping proclivities that attend the same, and thereby lend-
ing emphasis, we might argue, to the notion that !the singularity  of the event is 
always inscribed within a space of repetition". 31
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31 S. Glendinning, interview conducted at London School of Economics, November 2008.
The il y a may be considered both the container of thought and the product of 
thought.
64
Poor Me
Artist"s home, North London, December 2007.
3 minutes 18 seconds.
Disc 1 track 6. Please press play.
65
Is Rhythm Fundamental?
A Prayer.
                                                                                           
Two potential readings of metaphysics are indicated within !Totality  and Infinity". 
The opening lines offer an unattributed citation and a condemning, if somewhat 
enigmatic, framing of the metaphysical tradition, !“The true life is absent.” But 
we are in the world. Metaphysics arises and is maintained in this alibi". 1
This is followed a short time later by  a more (sustained) laudatory reference to 
the same:
It is [the] perpetual postponing of the hour of treason - infinitesimal difference 
between man and non-man - that implies the disinterestedness of goodness, 
the desire of the absolutely other or nobility, the dimension of metaphysics. 2
The distinction, it could be said, being one between the historic notion of a de-
termining (and subsuming) ontotheological condition, and the sense of meta-
physics as critical essence of knowledge or theory that presupposes ethicality 
and the calling into question of the Same by the Other. But how to understand 
more precisely such a distinction?
Ontology, of course, as a branch of metaphysics (and by extension philosophy), 
to offer a simple definition, constitutes a striving for understanding and ascrip-
tion of the nature of Being. Such a process, as a process of enquiry, is neces-
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1 E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. A. Lingis, Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1969. p. 33. The unattributed citation is from Arthur Rimbaud"s A Season in 
Hell.
2 Ibid. p. 35.
sarily (and, we might even say, !violently") reductive since it inevitably seeks 
comprehension through a totalising perspective. An understanding of difference, 
that is, through an imperialist reduction to the same. Considered in relation to 
such, the overarching metaphysical enterprise could then be construed as ac-
tively oppressive in its pursuit of knowledge, whilst maintaining an air (or alibi) of 
innocence through the !elsewhereness" of its questioning. That is, it evades re-
sponsibility  for difference through an insistence upon its !otherwise" status and 
concerns - being here and/or outside the elsewhere of the !true life", but neces-
sarily preoccupied with the elsewhere"s !true life" rather than (the) here.3
Such a reading then frames metaphysics (or the ontological emphasis within 
metaphysics, more pointedly) as wilfully neglectful and irresponsible. But in al-
lowing for such a condition, it could also be argued that an ethical orientation 
may yet, in fact, be concurrent - given that an ethically inclined reluctance or 
prevarication (perhaps to be regarded as the hither side of evasive irresponsibil-
ity?) underpins, at the same time, the condition of metaphysics more generally. 
Between the philosophies of transcendence and immanence, between the !true 
life is absent" and !we are in the world", that is, there occurs a !strategic hesita-
tion" that yet points towards a different (and more meaningful) apprehension of 
metaphysical intent. Such a reading being indicated towards the end of Section 
1.A of !Totality and Infinity":
Between a philosophy of transcendence that situates elsewhere the true life to 
which man, escaping from here, would gain access in the privileged moments of 
liturgical, mystical elevation, or in dying - and a philosophy of immanence in 
which we would truly come into possession of being when every !other" (cause 
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3 J. Robbins, Altered Reading: Levinas and Literature, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1999. pp. 117-119.
for war), encompassed by the same, would vanish at the end of history - we 
propose to describe, within the unfolding of terrestrial existence... a relationship 
with the other that does not result in a divine or human totality, that is not the 
totalization of history, but the idea of infinity. Such a relationship is metaphysics 
itself. 4
Here then, we find a sense that metaphysics may be informed by an ethical in-
clination that functions in contradistinction to ontological imperialism. But still we 
might ask after the condition of such ethicality as well as the nature of the rela-
tion, and distinction, between the conditions of enquiry. 
Ontology, in fact, implies a comprehension of humanity"s factual situation, func-
tioning as !the essence of every relation with beings and even of every relation 
in being".5 Such knowledge, moreover, formulated in an understanding of differ-
ence as theme or concept, must negate another"s independence through the 
possessive mode of its agency. My thoughts of or about you neutralise your dif-
ference to the point at which you are rendered the same. The realisation of 
which establishes my !freedom", since the identification of sameness precludes 
the possibility of my alienation at your hands.
Ontology, then, !as first philosophy  is a philosophy of power".6 Such power con-
stitutes, however, a renunciation of theory"s desire for exteriority, which is a 
grounding principle, in fact, of metaphysics. The recognition of which delineates 
a critical propensity within the same that in turn places into question its own on-
tological assertions. That is, through its comprehension of being, in fact, meta-
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4 E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, p. 52.
5 E. Levinas, Is Ontology Fundamental? in Basic Philosophical Writings, ed. A. T. Peperzak, S. 
Critchley and R. Bernasconi. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1996. p. 4.
6 E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, p. 46.
physics identifies an agency of !arbitrary dogmatism"7  at work within the !free 
exercise"8 of ontology, which it then seeks to contest. Such contestation, how-
ever, as a specific condition of critique, would simply function as a regressive 
ontological movement (the reassertion of the same) were it to be allowed as 
simply exercised theory. Rather, the ethical moment of metaphysics, the calling 
into question of authorising sameness, is obliged via the proximity of an alterity 
which overwhelms assimilatory inclinations. So that:
The strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and my 
possessions, is precisely accomplished as a calling into question of my sponta-
neity, as ethics. Metaphysics, transcendence, the welcoming of the other by the 
same, of the Other by me, is concretely produced as the calling into question of 
the same by the other, that is, as the ethics that accomplishes the critical es-
sence of knowledge. 9
The notion of difference here overflowing the potential for comprehension, with 
such occurrence the consequence of an encounter wherein the comportment of 
the relation (as face-to-face meeting) must preclude the possibility of 
thematisation.10  To address or to be addressed by another, that is, constituting 
an engagement with the unforeseen, with  an infinite exteriority that remains es-
sentially, and properly, unknowable. 
In saying that, however, such a relation ought perhaps not to be framed as a 
relation in the strictest terms, since the notion of relation (as it might be read 
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7 Ibid. p. 43.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 E. Levinas, Is Ontology Fundamental? in Basic Philosophical Writings, p. 6.
most notably through the I-Other encounter) posits a bipolarity which itself ef-
fects a totality wherein elements are ultimately reversible (you are determinable 
through that which I am not, and vice versa). Whilst in making such a claim it 
could also be argued that an assertion of irreversibility in positions, implied by 
the sense of !non relation", should not then itself be framed as a definitive read-
ing (locating itself outside or beyond the !non relation"), since the move to de-
terminacy constituted by  such would conceivably reappoint an ascriptive or 
thematic condition. With the declaration of such, in turn, making us equally 
guilty, of course, of precisely the same movement... 
In fact, the call here should be for acknowledgement (or, indeed, radically pas-
sive acceptance) of an object of thinking (cogitatum) that encompasses the act 
of thinking (cogitato), thereby inverting the rationalist tendency for thought"s as-
similating comprehension of its object.11 Effectively, the non/thought of a neces-
sary !overflowing" of thought, wherein
[T]he [ethically] radical separation between the same and the other means pre-
cisely that it is impossible to place oneself outside of the correlation between 
the same and the other so as to record the correspondence or the non-
correspondence of this going with this return. Otherwise the same and the other 
would be reunited under one gaze, and the absolute distance that separates 
them filled in. 12 
 
Such separation, then, should not be pursued as an apprehensible concern by 
the same nor a third party outside the same-other !non relation" relation. And in 
this way, the other is able to absolve itself from the relation which, nevertheless, 
70
11 The consideration being drawn from Descartes" Third Meditation (see R. Descartes, Medita-
tions on First Philosophy in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume 2, trans J. Cotting-
ham, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
12 E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, p. 36.
must remain to affect the same. Intimations of the impossible distance that ex-
ists between same and other, in relation to their relation of !non relation", as it 
were, being expressed in the description of such as !desire". Desire, in opposi-
tion to the condition of !need", representing an impossibility since it can never be 
sated, but signalling therein an ethical propensity via its status as longing (for 
infinite difference) without hope or expectation of fulfillment or reciprocation (a 
precise reading of such being perhaps most appositely framed, it might be said, 
via the oxymoronic notion of !desiring indifference"). 
  
The ethical nature of desire, moreover, might be identified as the condition of 
metaphysics which marks its departure from the ontological:
The metaphysical desire... [is] beyond everything that can simply complete it. It 
is like goodness - the Desired does not fulfill it, but deepens it... It is a generos-
ity nourished by the Desired, and thus a relationship that is not the disappear-
ance of distance, not a bringing together, or... a relationship whose positivity 
comes from remoteness, from separation, for it nourishes itself, one might say, 
with its hunger. This remoteness is radical only if desire is not the possibility of 
anticipating the desirable, if it does not think it beforehand, if it goes toward it 
aimlessly, that is, as toward an absolute, unanticipatable alterity, as one goes 
forth unto death. Desire is absolute if the desiring being is mortal and the De-
sired invisible. Invisibility does not denote an absence of relation; it implies rela-
tions with what is not given, of which there is no idea. 13
That is not to suggest, however, that infinite alterity cannot constitute a !pres-
ence" for or within thought, but it cannot be thematised or measured as such, 
and there is a radical distinction to be made therefore between thought and rep-
resentation as modes of relating to a !false" alterity (or the alter ego, in fact, 
which facilitates the identification of the same with itself, it could be said, via a 
detour through otherness) and the condition of metaphysical desire as the 
71
13 Ibid. p. 34.
mode of hospitality or generosity  in relation to another which specifically lacks 
an expectation of reciprocity.
 Effectively, it could be said that desire, within such a context, constitutes the 
!otherwise" than thought that yet signals its own condition through or within 
thought as the !sense" of the infinite. But how to then countenance or negotiate 
such a condition if it cannot in fact be thought? Perhaps a particular reading of 
rhythm, as pulse or even vibration, might be propounded here. Rhythm in this 
context becoming extant as the silent undercurrent of the !melodic" flow of 
thought and being (consciousness being posited here as a determining condi-
tion of being within Being). Though it is important, in relation to such, to ac-
knowledge a reading of discontinuity (or discontinuous continuity) attaching to 
the same, in contradistinction to any notion of rhythm as durational continuity 
wherein !the power to intuit futurity  within the present"14 - and to thereby inscribe 
or reinscribe an assimilatory potential - may make itself available.
And in the advancement of such a reading, of course, a consideration of the 
operational mode of the rhythmic process of !discontinuous continuity" (particu-
larly as it functions in opposition to conceptions of !durational flow") should then 
be necessarily undertaken here, in order to establish the particular significance 
that the same will have for the metaphysical concerns that occupy us (including 
the sense of desire as a rhythmic underscoring of thought and being). So how, 
therefore, are we to understand the notions of !discontinuous continuity" and 
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14 G. Peters, The Rhythm of Alterity: Levinas and Aesthetics in Radical Philosophy 82, March/
April 1997. p. 12. Peters identifies here the point of contestation that Levinas takes with Henri 
Bergson"s notion of rhythm as durational flow, which must, for Levinas, preclude the possibility 
of novelty and, indeed, alterity, through its predictive claims upon an unforeseeable and un-
knowable future.
!durational flow"? How do they function? How, precisely, do they differ? And why 
should the former, rather than the latter, be most especially framed as ethically-
oriented in relation to the condition of Being?  
The primary  focus for such concerns, in fact, lays here with the notion of the 
!instant".15 The instant constituting a break with conceptions of melodic and (du-
rational) rhythmic orders, and facilitating a sense of (non durational) rhythm and 
musicality  that is fundamentally  linked (despite determining the movement of 
existence as it pertains specifically  to the solitary subject) to difference or other-
ness rather than the same. That is, in conceiving of a melody (and its associa-
tion with duration) as ![B]eing lived through musically... [where] there are no in-
stants in the melody",16  since each moment must be sonically penetrated by an-
other and the whole reduced to the condition of seamless temporality (effecting 
a phenomenological continuity that erases difference within the instant), an em-
phasis given to the instant as a unique point of pulsation, even respiration (a 
breathing in/out), posits the same as an independent moment of birth and expi-
ration that yet gives rise, like a !rebounding movement",17  to another moment of 
birth and expiration, and so on (whilst precluding always the sense of the dura-
tional, but pursuing everywhere the condition of the new). So that in an instant"s 
contact with Being (the taking up of existence representing the intent and pur-
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15 The formulation of the instant laying at the heart of the dynamism of existence, in fact, as it is 
most emphatically delineated by Levinas within Existence and Existents. In allowing for the con-
cern with the same as a determinism of solitary rather than societal subjectivity, however, it is 
worth indicating that both are essentially desirous of difference. 
16 E. Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. A. Lingis, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 
1978. p. 21.
17 Ibid. p. 75.
pose of an instant) !its detachment from it is already presaged",18 and the event 
of rhythm can then be identified (in relation to the instant"s evanescence) as a 
!discontinuous continuous" effecting of presence without particular reference to 
a past or future. An effecting of the present presenting. An effecting, however, 
that in its condition of re-commencement signals a longing for !non-
definitiveness"19 and alterity.
In such a way, moreover, the instant, in relation to which classical views largely 
determine a !negation of eternity",20  may in fact evoke something of the infinite 
through its !evasion", as it were, of temporality, its propensity for apparent exis-
tence beyond the !dialectic of time".21  The !absolute" character of the instant, 
which gives !an appearance of being to the past and defies the future",22  here 
structuring a presence that is the locus of commencement and cessation, but a 
denial, as a consequence of its unique status, of an effectuation of the relation 
with Being at !the level which leads from one instant to another in duration".23
The instant, then, constitutes a recurrence of effort within the present to formu-
late a relation with, and initiation into, Being. The occurrence of which indicates 
a continuous opening to (and desire for) difference - the condition of which, in 
turn, offers the hope of flight for the solitary  subject from his/her definitive status 
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20 Ibid. p. 73.
21 Ibid. The suggestion here simply being that the instant, as read through classical conceptions, 
is immeasurable and, like the infinite, therefore ostensibly outside the condition of temporality 
which might render it determinable. 
22 Ibid. p. 77.
23 Ibid.
and the possibility of pardon (which can only emerge within another) for trans-
gressive existence. The occurrence is, however, double edged, since the in-
completeness of the instant"s evanescence (leading to the event of continuous 
re/beginning) means that the self can never strictly escape itself (and the !irre-
missibility of existence")24  and must continue to take up at every moment, in 
fact, the very condition of transgressive existence for which it will continue to 
hope for pardon. 
The sense of existence, then, as a condition of both desire (in terms of the re-
demptive possibilities of difference as well as the possibility of self forgetting or 
abnegation, as it were, afforded via states of enjoyment within existence) and 
dread (in terms of transgressive potential and the perpetuation of being within 
Being as entrapment, which, as a condition without exit, !constitutes the funda-
mental absurdity of being")25 posits a continuously vacillating status for the sub-
ject - vacillation, in fact, between a world of light and a world of dark indetermi-
nacy (such a condition, it could also be said, may appear an explanation for the 
aversion or hesitation before existence - a hesitation constituting the beginning 
of each instant - that is signalled via a phenomenon of !weariness" or !indo-
lence". That would be, however, to entertain a misconception. Weariness cannot 
be allowed a deliberating or judgmental ascription here since that would sug-
gest intuitive foreknowledge, with the same, as a reassertion of the durational, 
positing a creative mode of thinking that facilitates a mastery of futurity within 
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25 E. Levinas, Time and the Other, trans. R. A. Cohen, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 
1987. pp. 50-51. The notion of entrapment being framed here in relation to the condition of the il 
y a, which Levinas has as the anonymous sense of an existing without existents and, for the 
subject, a being without nothingness.
the present and a consequential preclusion of the radical nature attaching to 
difference and novelty. Rather, the condition of weariness, which should in fact 
be countenanced as a coextensive movement with effort in the uptake of being, 
could perhaps be more properly  understood as a delay, even a move to refusal, 
conceivably  occasioned by apprehension - in every sense of the term - of the 
absolute commitment obligated by existence, which has !the seriousness and 
harshness of an unrevokable contract").26  Though perhaps such conditions (of 
desire and dread) are a consequence ultimately of the same concern, since 
they are everywhere underwritten by  the preoccupation with the !beyond" of Be-
ing and the longing for the same.
With the emergence of being within Being, then, there occurs a simultaneous 
inauguration of consciousness, within the rhythmic condition of the discontinu-
ous continuity of the instant, which compels an accordant (even polyrhythmic?) 
sense of vacillation between binding and transgressive existence, and exis-
tence experienced through desire as being !toward" the Good that is beyond 
being.27  In specifically  locating the same within the context of thought, more 
pointedly still, the movement is between an !egology of synthesis" 28  and a facili-
tation of difference or the accommodation of the !presence" of the unthought 
within thought. The notion of facilitation, however, is worked through a condition 
of inflection rather than intentionality, since intentionality must inevitably strive 
for assimilation (and it could perhaps be suggested here, in relation to which, 
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27 Plato, The Republic Book VI, trans. P. Shores, New York: Putnam"s, 1930. The notion of the 
Good beyond being is drawn from the Platonic conception of the Good which denotes the high-
est idea, the idea which casts light upon all other ideas to render them intelligible, and which 
provides here an ethical perspective for thought.
28 E. Levinas, Time and the Other, p. 100.
that the non-assimilating sense of facilitation or hospitality, as a preparedness 
for difference without presupposition, marks the ethical comportment of the in-
stant in its uptake of being despite its particular orientation towards the condi-
tion of solitary  existence.29 The instant"s occurrence, that is, being concerned at 
every moment with a solitude that is marked by the hope for difference and non-
definitiveness, which must itself oblige a !receptivity" towards the condition of 
the non-self. Or is the condition of such an anticipatory  concern nevertheless, 
and a case, moreover, of !protention" by another name?).
Of course, an understanding of thought as vision, knowledge and intentionality 
must signify  an inevitable !reduction of the other [Autre] to the Same, synchrony 
as being in its egological gathering. The known expresses the unity of the tran-
scendental apperception of the cogito!.30  Even within the context of interior dia-
logue, wherein !finite thought is split in order to interrogate and answer itself",31 
the assimilating movement of apperception must yet preclude the possibility  of 
real distance or dissociation:
Thought reflects on itself in interrupting its continuity of synthetic apperception, 
but still proceeds from the same “I think” or returns to it... The dialectic that tears 
the ego apart ends by a synthesis and system whereby the tear is no longer 
seen... the mind in speaking its thought remains no less one and unique, the 
same in  presence, a synchrony despite its coming-and-going where the ego 
could be opposed to itself. 32
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29 The notion of !inflection" here owes much to the sense Krzysztof Ziarek allows it (K. Ziarek, 
Inflected Language: Towards a Hermeneutic of Nearness, Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1994) which signals the apprehension Levinas himself had of the coextensive nature of 
thought and language within modern philosophy, leading him to an emphasis of the essential 
dimension of language which remains !unheard" in thought and beyond thought"s propensity for 
thematisation.
30 E. Levinas, Time and the Other, p. 99.
31 Ibid. p. 100.
32 Ibid.
But still we might wonder about the moment of reflection, as thought"s interrup-
tion of its own assimilatory propensities (evoking the sense of metaphysical 
questioning of ontological assertion), and enquire about the nature of such rup-
ture. Could it not be argued, in fact, that such a movement is actually grounded 
within a condition of sociality that is prior to the encounter with difference (and 
constituted perhaps in accordance with the same sense of facilitation without 
presupposition that informs the comportment of the instant in its uptake of be-
ing)? And that such sociality  is actually !irreducible to the immanence of repre-
sentation, [and] is other than the sociality that would be reduced to the knowl-
edge one can acquire about the Other as a known object"?33 So that within the 
effecting of interior dialogue there is, it could be said, a predisposition for !a rela-
tionship  to the other person as other, and not... a relationship to the other al-
ready apperceived as the same through a reason that is universal from the 
start".34  And cannot speech in the name of the other, as an occurrence of inte-
rior dialogue, therefore be allowed a sense of ethicality - even if the condition of 
such dialogue is auto-generated (perhaps even a conception of thought as a 
process of erasure - because it exists as symbol - might mean that a network of 
symbolic associations continues to !beat" as trace element within the emer-
gence of thought, so that erased or forgotten meaning informs the !presenting" 
of thinking and, as a consequence, a subject"s own thought could be said to fa-
cilitate the very means for the condition of the !otherwise" than thought within 
thought, for !thought that lies beyond the classical categories of representation 
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34 Ibid.
and identity35)? And might the pre-extant condition of !sociality", as a dis/
continuous undercurrent of cognitive flow, not then be considered, moreover, a 
rhythmic pulsation at the heart of the recurring instant? 
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35 E. Levinas, The Transcendence of Words in The Levinas Reader, ed. S. Hand, Oxford: 
Blackwell Publications, 1989. p. 146.
A reader might acknowledge the unique status of every reading that he or she 
makes. No two readings can ever be the same. Within each instant we are dif-
ferent beings.
80
Address
The Crypt, Chelsea College of Art & Design, January 2010.
3 minutes 22 seconds.
Disc 2 track 1. Please press play.
81
The Cryptic Instant.              
A Prayer.
The condition of the theoretical text has two moments that conceivably elicit no-
tions of ethicality, of openness to difference. The first frames the notion of Say-
ing within a text which constitutes the transposition to the page of the face-to-
face encounter, and signals the call of, the call to, the Other, and the necessity 
of response to and responsibility for the same. This, we might contend, lays 
most specifically  with the nature of engagement between an interpreting subject 
as reader/writer and an authorising subject of a !source" text. The second ethical 
moment is signalled by the instant in writing (indeed, the !instant" in writing), 
which is structured in relation to the message for the reading subject who will 
be. That is, it concerns the writing subject"s comportment in relation to the po-
tential for difference represented by his/her reader, at the moment of writing. 
And it is the latter notion which in fact concerns us here (or will predominantly 
concern us whilst allowing that it has a particular relation with the first moment), 
and will be specifically  determined in relation to the !instant" as a condition of 
preface (pre-facing) or of overture. 1
 
Of course, we might argue that this entire dissertation is in a sense, in addition 
to being a !conversation" or facing, a preface or overture. Or perhaps a moment, 
or series of moments, in the process of writing, of pre-facing. That is, in its look-
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1 Overture in the sense of a condition that affords emphasis to musical themes that will be sub-
sequently expounded upon, and overture in its social context of movement towards a new rela-
tion.
ing towards the moment, or moments, of engagement without knowledge of its 
or their reception, we could perhaps countenance the possibility that the second 
ethical condition of writing, as a continuous !hope for the present"2 lays with its 
sense of anticipation and preparation for response. And that such a possibility 
presents writing as a recurrence of the instant, and a recurrence of hospitality 
that precedes a !return" (such a reading of preface inclining here, it should be 
said of course, towards a conception of opening rather than strict exposition of 
what will follow, whilst allowing that the actual realisation of a preface is in fact 
often a post-scripting).3
 
But how more specifically to understand, however, our own position here as 
writer? Might we, for instance, in fact locate the !turn" in the theoretical text from 
source to reader as a playing out of the situatedness between death and life? A 
midway point, a noon, a middle age?4 And might we begin to speak, moreover, 
in relation to such, of a possibility of the movement within the same context as 
being informed by conditions of !encryption" or !haunting"? That is, as a conse-
quence of intertextual inevitability, can this text (or any theoretical text) ever do 
otherwise than promulgate, as receptacle of the never completely  assimilable, 
something of another text"s !difference" within its own condition of existence (a 
possession or haunting as scriptural !substitution")? And might we understand 
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1978. p. 93.
3 G.C. Spivak, Translator!s Preface in J.Derrida, Of Grammatology, Baltimore and London: The 
John Hopkins University Press, 1976. p. xii.
4 The references here being to the conceptions of autobiography evinced in Nietzsche"s Ecce 
Homo, (F. Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, trans. R.J. Hollingdale, London: Penguin Books, 1979) and 
read perhaps most specifically through Derrida"s considerations of the same in The Ear of the 
Other (J. Derrida, The Ear of the Other, ed. C. McDonald (English edition), C. Levesque & C. 
McDonald (French edition), trans. P. Kamuf, Otobiographies, trans. A. Ronell, Nebraska: Uni-
versity of Nebraska Press, 1985).
this as a very specific moment of ethicality  - with !turning" being read as the em-
phatic manifestation of !witnessing" or !bearing witness to" in terms of its move-
ment between containment and delivery (and might this, to re-foreground the 
notion of musicality, additionally  be framed as the expressly ethical working of 
the !overture"?)? Or does the notion of encryption simply signal rather (or even 
concurrently) a very specific realisation of trauma in the apprehension of the 
condition of subject entrapment and isolation which horrifies in its preclusion of 
access to difference? Or trauma in the apprehension of the Self"s potential for 
violence or abuse in the event of encounter? 
To address such concerns, we might first consider the idea of the !crypt" and its 
application in relation to psychoanalytic readings of the thanatological.5  The 
crypt, in essence, representing a condition of containment for an unassimilated, 
or unassimilable, loved or mourned object, with the object in fact remaining !like 
a living dead abscessed in a specific spot in the ego".6 In contrast to the !normal" 
transference or !introjection" of object-love, which synthesises the object to the 
point at which the external object becomes a part of the Self, the condition of 
!incorporation" is a failure of introjection to enact such assimilation, leading to 
the object being !entombed" live, as it were, in a dead space within the Ego.7 
The crypt thereby becoming the site of the live burial of the love object and its 
attendant desires - desires which cannot be consciously expressed but maintain 
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5 Interest here deriving from the work in this area of Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok, as well 
as Jacques Derrida"s responses to their research (see N. Abraham & M. Torok, The Wolf Man!s 
Magic Word: A Cryptonomy, trans. N. Rand, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986, 
and J. Derrida, Fors: The Anglish Words of Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok (foreword to the 
same), trans. B. Johnson).
6 J. Derrida, The Ear of the Other, p. 57.
7 J, Derrida, Foreword in N. Abraham & M. Torok, The Wolf Man!s Magic Word: A Cryptonomy, 
p. xvi.
a presence (and !vocality") nevertheless - within the Self. So that in the intrapsy-
chic topos of incorporation then, a secret space (the crypt) is erected to com-
memorate the refusal not only  of the loss of the object, but also the associated 
desires of the same, which are maintained despite their unsynthesised status.8
Pursuing the concern a little further, it is also important to understand that the 
condition of entombment has consequences for both the Ego and the Id (or Un-
conscious) - both of which become divided. In the case of the Ego, it splits itself 
but has no knowledge that it does so. And because the Ego lacks such knowl-
edge, the crypt could be described as itself !unconscious". The Ego, moreover, 
has no knowledge of the crypt and the crypt has no knowledge of anything (in-
cluding the Ego) beyond its immediate circumstance. And in the withdrawal into 
seclusion and the construction of a barrier to separate it from the half of itself 
containing the crypt, the Ego refuses to acknowledge its own refusal to mourn 
and therefore rejects consciousness of the crypt it has itself erected to receive 
the !dead" (or perhaps !living dead") object. The Ego, moreover, then mimics 
!real" mourning as an un-acknowledgement, it might be said, of the crypt. A 
crypt, likewise, is erected  within the Unconscious which might be determined a 
reflection of the Ego. The splitting is, however, different inasmuch as the Un-
conscious has no consciousness (in the way that the Ego does) of itself.9
In delineating such concerns however, our interests lay not so much with the 
uncovering of a particular pathology, but the implications of the same for notions 
of ethical subjectivity and the conditions of language and composition (both 
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8 Ibid. p. xvii.
9 N. Abraham & M. Torok, The Wolf Man!s Magic Word: A Cryptonomy, p. 81.
scriptural and musical). Though it may still be important, in relation to such, to 
remember especially here that the formation of the crypt is engendered through 
crisis or trauma (and that the recurrence of the instant, which we have else-
where determined a comportment of openness, could perhaps itself even be 
allowed a pathological !tic"). But how are we to understand such a condition? 
What might be contained by the condition of the !cryptic"? How might it be un-
derstood in terms of the text most specifically? And how is the notion of the 
crypt to be understood in relation to the condition of !haunting"?
 
To approach such concerns, and to try  to intimate something of the nature of 
the trauma that compels the construction of the crypt, we might in fact frame 
ideas surrounding the same in very specific relation to notions of the !instant". 
That is, in affording emphasis to the instant"s recurrent uptake of Being, which 
might be allowed an affirmational proclivity in its insistent realisation that func-
tions as a consistently  pulsating opening to difference, the instant exists equally, 
it should be said, as an opening to the constraining condition of the il y a which 
must itself continuously structure an overwhelming anxiety. So that:
[w]hat is absolute in the relationship  between existence and an existent, in an 
instant, consists in the mastery the existent exercises on existence, but also in 
the weight of existence on the existent. 10
Such weight is an acknowledgement of entrapment within Being (itself a living 
!burial"), and the isolation that must attend the same condition, as well as being 
an acknowledgement, it could be argued, of the harmful potential a Self could 
represent in the event of encounter. So might we allow therefore that the !in-
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10 E. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 76.
stant" arising within Being is itself cryptic, and that the il y a therein constitutes 
the incorporated (non) essence that is the encrypted traumatising !object"? (The 
notion, of course, positing the possibility that the cryptic, like the condition of Be-
ing, is simultaneously structured as both interior and exterior occurrence. With 
the attendant possibility  that immersion within the same frames the subject, who 
contains the encrypted object, as him/herself both cryptic site and the object of 
trauma encrypted within Being).11
So understood, the crypt could then be allowed both a site of containment, and 
a no-place or impossible place within place. It is the locus of the uncanny, 
where !something or someone both dead and alive is buried, where something 
has happened without having happened".12  But it remains indeterminable and 
cannot be mapped - our naming the il y a as the !object" of containment repre-
senting an approach to, rather than identification or delineation of, the same. So 
that an incorporated difference - if we allow that the il y a may be such - is both 
borne and borne witness to without subjective knowledge that such is the case, 
and without obvious manifestation of its presence (in absence) other than in 
terms of the emanation of trauma or, indeed, horror (traced aurally) within a be-
ing. 
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11 The notion of interior/exterior can be linked, moreover, to the potential meaning of !Fors" as 
Barbara Johnson reads it within a footnote to Derrida"s essay/foreword of the same name, de-
termining the word as being derivative of the Latin !foris" (meaning !outside" or !outdoors"), and 
an archaic preposition for !except for" or !barring". Then additionally, !fors" as the plural of !for" 
refers to that which !designates the inner heart, !the tribunal of conscience," subjective interior-
ity." (see Barbara Johnson"s note for Jacques Derrida"s foreword Fors: The Anglish Words of 
Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok in The Wolf Man!s Magic Word: A Cryptonomy, pp. xi - xii). 
12 J. Hillis Miller, Topographies, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995. p. 295.
And perhaps we might contend that the !sound" of the il y a, the !rustling",13 
!rumbling"14 and so on, is actually a manifestation of resistance to synthesis in 
fact, which in its denial of progressive introjection improvises a !ventrilocat[ion] 
through the “living,”"15 with such !noise" representing a self-engendered address 
both to and through a being (a subject is both called and calls). The subjective 
!ear" being here attentive not to the sound of the il y a as such but, rather, the 
sound of its own condition of pathological responsiveness (which of course it 
could be argued amounts to an inflected approach to the condition of difference 
within Being, whilst also positing the possibility  that the il y a is an invention - 
but an invention for which a subject is unaware that he/she may be 
responsible).16
We might, moreover, begin to countenance the cryptic instant (as we might so 
name it) as conceivably  effecting, in its relation to the (auto-generated?) 
!anonymous current of being"17 that constitutes the il y a, a simultaneous revul-
sion and desire, that is informed by both the reading of Being as hope/horror 
and the reading of cryptology as loss/possession. So that a subject"s apprehen-
sion of the il y a can perhaps appositely be termed !a ravaging joy to which he 
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13 E. Levinas, Otherwise than Being: Or Beyond Essence, trans. R.A. Cohen, Pittsburgh: Du-
quesne University Press, 1998. pp. 55, 61.
14 Ibid. p. 163.
15 J. Derrida, The Ear of the Other, p. 58.
16 The contention here, in aligning the il y a with a notion of the encrypted object, is to suggest 
that the il y a may in fact not only be an aesthetic construct but one that we each invent for our-
selves without being aware that we have done so. The il y a, as with the condition of the cryptic, 
thereby becoming a part of and apart from the subject, but facilitating the possibility of an !oth-
erwise" voice that emanates from the Self.
17 E. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 52.
can bear witness only by tears, an endless flow of tears".18  With the implication 
that the condition of the il y a is never simply a condition compelling horror and 
repellence solely, but longing and hope equally. So that the notion of posses-
sion (possessing and being possessed) could, moreover, be said to pursue a 
particularly ambivalent course. And in the bifurcated comprehension of the term, 
in fact, we find the movement between possession (by the subject) effected in 
the affirmational uptake of existence (a self-possession), and possession (of the 
subject) effected in the same context as an owned body (!corps propre"),19  a 
contained materiality wherein a sovereign interiority might be !laid hold of in its 
works".20  To posit the self within Being, being then both a taking up and a being 
taken up.
   
And the notion of !possession", of course, presages the condition of !haunting" 
as a further dimension of cryptology (whilst accepting that the two things are not 
necessarily always and inevitably  interchangeable), which adds, it might be 
said, to a potential for subject fragmentation or indeterminacy as it occurs within 
such a context. That is, it conceivably adds to an already extant destabilisation 
of subjecthood (the split between Ego and Id, and the cryptic divisions within 
the same) as a presumed locus of original unity since it invokes a layer of fur-
ther undecidability  in the positing of another"s crypt within a subject"s uncon-
scious - leading to the calling into question of the notion of an !authentic" Self, 
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18 M. Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, trans. A. Smock, Lincoln and London: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1986. p. 72.
19 E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. A. Lingis, Pittsburgh: Du-
quesne University Press, 1969. p. 229.
20 Ibid.
and the possibility of real self-knowledge, in its promotion of the polyvocal. Who 
in fact speaks? Who writes? 
Or perhaps we could even conflate this with a notion of !substitution", which is 
effectively an assertion of a simultaneous self-definition and self-decentering in 
order to accommodate difference without assimilation.21  That is, as a !relation-
ship with the non-ego [which] precedes any relationship  of the ego with itself",22 
the notion of a receptive, indeed substitutive, comportment precedes a subjec-
tive relation with the self, but maintains a separateness in order to accommo-
date difference. The Other being !in me and in the midst of my very identifica-
tion",23  but as a presence without attachment, a relation without relation. Such a 
notion of !comportment" being indicative, moreover, of an !anarchic"24 propensity 
that is !prior to every initiative"25  and prior to any notion of subjective !freedom".
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21 And whilst there are obviously differences in terms of  the psychoanalytic notion of incorpora-
tion and the Levinasean conception of substitution, both are prompted it might be argued 
through an obligation to difference. And though substitution leaves the ego intact and incorpora-
tion divides it, the merging of the two processes would seek to posit the possibility that a poten-
tial polyvocalism is yet coextensively realisable with a condition of self-determinacy because of 
the process of !unknowingness" that informs the cryptic. There are also differences in terms of 
the specificity of the incorporated !object" - the psychoanalytic concern framing the process in 
relation to something known and valued, substitution in terms of a more vague notion of other-
ness. Again the conflation of the two processes means that something of both notions may be 
conceivable within the same context when read in relation to the il y a - which is a nebulous 
nothingness apprehended as something, but a something that in its potential facilitation of, or 
access to, difference, arguably constitutes it as desirable as well as horrifying.
22 E. Levinas, Otherwise than Being: Or Beyond Essence, p. 119.
23 Ibid. p. 125.
24 The notion of !anarchy", which might be considered as expressive of the il y a, first being ap-
plied by Levinas within Existence and Existents to denote a contrary position to categoric or-
ganisation when he suggests that ![s]ensation is not yet the unorganised quality which Kantian 
psychology teaches it is. The organisation or the anarchy of sensation does not affect its objec-
tivity or subjectivity". (See E. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 47).
25 E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, pp. 38-39.
At stake here, in any  event, is the sense that the Self is separated from itself as 
a consequence of a traumatic !engagement" with (or, indeed, anticipation of) dif-
ference. And, to reiterate our argument, such difference may be the condition of 
the il y a, and the il y a may be an object of auto-generation (even potentially a 
substitution, or channelling point, itself for trauma?), but the consequential (re) 
beginning and un-knowledge attending the condition of the (cryptic) instant 
means that engagement affords the continuous exposure to the unforeseen, to 
the otherwise. The notion of the crypt and its contained !object" positing the 
possibility that if the il y a is to be allowed a locus of difference, the !trace" (as 
the essence of difference) may effectively  be the trace of a trace, since the !ob-
ject" of alterity is here neither a being nor non-being, or it is perhaps both simul-
taneously. In effect, it is a ghostly or spectral presence (indeed a presence that 
must haunt subjective !becoming" at every turn within existence).26
But how then to fully  comprehend the significance of the spectral (and the spec-
tral, perhaps most importantly, in relation to text and music)? Psychoanalytic 
definitions, of course, determine the ghost as the condition of another"s crypt 
within a subject"s unconscious. And, as suggested, it is the locating of the same 
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26 As Derrida defines it in Ear of the Other, (J. Derrida, Ear of the Other, p. 59), and as read 
through Abraham and Torok"s notion of the ghost or phantom (N. Abraham & M. Torok, The 
Shell and the Kernel.; volume 1: Renewals of Psychoanalysis, ed. N.T. Rand, Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1994). The crucial difference between the two strands of the spectral, 
deriving from Abraham and Torok and from Derrida respectively, being found in the status of the 
secret. The secrets of Abraham and Torok"s !lying phantoms" - who return in order to maintain 
secrecy - are unspeakable in the sense of being a subject of shame and prohibition. It is not that 
they cannot be spoken; on the contrary, they can and should be put into words so that the phan-
tom and its noxious effects on the living can be exorcised. For Derrida, however, the ghost and 
its secrets are unspeakable in a different sense. Abraham and Torok seek to return the ghost to 
the order of knowledge, Derrida wants to avoid any such restoration and to encounter what is 
strange, unheard, other, about the ghost. For Derrida the ghost"s secret is therefore not a puzzle 
to be solved, it is the structural openness or address directed towards the living by the voices of 
the past or the not-yet formulated possibilities of the future. The secret is not unspeakable be-
cause it is taboo, but because it cannot (yet) be articulated in the languages available to us. 
Perhaps we might even conceive of such differences in relation to text as differences between 
the desire to understand and openness to what exceeds knowledge.
that opens a subject to the condition of polyvocalism. To a questioning of the 
centred !I". !Hauntology"27  also begins, however, to intimate something else 
about the relation with alterity that has additional consequences for the notion of 
ethicality. Namely  that it may be impossible for a subject to ever fully  assimilate 
another (an impossibility of introjection), because such assimilation, in its de-
structive propensity, must always be followed by a (rhythmic) return of the de-
stroyed as spectre. So the condition of !trace" might then be understood as a 
form of radical non-negativity, a residual, quasi-material insistence that inter-
rupts any movement of negation. The ghost constituting a presence therefore in 
absence, a return that cannot be resisted, but a return of that which is !othered" 
since its restoration could never occur in an absolute sense. 
And applied to language, we might suggest that the sign is never, again in ab-
solute terms, able to displace the named object.28 The conception that language 
loses that which it would name in the very movement of nomination, granting 
within such a moment only an !idealised" life within the mind, may in fact be 
misplaced. In fact the object does return. But its return occurs as a condition of 
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27 !Hauntology" is, of course, Jacques Derrida"s neologism (punning on !ontology"), employed in 
The Specter of Marx (J. Derrida, The Specter of Marx, trans. P. Kamuf, New York: Routledge, 
1994) to indicate the notion of Communism as a ghostly presence that European neoliberalism 
has been unable to exorcise. The term having recently been appropriated by music critics, no-
tably Ian Penman and Simon Reynolds, and !blogger" K-Punk, to exemplify a particular musical 
condition and genre. The original application of which occurred in relation to the atmospheric 
and sampling formations of electronic hip-hop and dubstep - with an added point of interest be-
ing that !dub" presumably derives from the Jamaican Patois word !duppy" meaning !ghost" or 
spirit (see J. Corbett, Extended Play: Sounding Off from John Cage to Dr. Funkenstein,  Dur-
ham and London, Duke University Press, 1994. p. 128).
28 And it is perhaps important to note, of course, that Abraham and Torok"s work does in fact 
root itself in the condition of language as it is operative in relation to the pathological condition of 
the crypt. But as Nicholas T. Rand has indicated within his definition of cryptonymy as a theory 
of readability, the psychoanalytic emphasis, in contrast with deconstruction, is more concerned 
with how !signification can be reinstated after its collapse", rather than with the potential for infi-
nite play of the same (see N. T. Rand Translator!s Introduction in N. Abraham and M. Torok, The 
Wolf Man!s Magic Word: A Cryptonomy, p. Ixvi). 
the uncanny (as ghost or spectre) which represents a disruption of, or resis-
tance to, the movement towards synthesis. 29
And when applied to theory, the process of naming or designation, moreover, is 
continuously  troubled (haunted) in its enactment since a subjective assertion 
can never be absolutely sure of its position either in relation to the notion of an 
original !preferred meaning" nor in relation to a subsequent interpretation (we 
can only guess at the way this might be understood). Effectively, an !otherwise" 
form (of meaning) returns incessantly  to the assertive declaration to cast its 
authorising status into question, and to frame a general condition of undecida-
bility in language. Such a condition, within a theoretical context, being played 
out in the !turn" between reading and composition, and revealing the extent to 
which our definitiveness is disputed as we are haunted by ghosts from both the 
past and the future (with the attendant possibility, of course, that the ghosts of 
other meanings, as it were, are themselves troubled or haunted by something 
similar). 
Such concerns, moreover, are actualised within an instant. That is, in the mo-
ment of a writing"s emergence its definitive status is under contention. And this 
occurs as the !rebound movement"30 of the instant wherein a !withdrawal in the 
very  heart of the present"31 effecting the present, affords an unbidden alternative 
!voicing" on the hither side of the designatory. This means, in fact, that the no-
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29 Following Maurice Blanchot"s view that language cannot !murder" the object, as Hegel, Lacan 
and others have claimed, since the thing lost is always subject to a decomposing/recomposing 
materiality which returns it at the very heart of its supposed absence.
30 E. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 75.
31Ibid.
tion of haunting could be understood as presence within the very construction of 
a concept, especially if we allow that the concept is grounded in the linguistic.32 
And that ontology might then be understood as simply an attempt at exorcism, 
at !conjuration",33  at the containment of the spectral, but equally  as that which 
pursues an impossibility, as that which is bound to failure. And could we then 
ask, by extension, whether the condition of trauma, framed in relation to the 
hauntological, is a disruptive but perhaps necessary moment of apprehension 
wherein the subject recognises that he/she is haunted by the !beyond" of their 
own interpretive reading? That is, as a condition of the hermeneutic or theoreti-
cal are we inevitably trapped within our own reading, whilst sensing the non/
presence of alternatives, both prior (original or source text) and subsequent (in-
terpretations of our interpretations), which haunt us as a condition of the ex-
cluded (but to which we may, through the notion of !possession", indirectly  give 
intimation or even voicing without understanding or awareness that we do so)? 
And in recalling our initial postulation about the notion of preface or overture, 
and this dissertation as a formation of such, could we equally then argue that 
the same are not simply haunted by that which might be indicated to follow 
them, but more precisely in fact by that which cannot be countenanced to fol-
low? So that, in essence, we are haunted by the non-definitiveness of our own 
reading.
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32 J. Derrida, The Specter of Marx, p. 161.
33 Ibid.
Such a consideration of language evoking the condition, it could be said moreo-
ver, of !arche-writing"34  which establishes the sense of writing as a condition of 
infinite referral or deferral. So that we can never be certain of that which we 
write. Our sense of assertion always being grounded within or upon, as it were, 
shifting foundations. Signification must always refer to other signs, and writing 
!is not a sign of a sign, except if one says it of all signs, which would be more 
profoundly true".35  Arche-writing determining a breach that could ostensibly be 
divided along two particular lines, of spatial !differing" and temporal !deferring".36 
The explication of such terms being that writing !differs" from itself by splitting 
(differing) from the absence that makes it necessary (either in terms of refer-
ence or address), and that a given text is never to be apprehended fully in 
terms of its meaning (even by  its author) since it must be subject to (or deferred 
to) unforeseen and wholly unpredictable future reading, which again determines 
a specific condition of absence (whilst accepting here, of course, that !arche" 
could yet be construed as an organising, or even assimilatory, concern itself in 
its correlation of the inception of a phenomenon with its domination by a princi-
ple37  - but that such organisation, or attempt at organisation, or even self-
acknowledgement of such an attempt, is, for all that, written through or indeed 
!haunted" by an anarchy, or anticipation of alterity, that instills a preclusion of the 
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34 Arche-writing being Jacques Derrida"s term for a condition of writing that is focused upon the 
instability of the sign and the breach between intent and actuality within all text, making refer-
ence moreover to an originary breach afflicting all things that one may wish to keep sacrosanct, 
including the notion of self-presence (see J.Derrida, Of Grammatology, Baltimore and London: 
The John Hopkins University Press, 1976).
35 J.Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 43.
36 With the two conditions, of course, being combined within the Derridean neologism !diffé-
rance" (see Différance in Margins of Philosophy, trans. A. Bass, Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1982).$
37 Both Heidegger and Schurmann having criticised the notion of !arche" along such lines. And in 
relation to which it is worth noting that even within the most ancient Greek writings !arche" has 
been consistently applied as a term to signify both commencement and (political) authority.
possibility of definitiveness or closure). So that arche-writing could in fact be 
construed therefore as intimation of both absence through an !iterability that be-
comes internal to what the mark is"38 and a deferred absence that signals a po-
tentiality for what the mark may become. 
 
The !absences" encapsulated by the condition of !différance" might then be 
framed in relation to the condition of !turning" within the theoretical text, in terms 
of the movement between the reading of an !original" text and the subsequent 
reading of such a reading. The absences posited, however, are replete with the 
notion of the !returned". That is, filled by the presence in absence of the spec-
tral. Emanations of which force themselves to the surface of a particular text as 
!vocalisations" (even !evocalisations"39  of !silent textual sounding")40  or intima-
tions of difference (of the il y a?) within a reading subject, destabilising any 
sense of decidability in terms of any given reading. The sense here being that 
an encrypted being carries always a ghost within itself as !structural openness"41 
that continuously !pushes at the boundaries of language and thought",42  and is 
an effectuation of the specific notions of both !différance" and !trace" where there 
must occur a state of !undecidability or tension... [with] an insistence, a pres-
ence of whatever resists us, recalcitrant to our understanding".43
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38 S. Glendinning, in an interview conducted at the London School of Economics, November 
2008.
39 G. Stewart, Reading Voices: Literature and the Phonotext, California: University of California 
Press, 1990. A phrase coined by Garrett Stewart in relation to a !phonemic" analysis of reading.
40 Ibid. p. 1.
41 C. Davis, Etat Present, Hauntology, Spectres and Phantoms in French Studies 59(3), 2005. 
pp. 373-379.
42 Ibid. p. 379.
43 J. Jervis, Uncanny Presences in Uncanny Modernity: Cultural Theories, Modern Anxieties, 
eds. J. Jervis and J. Collins, Houndmills & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. p. 10.
Such might even be understood, in its !obsession" with difference, as a refusal 
to allow the self to be !tamed and domesticated by a theme",44  with a condition 
of !anarchic passivity"45 subverting the possibility of a totalising movement of the 
same. The inherent concern for the non-self !strip[ping] the ego of its pride and 
dominating [the] imperialism characteristic of it. The subject is in the accusative, 
without recourse in being, expelled from being".46  The sense of the same indi-
cating a grammatical nature of existence, with the subject, in the accusative, 
finding him/herself the object of another"s relation. Such being the case anar-
chically, in fact, before a being can identify  him/herself as a subject, as an exis-
tent with nominative status, and before a self generating impetus can allow the 
subject"s possessive claim upon the world. But the notion of the same does not, 
conversely, objectify  the subject. It liberates him/her, rather, by negating the 
condition of arche, so that !through substitution for others, the oneself escapes 
relations... in this most passive passivity, the self liberates itself ethically from 
every other and from itself".47
And in allowing the anarchical haunting of the developmental condition of being 
(or the developmental void of the il y a), we encroach upon a musically  derived 
hauntological conception of existence that itself pursues a generative opera-
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44 E. Levinas, Otherwise than Being: Or Beyond Essence, trans. A. Lingis, Pittsburgh: Du-
quesne University Press, 1998. p. 100.
45 Ibid. p. 110.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid. p. 115.
tional mode and that, in turn, has implications for the textual.48  As a creative/
procedural generative concern, in fact, wherein the unfolding of a moment (or 
instant) occurs in the improvisational response to an order to improvise (or a 
prefaced order to pursue disorder) the hauntological dimension could therein be 
understood as the forbearing of encrypted instruction to resist instruction. 
The same, it might be said, framing a particular problematic in relation to the 
condition of the !historic" as it occurs within the context of the spectral. That is, 
in the question of the proper !moment" of the revenant (is it, for example, the 
same thing that it might be said to historically !represent", or is the same repre-
sented object to be properly allowed itself an object of the present?) we might 
consider the same both a !return" and !inauguration", with the hauntological con-
figuring !a coinage that suggests a spectrally deferred non-origin within ground-
ing metaphysical terms such as history  and identity".49  So that we might then 
ask, by extension, if interpretation (as musical or theoretical concern) could ever 
then truly function as genuine !re-presentation" in absolute terms when any 
reading (or reading of a reading) must acknowledge the potential influence of 
multiple historic and contingent spectral !presences" (that must in turn preclude 
the sense of authentic replication)? So that we might perhaps argue that the 
spectral !makes possible reproduction even as it also fragments reproduction 
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48 The emphasis here laying more with a musical model of the generative, aiming at unpredict-
ability, rather than a linguistic/structural model which arguably facilitates the application of an 
overarching schema.
49 From Ghosts: Deconstruction, Psychoanalysis, History, eds. P. Buse & A. Scott, London: 
Macmillan, 1999. Quoted by K-Punk, Hauntology Now, k-punk, abstractdynamics.org, Jan 17th, 
2006 (accessed March 2009).
and ruins the very possibility of reproduction"s apparent guarantee to represent 
that which is no longer there fully".50
And more broadly still, the notion of a musically derived condition of hauntology 
could be said to foreground another dimension of the same as it occurs in rela-
tion to the technological (and which, of course, has further implications for the 
textual). Namely, it invokes a spectral conception of the information realm (no-
tably in terms of recording methods and agencies) which might be deemed !the 
technological uncanny".51 The sense of the same as !layers of fizz, crackle, hiss 
and white noise"52  being coextensive with the notion of !sound" as it emerges in 
relation to textual practices (which themselves, as previously suggested, could 
be allowed in turn the emanations of the il y a).
Such a notion of the spectral in relation to technology positing, moreover, a 
sense of surfeit or surplus production in the material !inscription" of music, that 
structures a haunt (as locus) and haunt (as event) in the space between content 
and context, between the immateriality of music and the materiality of inscribed 
sound. So that music exists here as a !present memory" of itself, as music that 
is haunted by  the technological and that itself haunts the technological. Trans-
posed then to the theoretical (as recording agency), we might suggest that text 
is informed consistently by emanations that must render it distinct from a source 
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50 J. Wolfrey, Victorian Hauntings: Spectrality, Gothic, the Uncanny and Literature, New York: 
Palgrave and Macmillan, 2001. p. 13.
51 M. Fisher, quoted by B. Kreitler, The Music was Dying in The Brooklyn Rail, June 2009. 
52 K-Punk, Phonograph Blues, k-punk, abstractdynamics.org, October 19th, 2006 (accessed 
March 2009). An expression used by K-Punk with specific reference to the recorded work of 
Robert Johnson.
or !original" text. And as such is configured within the !ear" of the receiving sub-
ject who !plays back" a text. 
Curiously perhaps, the technological imperfections that occur within the field of 
recording may in fact determine voice as being all the more human (perhaps the 
layers of anarchic sound, as emanations of the il y a, reinforcing the entrapped 
status of visceral being?), with the reverse occurring in the opposite direction, 
where the clearer the recording the more inhuman it might sound.53 But to what 
does this condition of humanity that is contained or amplified within such degra-
dation, as it were, of the human, actually point? Should we posit it a !return" in 
fact, a (re)visiting of the preternatural, to be grasped (in terms of music) as an 
!anamorphic sonic object"54 that is always outside the realm of the human? Or a 
return, in fact, of absence as !seething presence"55 that might be understood as 
the essential condition of being? As the !real" condition of continuous being?
And in framing such a perspective in relation to the technological (which in turn 
might equally  be understood as a condition of the textual) we might perhaps 
conceive of the uncanny thought, perhaps repressed or indeed encrypted, that 
posits our technically !doubled" selves (through recording and writing) as endur-
ing entities that in turn are rendered as ghosts of ourselves.56  And in appre-
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53 B. Kreitler, The Music was Dying in The Brooklyn Rail, with reference to views expressed by 
Theodor Adorno in his essay The Curves of the Needle (see T. W. Adorno, The Curves of the 
Needle in Essays on Music, introduction, commentary and notes R. Leppert, trans. S. H. 
Gillespie, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. p. 271).
54 K-Punk, Hauntology Now. In relation to which it is perhaps of some interest here to note that 
the term !anamorphosis" derives from the Greek expression to !form again".
55 A.F. Gordon, Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination, Minnesota: Univer-
sity of Minnesota Press, 2008. p. 17.
56 An argument that K-Punk specifically makes in his article Phonograph Blues. 
hending our ceaseless, spectral selves (the horrifying condition, in fact, of exis-
tence) via such means, we are, moreover, obliged to recognise the specific na-
ture of our imprisoned status. The occurrence of which takes place not simply in 
response to our own !product" (our own recorded voice, our own text etc.), but 
also in response to the presence of another"s (perhaps most especially) !dislo-
cated" voice as it might occur within the imperfections of recorded sound, or the 
incorporation (significantly) of the same within a different body (as in the proc-
ess of sampling within music or citation within writing). The status of otherness 
as revenant here conceivably  (albeit paradoxically) emphasising an essential 
condition of being which must in turn oblige the apprehension of the spectral 
condition of our own existence (the sense of which is to perhaps be drawn 
through our own encrypted status within Being - and our own condition of 
trauma which is therein entombed and !available" to the !possession" of an-
other). So that it could perhaps be argued that we all ultimately exist as condi-
tions of the ghostly, as !speaking voids, made up  of scraps and citations... con-
taminated by other people"s memories... adrift..."57  With the most telling condi-
tion of the cryptic as it arises within such a context (as we know from psycho-
analytic determinations) being the inability  it induces within the subject to mourn 
loss (since loss can never occur in an absolute sense). We essentially mourn, 
rather, the impossibility to mourn. 
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57 I. Penman, Tricky: [the Phantoms of] TRICKNOLOGY [versus a Politics of Authenticity], The 
Wire, March 1995.
A reader should struggle to continuously grasp his/her own instantaneous pres-
ence, and to read him/herself reading. But might also recognise that in the mo-
ment of comprehending the same the present slips away, and he/she must then 
take up the struggle anew. 
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Exchange (extract)
Artist"s home, North London, December 2005.
6 minutes 21 seconds (of 20 minutes approximately).
Disc 2 track 2. Please press play.
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Insomnia.
A Prayer.
 We will watch and listen. All through the night, we will watch and listen. In the 
garden, we will watch and listen.1
The endless night is at the door, now in the room. Enfolding and demanding. 
We long for sleep, for flight. But we will watch and listen. We will bear witness. 
To the rumbling horror. To the murmur of contained absence. To the drone of 
dis/continuity. We cannot do otherwise. Consciousness will not resist. Con-
sciousness has absorbed the night. Or the night, consciousness. We cannot 
stay awake, !"it" stays awake".2  It watches through us. We have become the 
space of there is. We are one with it. We cannot escape it. We have no past or 
future. And !memory would already be a liberation with regard to the past".3
We have listened like animals, for hunter or prey. We have listened as interpret-
ing men. Now we listen in passive panic. Panic enters through the ear. Hearing 
being !intensity  without specificity".4  And we listen therefore without certainty 
104
1 An oblique reference to the Garden of Gethsemane and the watchful night that Jesus de-
manded of his disciples.
2 E. Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo, trans. R. A. Cohen. Pitts-
burgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985. p. 49. 
3 E. Levinas, Time and the Other, trans, R. A. Cohen, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 
1987. p. 48.
4 R. Barthes, Listening in The Responsibility of Forms, trans. R. Howard, New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1985. p. 258. Roland Barthes" use of the term !panic listening" suggests an inter-
subjective formation continuously producing new signifiers without ever arresting their specific 
meanings. The term seeming particularly apposite in relation to Levinasean notions of the audi-
ble condition of the il y a, moreover, since the etymology of !panic" derives from the god Pan, 
himself the source of mysterious sounds causing contagious fear.
about that to which we are listening.5 Sound is contingent. Sound depends upon 
that which comes into contact with it to generate sound. We hear !the event of 
the thing, not the thing itself".6 Sound is residual.
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5 Listening, moreover, is always a condition of the immersive present. That is, it precludes a 
possibility of the withdrawal pertaining to the visual (itself facilitating a position of certainty and 
authorisation), and locates a subject within the inevitable !now" of a particular soundscape.           
Such a soundscape, of course, as perhaps intimated by the notion of !hearing without specific-
ity", is also a constantly !created" space (indeed a self-created, or auto-generated, space) since 
listening, with limited recourse to the collectively derived meaning that attends visuality, is itself 
aligned infinitely with the imagination. The generated meaning that might attend such creativity, 
however, is always fleeting, due to its contingent nature, and needful therefore of its own con-
tinuous reconstitution.                                                                                                                
And whilst the same, it could be said, evinces an ethical mode of responsiveness (since it sig-
nals the negation of dominant meaning), the conditions of transience, intangibility and ephem-
erality that attach to the !fabricated" soundscape, must also generate a pervasive unease and 
doubt that underscore the process of listening as an action of solitude. In listening, that is, as an 
event of subjective individuality, we can never be sure that we each hear the same thing. Such 
destabilisation compelling a !seeing" that surpasses the visual imagination and ensures the 
unique nature of the experience.                                                                                                       
In The Anxiety of the Lonely Listener, Salomé Voegelin, writing of the isolation attending the 
practice of radio listening (but which we might extend here to the listening practice per se) sug-
gests that: “In his or her engaged solitude the listener can imagine anything, and anything he or 
she imagines is true in the context of his or her imagination. What public conventions there are, 
are soon hijacked and manipulated in the private and uncontrollable sphere of the listener"s 
mind.” Listening producing, it could be said, a sonic and visual (indeed multi-sensory) imagina-
tion in relation to apprehended sound, rather than attaching to an a priori visual point of refer-
ence. And in so doing, of course, the listener is continually then engaged in an effort of re-
orientation, since !settled" meaning as a consequence of listening (and its auto-generative mode 
of being) is an impossibility.                                                                                                              
Voegelin goes on, moreover, to compare such considerations with the !accents" named by 
Roland Barthes as points within photography that escape any collective and stable understand-
ing (R. Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, trans. R. Howard, New York: Hill 
& Wang, 1980), and posits that radio (and listening, as we might have it, in general) produces 
only accents: “There is no certainty. Every fragment of every sound is an accent, unrecognis-
able, entreating the listener to place it temporarily in the individual context of his or her imagina-
tion... Any notion of an authentic, shared reality is suspended... Of course there are recognis-
able rules of production and transmission, commercial and independent. However, even within 
such a structure, the darkness of reception disorientates, and in this disorientation demands of 
the listener an effort of production... organising the material heard to produce a personal and 
contingent sense” (S. Voegelin, The Anxiety of the Lonely Listener, 
http://www.salomevoegelin.net/listening_to_noise....html, accessed December 2010).                    
Here then, we might suggest that listening, as an event of created meaning, gives shape to a 
temporal value, that in its repeatedly reworked status gives rise by extension to the apprehen-
sion that the Self is both listening to itself within the fabrication of its own meaning (that the sub-
ject is always a part of its own soundscape), and that the transient !fixed upon" meaning is de-
rived from a number of potential meanings. So that !the heard" with which the subject engages, 
with which the subject is in dialogue, as it were, may itself be in dialogue at the same time with 
an otherwise that is always outside, always beyond, the conception of the listening subject, yet 
remains always itself insistent in the !now" as a continuous presence in absence.                           
6 S. Connor, Edison!s Teeth: Touching Hearing, a paper written for the conference Hearing 
Culture, a conference organised by the Wenner-Gren Foundation and scheduled to 
take place in Morelia, Mexico, October 4-12th 2001. The conference was postponed in 
the aftermath of the September 11th attack on New York (accessed February 2010).
But sound too, is a paradox. At once both seemingly acousmatic and 
corporeal.7 Perhaps it is both and neither. Sound is always disembodied, never 
quite belonging to the object or place from which it emerges. Yet sound relies 
upon a materiality through which to travel, through which to be engendered. 
And such materiality is never quite abandoned. As itself a residue, it contains a 
residue of the material. To consider sound as the !voice" of what sounds, 
moreover, may be to animate the sounding world. May be to ascribe to it a con-
dition of soul. But it is also to determine sound as owned, as emanating from its 
source, rather than as an accidental emission from it. So that we find ![p]recisely 
because of its default condition of disembodiment, sound may be apt to be 
thought of in terms of how it clings or stays in contact with what begets it".8
Is it correct, therefore, to ascribe an !interiority" of voicing to the whisper alone? 
Other !voiced" sounds, including spoken words, may resonate with an essence 
of the same. Consider the word !resonate" in fact. Say it aloud. After the final !t" 
has been spat into the world, the back of the mouth and tongue still savour the 
shape of the term. Is it really possible to deny the sense of a lingering continu-
ity?
The notion of the Logos of course frames a division between breath and voice, 
whilst accepting that speech necessarily combines the two. The Son of God is 
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7 Jérôme Peignot and Pierre Schaeffer were the first to use the term !acousmatic" in 1955 to 
define the listening experience of musique concrète. The term, from the French acousmatique, 
itself derives from the Greek akousmatikoi, a description used to refer to probationary pupils of 
Pythagoras.
8 S. Connor, Edison!s Teeth: Touching Hearing.
of the mouth. The Angel of the nose.9  But theology also accepts that voice in 
such a context is continuum. The Son of God is the Word of God. Voice is here 
umbilicus.
The telephone that rings in the next room calls to us. It calls. And we respond. 
To even refuse to pick-up is still a response. But the telephone is perhaps more 
especially  a pointedly  paradigmatic occasioning of umbilical continuity. In rela-
tion to which the most important feature of the phone lays not in its separation 
of voice from speaker (at the Other end of the line), but its propulsion of the 
voice along a wire that locates the receiver in real-time contact with the speaker. 
Prior to such invention, sound had been regarded as radiative or diffusive, in 
contrast with the straight travelling dynamism of sight. The telephone wire, 
however, posited a sense of tactility, or imaginary tactility, that concentrates 
sound in a vector.  A clear line of communication.10 The notion of proximity and 
distance being undercut by the !presencing" of the speaker, and the physical 
application of phone to ear admitting of difference, as it were, within.
And to read the telephonic in such a way  may be to determine ourselves in 
specific continuum with the Other - and potentially at the juncture of listening 
modes predicated upon the notion of pathos.11 That is, in conceding a generally 
violent inception for sound (inasmuch as sound production, and reception, 
might be allowed the consequences of material !collision" -  be it the friction pro-
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9 Ibid.  Following a proposition of the African theologian Lactantius that distinguished the Son of 
God as speech and angels as the silent breath of God - and that each potentially is emitted via 
a different orifice.
10 S. Connor, Edison!s Teeth: Touching Hearing.
11 Ibid.
duced by air upon vocal chords to produce the voice, the impacting of air parti-
cles in the transmission of sound to the ear, or the colliding of sound waves with 
the ear or skin), sound has the propensity to disturb, to unsettle, and, indeed, to 
provoke change. Sound having, it could therefore be said, the capacity to inflict 
agitation and suffering.12 Though sound could also be regarded as both the sub-
ject and object of pathos - being both the product of pathos and the instigator of 
pathos in others.13 
In reading the condition of sound in relation to pathos, moreover, it could be 
contended that an umbilical association posits a proactive potential in hearing 
that counters the notion of the same as a condition of simple or pure passivity. 
So that:
sound can itself have two contrasting sides or dimensions... [Listening] is not 
always... silent, reserved, withdrawn, passive or alert responsiveness to sound. 
Most of the time... [listening] is accompanied by different kinds of action, most 
typically, perhaps in the production of sound in speech, which is perhaps best 
thought of as a kind of continuous, indistinguishable composite of hearing and 
speaking, rather than a simple, so to speak, deaf production of sound. Just as 
we cannot speak without#listening#or overhearing ourselves, so we cannot#lis-
ten#without taking in to ourselves the sounds we hear. Hearing always operates 
to some degree on both sides of the active-passive, productive-receptive di-
chotomy... Sound is imagined in the same-two-sided way as skin: both as that 
which touches and that which is touched.14
To listen here then, is to be already engaged within a process of the interlocu-
tory. The acknowledgement of which, exemplified in the telephonic conversation 
(wherein !the listener"s silence will be as active as the locutor"s speech: [so that] 
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12  Ibid. !Suffering" being the literal translation of the Greek term %&'(), or pascho, from which 
pathos is derived.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
listening speaks")15, also points to a mode of receptivity  that effectively  evokes 
the sense of  alert openness attending, perhaps most especially, the process of 
psychoanalytic listening.16  Indeed, psychoanalysis proffers a very particular 
mode of active or !dialogical listening" which precludes a possibility of the pre-
sumptive, and in its !panic" mode of being pursues a condition analogous to 
musical reception (inasmuch as musical listening functions as !unknowing" re-
ceipt followed by rationalisation, and is perhaps somewhat akin to the psycho-
analytic procedure of sustained !openness" followed by interpretation. In both 
cases, the emphasis laying, it could be said, with delay, though it is important to 
understand that such rationalisation/interpretation is not then to be determined 
here as definitive, but continues unfolding ceaselessly with new meaning).
So that a notion of pathos in sound instills a condition of !availability" that whilst 
being potentially !harmful" also posits a possibility of passive compliancy, 
wherein !the soft, plasmatic body... dominates... [facilitating a listening wherein] 
hearing and speaking peacefully, erotically  alternate".17  The notion of the body 
in relation to the voice, or the !corporality  of speech",18  could also be allowed a 
particular consequence of the psychoanalytic mode of listening, a listening to 
the otherwise of speech - since it embraces the !residual" condition of speaking 
(including its point of emergence) in the body:
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15 R. Barthes, Listening in The Responsibility of Forms, p. 252.
16 Ibid. Barthes" notion of psychoanalysis and the unconscious being read in relation to particu-
lar Freudian concerns - expressed perhaps most specifically in Freud"s text Recommendations 
for Physicians on the Psychoanalytic Method of Treatment.
17 S. Connor, Edison!s Teeth: Touching Hearing.
18 R. Barthes, Listening in The Responsibility of Forms, p. 255.
[The] voice is located at the articulation of body and discourse, and it is in this 
interspace that listening"s back-and-forth movement might be made. “To listen 
to someone, to hear his voice, requires on the listener"s part an attention open 
to the interspace of body and discourse and which contracts neither at the im-
pression of the voice nor at the expression of the discourse. What such listening 
offers is precisely what the speaking subject does not say: the unconscious tex-
ture which associates his body-as-site with his discourse: an active texture 
which reactualizes, in the subject"s speech, the totality of his history”... From 
this point of view, the psychoanalyst listening is a posture oriented towards ori-
gins, insofar as these origins are not considered as historical. The psychoana-
lyst, attempting to grasp the signifiers, learns to “speak” the language which is 
his patient"s unconscious.19
Here, of course, in pursuing a psychoanalytic receptivity  (without closure) the 
listener also places him/herself at risk. To listen without seeking determinacy is 
after all to open the self to the recognition of desire within others. Exposure to 
which could conceivably overwhelm us:
[for we] cannot, like Ulysses bound to his mast, “enjoy the spectacle of the si-
rens without risks and without accepting its consequences... There was some-
thing marvelous in that song, secret, simple, and everyday, which had to be 
immediately recognized... a song from the abyss which, once heard, opened an 
abyss in each word and lured one to vanish into it.” 20 
In listening then without presumptive authority, in listening with openness, in de-
veloping the modality  of psychoanalytic responsiveness that facilitates poly-
semy, we must risk our own well-being. We must allow for our own potential suf-
fering. 
But how does this play in the night? In the ocean of the nocturnal? How then to 
regard the condition of listening? And to what does insomnia bend our ear? In 
our state of exposure, to what do we remain vulnerable? Ours is not a dread of 
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19 Ibid. p. 255-256. The quotation is from the psychoanalyst Denis Vasse. 
20 Ibid. p. 256. The quotation is from M. Blanchot, Le Livre a Venir, 1959. 
subsumption, a fear of absolute immersion. Of our own absolute displacement. 
If the night is an augury of difference that compels the renunciation of !inward-
ness", perhaps the night also signals something further. At once both wondrous 
and horrifying, our listening, attuned to the !shimmering of signifiers"21 that attest 
to the uncontainable, may  pose within its occurrence the further question of 
emanation, and the possibility that we listen only to ourselves. That is, in the 
moment that questions the origin of nocturnal noise, there takes place a concur-
rent realisation of our own individual self-contained or, indeed, entrapped 
status. The recognition of which may conceivably  elicit a perception that we 
ourselves are potentially the source of any noise, that we hear always and only 
our own perpetually  isolated condition of existence. This listening, a listening 
that encroaches upon panic, is an !agnostic listening". A listening of incontro-
vertible uncertainty. Perhaps the otherwise is otherwise? Difference simply  a 
projection? 
And yet, here too perhaps, the emergence of an ethicality. For a nocturnal lis-
tening that !un-preoccupies" itself with difference is an opening for difference. 
That is, in the disregard or uncertainty  that relinquishes preoccupation with dif-
ference, and the thematising potential that exists even in terms of an opposi-
tional relation (difference being that which we are not), the process of !unthink-
ing" mobilises a condition of, as it were, inflected difference. So that it could be 
said that whilst alterity  cannot be approached or countenanced in terms of dif-
ference, since it could then be thought and thematised, it already overflows the 
condition in fact and marks it with this same excess. So that difference unfolds 
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21 Ibid. p. 259.
itself within a condition of overflowing compelled by our !inwardness", which is at 
the same time a condition of being !towards". 22
Here then, the paradox of !agnostic listening". The process of !towards" directing 
us to !the “inverse” of all differences, of all thinking, the “other side” that can 
never be reversed and become “this side”; it is the “side” that only “may be.”"23 
Difference being promulgated through unknowing or, indeed, indifference.
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22 T. de Boer, An Ethical Transcendental Philosophy in Face to Face with Levinas, ed. R. A. Co-
hen, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986. pp. 93-95. De Boer makes the point that 
Levinas must be read ethically - intimating that to do so one must read otherwise than in terms 
of opposition, even perhaps otherwise than in terms of difference.
23 K. Ziarek, Inflected Language: Towards a Hermeneutics of Nearness, Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1994. p. 76.
A reader might allow that the text is the space of the il y a. The unintelligibility of 
the same representing the uncoupling of writing and meaning.
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Bucket Music
Home of Andrew Marchant, Linda Pilsbury-Marchant and Martin Charter,    
North London, 
November 2009.
3 minutes 14 seconds.
Disc 2 track 3. Please press play.
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The Music of the Il y a.
A Prayer.
In postulating that the il y a may be an aesthetic, and specifically  musical, con-
struct (whilst not denying the possibility  of the il y a"s status as separate entity - 
but positing, rather, the mode of comprehension of, or approach to, the same as 
creative concern), we might say  that the condition of such is underscored or 
brought into being by a subject"s rhythmic uptake of Being that manifests itself 
within the recurring instant. That is, whilst the il y a may exist as the !unknow-
able", we strive to render it graspable through an aesthetic !filter", and in so do-
ing seek order in potential disorder and music (as an organising principle deliv-
ered via an overlay of rhythmic instantaneity) in uncontrollable noise. And we 
could perhaps argue, moreover, that whilst we individually !make" the music of 
the il y a (with the possibility that such music may sound different for every sub-
ject) the aspect of compulsion (the obligation to recurrently  take up existence) 
implies both an exterior authority and a commonality that in itself may  promote a 
possibility of social norms (inasmuch as we are all !called" to the recurrence of 
being"s uptake, all called to uphold the law affecting and effecting conditions of 
existence).   
But how, more specifically, to understand such a conception of music and 
rhythm here? Perhaps we could begin by foregrounding the notion of listening 
to music as a process of memory. Or more pointedly, a process of uncompre-
hending reception and post-event rationalisation or interpretation (a compre-
hension of our own inability  to comprehend, as it were, which in itself could also 
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be said to deliver the possibility  that the aesthetic renders for each of us a sug-
gested sense of alterity, though we may in fact be listening to ourselves only  - or 
perhaps a condition of alterity  which informs our constitution). Such movement 
might also be framed as an oscillation between the Dionysian and the 
Apollonian.1  An oscillation, that is, between immersion and (removed) contem-
plation. In relation to which, the designation of the il y a as a musical condition 
could be viewed as an attempt (albeit an attempt that is bound to ultimate fail-
ure) to control the uncontrollable horror of existence through a rationalisation 
that permits of an approach toward, and retreat from, difference read specifi-
cally as noise. 2
Variously, the il y a has been described in aural terms as a !murmur",3  a !rus-
tling",4  a !rumbling",5  an !incessant buzzing",6  a !heartrending bustling",7  an !in-
cessant droning".8  The delineation of the same conceivably attempting an ap-
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1 The reading of the Apollonian and Dionysian being drawn most specifically here through the 
Nietzsche of The Birth of Tragedy (F. Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, trans. C.P. Fadiman, New 
York: Dover Publications Inc., 1995), whilst allowing that both positions are effectively amalga-
mated under the Dionysian rubric in later works, and that the notion of Dionysus changes, it 
might be said, from a position of universality to an emphasis upon the subject"s !will to power", 
and even to a condition of the !monstrous". 
2 The aim here is to draw a parallel with the Kantian notion of approach to the sublime - wherein 
representation must always fail in its attempt to evoke, for example, the might of nature or the 
infinity of the universe, but permits in its very failure a perception of a metonym of representa-
tional inability as such before the transcendent dimension of reality - giving rise to an intimation 
(or perhaps an inflected apprehension), in fact, of the very same.
3 E. Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. A. Lingis, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 
1978. p. 59.
4 E. Levinas, Otherwise than Being: Or Beyond Essence, trans. R.A. Cohen, Pittsburgh: Du-
quesne University Press, 1998. pp. 55, 61.
5 Ibid. p. 163.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid. p. 183.
8 E. Levinas, A Conversation with Andre Dalmas in Proper Names, trans. M.B. Smith, California: 
Stanford University Press, 1975. p. 152.
prehension of the otherwise through a !saying of the unsayable", with naming 
becoming an attempt at the brokering of difference or indeed, through a musical 
framing, the subsumption of noise - wherein music is defined as:
 noise given form according to a code (in other words, according to rules of ar-
rangement and laws of succession, in a limited space, a space of sounds) that 
is theoretically knowable by the listener.9
 Our proposition in relation to such thought being that a musical reading posits a 
framework for Being wherein !instant rhythm" provides an overlay  for the consti-
tution of a system from which noise could be said to !generatively" take flight (or 
to strive to !un-music" itself), only to be overtaken and re-assimilated before tak-
ing flight once more (the condition of generative music being one, it could be 
said, of authorisation that gives way to, or encourages, loss of authority). 10
And in allowing such a reading, moreover, we could additionally argue that the 
music/noise determinable here may even be a manifestation or representation, 
of !will". That is, the will of the il y a to existence. The will to power.11  Though of 
course such !will" would be a drive, or the drive, of Being (or even potentially  the 
subjective drive to overcome Being), which ostensibly then elicits a question 
about the sustainable employment of musicality, or indeed aestheticism, in the 
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9 J. Attali, Noise: The Political Economy of Music, trans. B. Massumi, Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1985. p. 25.
10 Though our argument is not that the generative exists as music and/or non-music in fact, but 
more perhaps as sequential moments of authorisation and non-authorisation, or more perti-
nently, it could be argued, as moments of composition and improvisation. The thought being, by 
extension, that a generative notion of music may offer a more inherently ethical approach (in 
Levinasean terms) than other musical formations since the move towards assimilation is consis-
tently ruptured. 
11 The notion of which being obviously drawn through the Nietzschean postulation (see F. Nietz-
sche, The Will to Power, trans. W. Kafmann and R.J. Hollingdale, ed. W. Kaufmann, New York: 
Vintage Books Edition, 1968).
delivery of the condition of such a force, since will, according to certain modes 
of thought, constitutes the !antithesis of the esthetic [and its] purely contempla-
tive, and passive frame of mind",12  drawing a definite distinction !between the 
concept of essence and the concept of phenomenon".13  But that is to perhaps 
reinforce the perspective in fact that posits musical apprehension as a move-
ment between uncomprehending immersion and comprehending reflection, as 
well as foregrounding the sense that !failure", or the specific failure to objectify, 
becomes yet the means by which the otherwise (as intimation or inflection) is 
actually rendered !knowable". 
In positing a notion of !power", however, we might also consider the relation of 
the same to music and its function in relation to the societal, wherein music 
could be said to participate in !the crystallization of social organization in an 
order".14  That is, in conceding the potential for a musical !appositeness to a 
code of power",15 we might then wonder about the condition of such a code, and 
whether music"s function in relation to the same might really  be allowed, in fact, 
!a minor form of sacrifice",16  and if so, in what sense the term !sacrifice" is to be 
understood.
To comprehend such a reading, of course, the condition of noise might perhaps 
first be properly determined as the will towards death or an !essential violence" 
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12 F. Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, Or Hellenism and Pessimism, trans. C.P. Fadiman,  New 
York, Dover Publications Inc., 1995. p. 19. 
13 Ibid. 
14 J. Attali, Noise: The Political Economy of Music, p. 25.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
(which is written through the condition of Being, or the will towards Being), con-
stituting an interruption to transmission, a disconnection, an act of violence. In 
effect, its destructive propensity determines it as !a simulacrum of murder".17  In 
relation to which, music as the organisation or !channelization of noise"18  be-
comes, by extension, itself a !simulacrum of the sacrifice".19  That is, as a means 
of approach to, as well as control of, the condition of difference represented by 
noise, music could be allowed !a sublimation, an exacerbation of the imaginary, 
at the same time as the creation of social order and political integration".20 
Such a perspective is to be understood perhaps most specifically in relation to 
the notion of the Scapegoat as a bearer of, or substitute for, the notion of an es-
sential violence as it informs the condition of the social.21  The Scapegoat 
emerging within ancient societies as an agency (designated through political or 
religious power) for the prevention of a disseminated violence unleashed as a 
consequence of, it could be said, covetousness and rivalry. So that the real or 
imaginary sacrificing of the Scapegoat !polarized all of the potential violence, 
recreating differences, a hierarchy, an order, a stable society".22
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17 Ibid. p. 26.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid. As delineated by Attali following the reading of the same in the anthropologist Rene Gi-
rard"s determination of the role of ritual sacrifice in ancient societies as a political channeling 
agency for the condition of a general violence, itself prompted through conditions of competing 
desire and terror of identity and difference. The origin of the term deriving from the biblical and 
pre-biblical practice of driving an animal into the wilderness, as a bearer of iniquities, and as an 
act of ritual purification (see R.Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. P. Gregory, Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1977).
22 Ibid.
The conception of the Scapegoat as sacrifice (and its alignment with music) is 
not, however, to be read in too simplistic a sense. As the intermediary, it could 
be said, between mankind and the divine, it is both excluded and worshipped, 
desired and repulsed, an object of !Power and Submission. God and 
Nothingness".23  And in its status as !bearer", of social sin or wrongdoing (or as 
witness to the same) and presence or intimation of the divine (or witness to the 
same), it takes upon itself a responsibility that renders it victim, suppliant, power 
and authority. 
And in comprehending the condition of the Scapegoat as such, and transposing 
it to the notion of, and relation between, music and noise, it becomes evident 
that the same are not simply  moments of polarity. Noise, for example, as !a 
resonance that interferes with the audition of a message in the process of emis-
sion",24  is largely framed as a destructive agency, an instrument of torture, pain 
or death:
In its biological reality, noise is a sense of pain. Beyond a certain limit, it be-
comes an immaterial weapon of death. The ear which transforms sound signals 
into electric impulses addressed to the brain, can be damaged, and even de-
stroyed, when the frequency of a sound exceeds 20,000 hertz, or when its in-
tensity exceeds 80 decibels. Diminished intellectual capacity, accelerated respi-
ration and heartbeat, hypertension, slowed digestion, neurosis, altered diction: 
these are the consequences of excessive sound in the environment. 25
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23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid. p. 27.
But noise can also be allowed !a source of exaltation, a kind of therapeutic drug 
capable of curing tarantula bites or... “fourteen forms of melancholy.”"26  So that 
noise could also be apprehended as a positive or benign force, and in linking it 
with a condition of the !beyond Being" (the condition, indeed, with which music 
seeks communion), we could perhaps determine the same as the presence of 
terrifying/benevolent divinity (a destructive/healing God?).
    
And in the alignment with music, it becomes possible to then conceive of musi-
cality as an attempt to order and control the dissonance of noise (to reimpose 
the social), to organise a moment, as it were, of !controlled panic",27 but it could 
also be read as simply  an attempt at the communication with the primordial 
condition of noise, the exteriority of noise (as the difference beyond existence), 
and in that sense constitutes a mode, in fact, of prayer.28  Prayer effectively 
functioning within such a context as a volitional connection to an extraneous 
condition (of other authority), its agency functioning however as intimation 
rather than pointed representation of such alterity  (prayer existing, we might 
say, as a condition of knowing without knowledge, rather than presumptive 
intuition).29 
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26 Ibid. The quotation is from Boissier de Sauvages (see F.B. de Sauvages de la Croix, Noso-
logica methodica, Amstelodami, 1763).
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 The reading of intuition here deriving through a Husserlian conception of the same (see E. 
Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. J.N. Findlay, London: Routledge, 1973).
The connection with the theological foregrounding, moreover, a sense of the 
terrible/benign !noiseful" God of Judeo-Christian religion,30  and music"s align-
ment not only with prayer but the condition of atonement (through sacrifice) of 
!Christus Victor".31  Such a condition should perhaps be regarded, however, as a 
recurrent concern (when considered in relation to the instant), rather than abso-
lute cessation of the cyclical condition that atonement might imply  (the notion of 
atonement as !ransom" aligning itself, additionally, with a conception of endur-
ance through !necessary violence"). 
 
Music then, as a process of sacrifice, a process of scapegoating and prayer, 
presents a doubled moment, as it were, of witnessing or bearing witness to. And 
we might say that it in fact carries as witness the iniquities of a noise-filled world 
(as !channelization of noise",32  indeed of murderous noise, for which music be-
comes a simulacrum of ritual murder) towards an exteriority (towards the divine, 
and the condition of pardon that the same might represent), whilst simultane-
ously conveying as witness an intimation of the same exteriority (or divinity) in 
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30 J. Attali, Noise: The Political Economy of Music, p. 27. As Attali observes, the Old Testament 
suggests that  man does not hear noise until after the original sin has been committed, and the 
first noise he hears are the footsteps of God.
31  Christus Victor being the title of Gustaf Aulén"s 1931 text (see G. Aulén, Christus Victor: An 
Historical Study of the Three Main Types of the Idea of Atonement, trans. A. G. Hebert, New 
York: Macmillan, 1969) in which he drew attention to the early Church considerations of the 
Atonement, and in relation to which Girard delineated the notion of Jesus as Scapegoat and 
figure of redemptive self-sacrifice (see R.Girard, Violence and the Sacred).                                    
Aulén identifies three main types of Atonement theory - namely !ransom", !satisfaction" and 
!moral influence" - the first of which delineates a deliverance of humankind, from Satanic op-
pression, through a !ransomed" Christ, whose Resurrection proves redemptive. The intention 
with such a conception here being to frame it not only in relation to the condition of the Scape-
goat, but also the !necessary violence" of Winnicottian Infant/Mother theory (whilst accepting 
that the conditions are not absolutely interchangeable), wherein a notion of difference is proved 
sustainable through a propensity to endure (see for example D.W. Winnicott, The use of an Ob-
ject and Relating through Identifications in Playing and Reality, London: Routledge, 1991. pp. 
86-94). At a personal level, equally, we could say that the !bearing" of music as sacrifice consti-
tutes a reading of !will" as the desire and attempt to in fact overcome sin/failings within the Self. 
32 J. Attali, Noise: The Political Economy of Music, p. 26.
the opposite direction (and always allowing that at the same time the condition 
of noise could itself be said to constitute the very essence of exteriority, the very 
essence of the divine). 
 
At the heart of the condition of music, however, in its movement between the 
noise of the world and the noise of the heavens, is an intentionality that aims at 
the societal. Both in the process of sacrifice and the process of representation 
there exists a pointed sense of commonality, of a striving for the implementation 
of social norms. Such a perspective being conceived, moreover, in parallel with 
the religious:
The channeling power of music, like that of religion, is quite real and quite op-
erative. Like an individual, a society cannot recover from a psychosis without 
reliving the various phases of its terror; and music, deep down induces a reliv-
ing of noise"s fundamental endowment with form, the channelization of the es-
sential violence... [The work of the musician]  is political because it is religious, 
[and] serves to integrate and channel anxiety, violence, and the imaginary, and 
to repress marginality. 33
So that in effect, music functions as that which might be deemed a !promise of 
reconciliation",34  determining therein an essential function of ritual sacrifice in 
religious processes - namely the reconciliation of subjects with the social order:
[T]he production of music has as its function the creation, legitimation and main-
tenance of order. Its primary function is not to be sought  in aesthetics, which is 
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33 Ibid. p. 30.
34 Ibid. the quotation taken from Adorno (see T.W. Adorno, The Philosophy of the New Music, 
trans. A. Mitchell and W. Blomstel, New York: Seabury Press, 1973).
a modern invention, but in the effectiveness of its participation in social regula-
tion. 35   
 
And in reading the same in relation to the il y a, and the il y a as a condition of 
music (or in fact a condition of noise that is approached through a musical read-
ing, or perhaps a musical overlay), we could in fact allow that the il y a may be a 
vehicle, a portal, that connects our own condition of existence with the condition 
of difference (through intimation), as well as being, at the same time, a reposi-
tory for social ills. So that the il y a is itself to be framed as a duality  - a locus of 
divinity  and a locus of the base (and perhaps we could even begin to equate the 
notion of such !baseness" not with a sense of sin specifically, but a !materiality" 
of experience which is !thickness, coarseness, massivity, wretchedness",36  in 
essence the marginalised of existence, made apparent in the presentation of 
music as sacrifice that in turn renders the il y a available).
The attempt to apprehend the condition of the otherwise that pertains to the il y 
a, however, is of course inadequate. We can never in absolute terms grasp  a 
condition of absolute difference without reducing it to a condition of the Same. 
Or, perhaps more properly, we can never in fact simply  grasp  the condition of 
difference at all without immediately negating it, and in the moment of appre-
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35 Ibid.
36 E. Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. A. Lingis, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 
1978. p. 51. The thought here being to align a thinking about sacrifice and art (and music spe-
cifically in this context) with the Levinasean contention that certain forms of modern art compel 
an awareness of an untypified, even fearful, condition of material experience. So that we might 
say that art is here a foregrounding of the unbidden, the unpleasant, the unsettling, with the un-
covering of the same constituting an excess of experience. The notion of a !material" condition 
of musicality, moreover, posits music as substantive rather than ephemera, and could perhaps 
be conceived in relation to Stockhausen"s conception of a music carved from “homogenously 
filled acoustical space.” (Robin Maconie, The Works of Stockhausen, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 47).
hension the condition of exteriority is lost. So that the notion of comprehension 
becomes an impossibility. The attempt to apprehend, as it were, itself arrests 
the very condition of apprehension. The question then becoming one of how to 
acknowledge the presence of difference at all (and of course how we might 
!know" that difference is present when such knowledge must render it a condi-
tion of the Same). 
The answer that we might look to, in fact, lays in the understanding that an ap-
proach through music (as a condition of representation) is an acknowledgement 
of the encounter itself, rather than an apprehension of the !object" of encounter. 
That is, in the moment of !exposure" a reflexive propensity acknowledges the 
self"s inability to comprehend, which (somewhat perversely) facilitates a com-
prehension of difference as !trace". The trace constituting a presence of abso-
lute difference without definition.
Such an approach to the condition of otherness, of course, recalls the notion of 
approach to the sublime. Prior to the evocation of which (in an encounter, for 
example, with the might of nature), a subject is able to give free reign to the play 
of imagination within the world, and to secure a sense of belonging and “fur-
therance of life.”37  The apprehension of an exteriority represented by the sub-
125
37 I. Kant, The Critique of the Power of Judgement in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of 
Immanuel Kant, trans. P. Guyer and E. Matthews, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001. p. 128.
lime, however, denies the possibility of such play. Here, the encounter reduces 
a subject to incomprehension and utter dumbfoundedness. 38
The ethical propensity of the aesthetic, however, consists in an inward focus 
that structures a commentary upon its own condition of presence and its own 
inability to represent the unrepresentable (despite its attempt at the very  same), 
which leaves the condition of absolute difference intact. That is, in the encoun-
ter with the sublime, the subject"s state of unsettlement and incomprehension in 
the face of difference becomes the condition to which the artwork bears wit-
ness, but in so doing is also testament to the fact of its own inability  to give rep-
resentation to the otherwise. In the course of which, it could be said that such 
failure in fact establishes an inflected referral to the otherwise or unrepresent-
able, becoming a !scheme that succeeds through its very failure"39 (accepting of 
course that !failure" within such a context is not failure in an absolute sense - or 
that it may  not even be failure as such at all). And that such a moment, moreo-
ver, which we might countenance as a !second moment" in the encounter with 
the difference constituted via the sublime, could be understood as an alignment 
with a condition of musical reception - inasmuch as listening to music is a proc-
ess of dumbfoundedness followed by rationalisation (though we are making 
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38 In evoking a parallel between Levinas and Kant, in fact, we might look to the notion of repre-
sentation as it exists in relation to a condition of the sublime (or the sublime as a manifestation 
of difference), and its relation here to both philosophers, as a condition of !failure". For Levinas 
(or most specifically, the Levinas of Otherwise than Being) there is a recurrent attempt at the 
denial and denunciation of his own representational procedure and ambition (the paradoxical 
concern to which Levinas takes himself to be responding, being the paradox of !representing the 
unrepresentable"). The Kantian approach, however, offers an acquiescent approach to the no-
tion of !failure", so that a reflexive understanding of representation"s impotence is built into the 
process of representation itself. The sublime thereby overwhelming the condition of normal 
phenomenological self-experience, with the same intimating a !beyond" of such experience, and 
allowing for the formulation of a schema that is !successful" through its very failure. 
39 S. Zizek, The Ticklish Subject, London: Verso, 1999. p. 40.
such rationalisation a pointedly reflexive concern here, as an acknowledgement 
of the self"s dumbfoundedness, rather than an apprehension of particular 
meaning).40
So that we pursue a situation, it could be said, wherein the impossibility of com-
prehension becomes still a situation within which we adduce a representation of 
such impossibility. Such a condition is not an adequate representation, as it 
were, of that which it could be said the first movement (towards representation) 
failed to apprehend. Though it should also be understood that such a move-
ment"s attempt to represent is actually necessary since it elicits failure - which in 
turn is a prerequisite for the realisation that it cannot represent the unrepresent-
able, but maintains always an inflected relation with the same. The failure to 
represent meaning that the alterity  of the !noumenal"41 entity is indirectly  always 
kept in question.
       
And art as a condition of representation reinforces such a perspective, since its 
process of re-presentation is a communication of the !presence" of the unset-
tlement prompted by the encounter with difference. Though that is not to frame 
such as the !presence of being",42  and does not indicate a mystical communion 
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40 Following Jean Francois Lyotard"s reading of the condition  of !dumbfoundedness" (J-F. Lyo-
tard, Presence in The Language of Art History, ed. S. Kemall and I. Gaskell, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1991. pp. 26-27)  triggering artistic response (which itself parallels the 
Kantian response to the sublime), and which could be aligned with the view of listening to music 
propounded by Morton Feldman, amongst others, for whom we employ a process of uncompre-
hending hearing that is followed immediately by rationalisation or comprehension. Listening, in 
that sense, constituting a memory or witnessing of the initial moment of incomprehension.
41 !Noumenal", in Kantian theory, representing an object as it is in itself, as the !thing in-itself", 
independent of the cognitive attempt at apprehension, and in opposition to the notion of phe-
nomenon (see I. Kant, The Critique of the Power of Judgement in The Cambridge Edition of the 
Works of Immanuel Kant).
42 J-F. Lyotard, Presence in The Language of Art History, p. 24.
with the event (of encounter) nor its equivalent, which would determine an ap-
prehension (and assimilation). Rather, it attempts a re-presentation of dumb-
foundedness through acknowledgement of its own !inauthenticity" and a pointing 
towards the impossibility of adequation and comprehension. In effect, it bears 
witness to the unrepresentable through a presentation of its own condition of 
existence - existing (beyond the intentions of its author) as its own communica-
tion, with !the message [being]... the messenger",43  and the author no longer 
speaking as !I" in the revelation of presence.
In relation to such thinking, then, we might allow that difference is irreducible to 
our calculative comprehension but remains at the edge of consciousness. There 
must also exist, however, a sense within which the very awareness of !pres-
ence" or awareness of the !something [that] took place"44 (when speaking of the 
event to which the aesthetic may constitute a bearing witness), might be read 
as an a priori assumption of difference. That is not to define the same, however, 
as a condition of intuition, which could be determined as presumptive knowl-
edge, but rather as a knowing, perhaps we could say, without knowledge. Such 
knowing existing as an awareness of difference"s irreducibility  and subjective 
failure to represent the same, with such failure presenting, at the same time, a 
particular condition of ethicality  in the emphasis it affords non or mis-
apprehension. 45
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43 J-F. Lyotard, Newman: The Instant in The Inhuman, trans. G. Bennington and R. Bowlby, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991. p. 81.
44 J-F. Lyotard, Presence in The Language of Art History, pp. 14-15.
45 The intention here being to distance such a condition of knowing from the Husserlian phe-
nomenological, and the Bergsonian intuitive, which could both arguably be deemed presump-
tive.  
At work then in the encounter with difference is a dualism of responsiveness 
that both acknowledges (or recognises) alterity and concedes that the same is 
precisely not another intra-worldly object or condition (and therefore beyond the 
realm of experience, including recognition). Such oppositional perspectives be-
ing coextensively assumed, it could be said, in the comportment towards an-
other, with the implicit possibility that such a mode of responsiveness is actually 
inherent. We already comprehend in our failure to comprehend. The condition 
facilitating, moreover, a potential for acknowledgement of mediation in the re-
sponse to the otherness of the Other (an acceptance that an object can exist, 
and function as filter, between ourselves and absolute difference). 46
At stake in relation to such a view is the possibility of an acceptance of a signi-
fier that signifies, as it were, an absence of adequate signification. And rather 
than framing the objects of approach to difference as simply conditions of in-
adequacy per se, they  might be apprehended rather as processes of normative 
coding that are akin to the occurrence of sublime objects, which fail to give form 
to that which is evoked by our Ideas of Reason (God, the Good beyond Being 
etc.) yet in fact evoke or bear witness to such Ideas in the same (rhythmic) in-
stant through an indirect or inflected testament. Effectively, a subject succeeds 
in !knowing" difference through recognising that he/she can only ever fail to 
know such difference.
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46 Such an acceptance is not something that Levinas is prepared to allow, of course, especially 
as it might be formulated within the aesthetic, arguing that the difference that confronts the sub-
ject invokes only itself in its condition of Otherness. That said, however, the Levinasean notion 
of ethicality is grounded within a sense, it could be contended, of metaphor - inasmuch as the 
Other could be deemed a vessel for absolute difference, and the application of the same is an 
evident device (especially in Otherwise than Being) which allows the ethical to signify in its attri-
bution to language (a linguistic condition rendering ethicality, as it were, via its application to 
ontological language). 
And framed in terms of a social consequence, a code of moral law would osten-
sibly appear to repress the condition of singularity (any law, as with the sublime 
object"s inability to adequately represent difference, must fail to acknowledge 
the singularity of individuals and the otherness of Others through the need for 
commonality, the need for community), yet it may be possible to conceive of 
particularity precisely through an application of such where an implicit accep-
tance of the same, in its inadequate treatment of individuality, takes place. That 
is, in the acceptance of an overarching schema in the condition of normative 
law a subject has an inbuilt propensity  to indirectly recognise at the same time a 
!beyond" of the prescriptive, and to treat of the singularity of another. Indeed, the 
singularity of difference.
And in re-foregrounding the notion of Sacrifice and its relation with music, we 
might argue that a sense of musicality  then underpins the process of law as a 
means of social organisation, and that subjective particularity becomes the 
Scapegoat in the facilitation of communality and order. A subject must effec-
tively destroy alterity (albeit symbolically), or another"s individuality, in order that 
a condition of general stability might prevail, and in the same instant the recog-
nition of the inadequacy of the same facilitates a receptivity  towards particularity 
(and the exteriority that such individuality represents).47  Here then, a space is 
formulated within which the unrepresentable Otherness of others is realised via 
a !letting of the other be" in the redirection of focus. A facing, perhaps, without 
facing.  
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47  Linking of course with the Winnicottian notion of !good violence" in the relation between 
mother and child.
A reader is invited to recognise the occurrence of his/her own state of with-
drawal through reading. The retreat to a position of "home! being the position 
from which a subject might acknowledge difference.
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Hypostasis and the Rhythmic Intimacy of Dwelling.1
A Prayer.
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1 As several commentators (Simone de Beauvoir, Luce Irigaray, Stella Sandford amongst oth-
ers) have observed, and as it should be acknowledged here, of course, Levinas"s treatment of 
the feminine, pointedly linking conceptions of !woman", !home", !domesticity" and !dwelling", 
would appear a wilful reinforcement of patriarchal precepts in the structuring of the Symbolic 
Order. Such treatment determining the development of the male ego as autonomously derived, 
as competitive, domineering and privileged - and in direct opposition, moreover, to the empa-
thetic nature of the female ego, itself formulated via a particular propensity for connectivity and 
nurture.                                                                                                                                              
That may, however, be to too readily presume an essentialist perspective in terms of Levi-
nasean thought. Tina Chanter in fact indicates two significant points of enquiry in relation to Lev-
inasean texts that question such presumption. Namely, the value of comprehending the work 
from a feminine point of view and, additionally, the value of comprehending the distinction be-
tween the feminine as concept and the feminine as actuality. (T. Chanter, Time, Death and the 
Feminine: Levinas with Heidegger, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2001). In relation to 
which, we might also foreground the Levinasean approach to language (or perhaps the ap-
proach most especially employed in Otherwise than Being: Or Beyond Essence), giving particu-
lar emphasis to the notion of scepticism, and read the same in relation to the condition of ma-
ternity, which may itself be allowed then an agitative substratum of paternalist discursiveness.       
That is, in comprehending the nature of language as itself an amphibology (the constant pro-
pensity for ambiguity within the structure of meaning), wherein a condition of scepticism pro-
pounds, as it were, a consistently interruptive event within language"s own mode of being, the 
notion of the feminine (or the feminine read in terms of motherhood and the prenatal most nota-
bly) might be similarly determined as the metaphoric bearer of, or agency for, recurring doubt, 
contestation and difference, within the !language" (and the paternalist ontology) of Being.               
In taking such a view into account, it should also be recognised that maternity itself proffers a 
very particular paradigmatic ethical responsiveness, as attendant vehicle of alimentation, as 
intimation of the transubstantive, and (pointedly aligned with Levinasean thinking) as condition 
of asymmetric substitution. The maternal body functioning therein as both host and hostage 
(host/age) in relation to the condition of alterity exemplified by the unborn child (the maternal 
body representing the antithesis of the secure or neutral conception of subjectivity, in fact, with 
the loss of control at the body"s boundary - the skin - expressing both literally and symbolically 
the suffering and pain of responsibility as it is played out through the conditions of pregnancy 
and childbirth).                                                                                                                                   
In relation to which, of course, it could perhaps also be noted that the constitution of the !face" 
within Levinasean thought, the encounter with which is determined as the critical focus of sub-
jective destabilisation within existence, has itself been aligned with the feminine. This linking to 
the notion of the first face we each generally encounter (our own mother"s) and the conception 
of the same as that which constitutes the welcome to the condition of dwelling. Yet in fixing upon 
the sense of !home" here, it might also be important to consider that the same is held to take 
place in relation to a gendered determination of welcome as feminine, but host as masculine, 
which arguably proffers in turn the apprehension that masculine and feminine subjectivities 
have in fact ceased to exist within this instance, or are, rather, inseparable from each other (the 
same linking to the oscillatory propensity realised within subjective conditions of host and hos-
tage, and host and guest - Francois Raffoul indicating the fact that !hote" can refer in French to 
both terms (F. Raffoul, The Subject of the Welcome: On Jacques Derrida!s Adieu à Emmanuel 
Levinas, Symposium, II, 2, 1998. pp. 211 - 222).                                                                              
Elsewhere, Levinas has conflated the maternal body with the psyche, suggesting that “the one-
for-the-other has the form of sensibility or vulnerability, pure passivity or susceptibility, passive to 
the point of becoming an inspiration, that is, alterity in the same... psyche in the form of a hand 
that gives even the bread taken from its own mouth. Here the psyche is the maternal body...” (E. 
Levinas, Otherwise than Being: Or Beyond Essence, trans. A. Lingis, Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1998. p. 67). And in so determining matters, we might then conclude that a 
The condition of oscillation within Being, an ostensible movement between 
longing and recoil, is in fact prompted, it could be said, by a concern (in both 
instances) with, and for, flight or evasion, and desire for the !otherwise than be-
ing". That is, as a consequence of the overwhelming desire for the Good that is 
beyond being,2  a subject is both drawn to the trace of absolute alterity (as ex-
pression or intimation of the !beyond") manifested by another within existence 
(or, indeed, the otherness of Being), whilst simultaneously feeling repelled by 
the possibility  of being !riveted"3 within an existence that precludes the possibil-
ity of escape (and, therefore, access to the !beyond"). And yet, affirmation of ex-
istence - of our own condition as existents - is imperative if we are to actually 
locate a means at all of deliverance, as it were, from being. In the constitution of 
an existence, in the rhythmic condition of the instant, we must actively, and re-
peatedly, take up the same existence with which we are affected (and effected), 
in order to apprehend an alterity which may facilitate flight (as well as provide 
the possibility of pardon). We cannot simply exist with our existence, but must 
take up a position with specific regard to it.4  We must embrace our condition of 
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Levinasean notion of maternity structures a movement that operates beyond a simplistic sym-
bolic sense of inhabitation to arrive at a comprehension of the maternal body as that which has 
the form both of a dwelling for the Other and a context of indwelling, as it were, for the Self as 
fundamental exposure to the Other. Here then, there is no !fixing" of gendered roles as such, no 
movement to determine essentialist positions, but the employment of a trope that arguably un-
shackles itself from the designatory, rather, and establishes the grounds for notions of a primary 
ethical relation.
2 Plato, The Republic Book VI, trans. P. Shores, New York: Putnam"s, 1930. The notion of the 
Good beyond being is drawn from the Platonic conception of the Good which denotes the high-
est idea, the idea which casts light upon all other ideas to render them intelligible, and which 
provides here an ethical perspective for thought.
3  The term !riveted" occurs within a number of Levinasean texts, most notably perhaps Exis-
tence and Existents and On Escape, as a particularly striking description of the binding condi-
tion of being -  the latter text, moreover, lending a particular emphasis to the corporeal sense of 
the same. 
4 A. Lingis, Translator!s Introduction in E. Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. A. Lingis, 
Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1978. p. xxi. 
being as !Geworfenheit" (or !thrownness"),5  as an abandonment to possibilities, 
and allow that it is necessary that the same assert itself as !the fatality of being-
riveted to that which we cannot desert",6  in order that we might, in fact, ulti-
mately transcend our own state of existence. But how is such a process to be 
effected? How does one evade the self through auto-positing and self-
affirmation? Or could the notion of escape be afforded in any other way (might 
we even speak of degrees of flight or withdrawal)? And how might we appre-
hend the same?
To !position" the self, put simply, or to posit the self in terms of !hypostasis" more 
specifically, is to contractually, as it were, take up  existence (which is also to 
presuppose that Being is distinct from beings). The notion of !hypostasis", itself 
designating !the suspension of the anonymous there is",7  also significantly sig-
nals the !apparition of a private domain",8 though the same might be understood 
as event (or more properly, as the transformation of event into existent) rather 
than location. Within the occurrence of the same, however, or within the consid-
eration by a subject of his/her own existence within the same, we might argue 
that a subject !goes forth outside from an inwardness".9 That is, in the uptake of 
being a subject"s movement of apprehension signals a potential, at the same 
time, for a retreat or withdrawal within existence, that itself determines a posi-
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5 J. Rolland, Annotations  in E. Levinas. On Escape, De l!evasion, eds. M. Bal and H. de Vries, 
introduced and annotated by J. Rolland, trans. B. Bergo, California: Stanford University Press, 
2003. p. 74. The term, and notion, are Heidegger"s (see M. Heidegger, Being and Time, New 
York: Harper and Rowe, 1962).
6 J. Rolland, Annotations  in E. Levinas, On Escape, De l!evasion,  p. 75.
7 E. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 83.
8 Ibid.
9 E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. A. Lingis, Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1969, p. 152.
tion from which to grasp  the materiality of being, so that ![t]he I in the world has 
an inside and an outside".10  And though sleep  (a condition of the unconscious 
within consciousness), can be determined similarly (as itself a !withdrawal into 
the plenum"11 in fact), our concern here is with the notion, rather, of !dwelling"12 
(to be aligned with the notion of !private domain"13) which is constituted through 
ambiguous subjective enjoyment of the world as a peremptory effectuation of 
the postponement of the anonymity of the il y a, and occurring most specifically 
through the occasion of an !intimacy of recollection".14  The essential nature of 
which might be determined as a position of recoil, prompted in response to an 
exteriority, that does not return to the immanency of oneself. Effectively, we 
might determine such movement, of advancement and recoil (indeed of opening 
and closure), as the rhythmic underpinning (once more) of the event of exis-
tence within the world, framed not as a condition of oppositional situations but 
as a doubling of space into an interval of postponement and separation.
Perhaps the most important aspect of dwelling, however, lays in the sense that 
the postponement it occasions of the il y a is dependent, as suggested, upon an 
intimacy that is not to be determined in the relation between a subject and being 
nor to be presupposed as a primary condition of the quotidian, but as a forma-
tion of !gentleness"15 that precedes the sense of !recollection"16 or indeed actual 
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11 Ibid. p. 70.
12 E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, pp. 152-174.
13 E. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 83. 
14 E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, p. 155.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
postponement of the il y a. Recollection signalling a summoning up that is de-
pendent upon a condition of welcome,17  with the same being at once a condi-
tion of difference but without being one of extraneousness. Effectively, the no-
tion of difference here then, as a condition of openness or hospitality, is a condi-
tion or place within being and the being, it might be said, within a being (per-
haps we might even speak of a !domesticity of being"). And in the alignment of 
the same with the conception of subjectivity, and the condition of !welcome" as a 
pointedly feminine emanation, we find, moreover, a reading that links sexual 
identity to an ambiguous unicity  of subjecthood beyond the limits of the inten-
tional ego. And in associating sexuality then with the subjectivity of dwelling, we 
might begin to claim that sexuality is neither biologically nor sociologically de-
termined, but is in fact an integral aspect of a subject"s unique identity, facilitat-
ing a condition of subjective !unfixedness" and the possibility  of multiple poten-
tial meanings in relation to the same.
And underpinning such thinking is the possibility for the intimacy  associated with 
the feminine to propound an ontological significance undermining the status of 
existence as a play of anonymous forces. Intimacy should not be compre-
hended as an opposition to a primary alienation, but rather as characteristic of 
it. Such a condition reversing, moreover, the notion of the feminine as the 
!mother earth" from which man (with emphasis upon the masculine) becomes 
alienated.
But how to read the notion of ethicality in relation to the same? Can the wel-
come afforded by the condition of dwelling, and which establishes a specific re-
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lation with exteriority, be allowed a genuinely ethical status? Ostensibly, it would 
seem unlikely, since the postponement (of the il y a) effected through intimacy 
posits the subjectivity of !intentional consciousness"18 as a will without inherent 
powers of comprehension, but with a relation to the world which it !possesses" 
across a distance. And whilst the arbitrary condition of the will undermines sub-
jective intentionality, it does not preclude the possibility that it lacks at the same 
time a violent propensity. So that an ethical dimension would appear sustain-
able only in relation to the unique encounter with difference, the unique encoun-
ter with the Other (and realised most specifically in terms of the process of !fac-
ing"). The notion of ethicality  being dependent, in effect, upon the condition of 
!graspable" difference.
Perhaps such a concern, however, might be considered more specifically in re-
lation to a notion of intentionality and light in order to foreground at least a po-
tential for ethicality as an essential component of dwelling or the !domesticity of 
being". Consider therefore, the notion that the ego takes possession of the 
world, but !is not overwhelmed by that possession and keeps a distance from 
the object... which is what distinguishes an intention from enjoyment",19  with 
![t]his possession at a distance... [representing that which] constitutes the inten-
tionality  of intentions".20  The relation, of course, with !existence", itself being 
event and relationship  but not substantive, would appear to function a little dif-
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18 E.Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson, 
London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1931. p. 133. Husserlian thought suggesting that con-
sciousness is intentional insofar as it refers to, or is directed at, an object. Intentionality being a 
property of !directedness" toward an object. So that whilst consciousness may have intentional 
and non-intentional phases, intentionality is what gives consciousness its objective meaning.
19 E. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 38.
20 Ibid. pp. 38-39.
ferently inasmuch as ![t]he I does not turn to its existence... [but] is enthralled by 
it... [So that] one possesses existence, but is also possessed by it".21 The effec-
tive difference perhaps being between a notion of phenomenological !graspabil-
ity" grounded in the real and the assumed or presumed, and the absolutely as-
sumed or imagined. But we might yet allow, for all that, a notion of !retreat" or an 
!attitude of reserve"22 as still being operative in relation to existence specifically 
because of, or through, the process of intellection. Thought structuring a simul-
taneity of forward and backward movement that strives, it could be said, for both 
apprehension and distance.
But how does thought achieve such a position? Or how, more pointedly, does it 
achieve the same in relation to the condition of the non-substantive? In fact, 
thought might be most readily understood as the !clarity  or the dawning of a 
light",23  with such light facilitating the !enveloping of the exterior by the inward, 
which is the very structure of the cogito and of sense".24  That which comes from 
without is, as it were, !already ours in the horizon which precedes it... [coming] 
into being as though it came from us, as though commanded by our freedom"25 
(freedom being facilitated via the condition of distance). So that thought is then, 
effectively, a process of knowledge, with the mind !taken to be what knows",26 
and !acts of  feeling, suffering, desiring or willing belong to the life of the mind by 
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virtue of the fact of being conscious, being experiences, being thoughts in the 
Cartesian sense".27
The movement towards something, however (including a movement towards 
the !sensed" object or non-object, the movement indeed towards existence), is 
shadowed always by a retreat:
[T]hough it tends unambiguously toward an object, knowing is essentially a way 
of being on the hither side of being. It is a way of relating to events while still be-
ing able to not be caught up in them. To be a subject is to be a power of unend-
ing withdrawal, an ability always to find oneself behind what happens to one. 28 
And the  condition  persists even in terms  of self-apprehension. To conceive of 
the self is always to withdraw from such conception, so that a subject is en-
gaged in an endless condition of displacement, wherein !a subject  is never one 
with the idea it can have of itself; it is already a freedom with regard to all ob-
jects, a drawing back, an “as for me...”" 29
Effectively then, we might allow a movement of simultaneity  through knowledge, 
that is both advancing apprehension and relinquishing retreat. And such retreat, 
as we have proposed, is the locus of !dwelling" or that which we have deemed 
!the domesticity  of being" (which could perhaps itself be equated, moreover, with 
a notion of musicality  as the !recollection" of noise, or the establishment of a 
context for the apprehension of difference without the absolute presumption of 
appropriation. In effect, such movement operating as perhaps the will towards 
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the postponement of the il y a, and the condition of the il y a as unfettered 
noise. Or equally, we might determine the condition of dwelling as theoretical 
retreat, the presence of a source text operating as the condition of !feminine 
other"30  within the habitation of an interpretive text). So that in the imagining of 
the condition of existence (with emphasis being afforded the creative potential 
of thought), there conceivably occurs a !grasping" advance that signals a coex-
tensive process of continuous withdrawal. 
That is not, however, to specifically posit the notion of dwelling as an action of 
free will, but rather as an autochthonous inevitability. Though the significant dif-
ference between dwelling and enjoyment (albeit that they are not mutually  ex-
clusive) as moments of subjectivity lays in their willingness, or otherwise, to, as 
it were, acknowledge the relation of subjectivity to the condition of being as il y 
a. Enjoyment aiming at a conception of the primary  relation to the world as pre-
clusive of the relation of existence to the il y a, whereas dwelling and the post-
ponement it effects, not only  foregrounds the question of the specific relation-
ship between subjectivity  and being, but also structures a rethinking of the 
same without negation of the subjectivity  of enjoyment. So that dwelling might 
be deemed a retreat that in its very state of withdrawal is an acknowledgement 
of that from which it withdraws, whereas enjoyment is an attempt to ignore the 
same (whilst in fact remaining haunted by it). With such responses the result, it 
could be said, of position as !distance" (from the il y a) and position as !immer-
sion" (within the world). Though the notion of dwelling should not, however, be 
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30 See E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, pp. 154-156, for detailed per-
spective of the feminine as condition for recollection, interiority of the home and inhabitation.
read as a specific site as such, but as a mode of thought within existence that 
facilitates the !I" recollecting itself as domiciled at !home" with itself.
The notion of subjectivity becoming here an oscillatory, or perhaps coexten-
sively oppositional, movement between processes of openness and closure - 
openness inasmuch as it pursues a continuous relation to an exteriority, discov-
ering at the same time that recollection and postponement already refer to a 
condition of welcome, and closure in terms of a !contraction" of identity. The 
condition of dwelling functioning somewhat differently, therefore, to a notion of 
subjective totality  which seeks (via enjoyment) the evasion of an inevitable at-
tachment to the present:
The ecstatic and immediate enjoyment to which, aspired as it were by the un-
certain abyss of the element, the I was able to give itself over, is adjourned and 
delayed in the home. But this suspension does not reduce to nothing the rela-
tionship of the I with the elements. The dwelling remains in its own way open 
upon the element from which it separates. 31
Perhaps an even more apposite way to conceive of the condition of dwelling, 
however, is as the realisation of the !intent" of hypostasis in which it could be 
said that a verb !laps[es] into a substantive".32 That is, whilst enjoyment might be 
allowed the suspension of the anonymity of being it is not an effecting of a be-
ing, whereas the transformation of verb  to substantive elides with the notion of 
habitation which, whilst sustaining an ambiguity (as a condition of !extra-
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32 E. Levinas, Otherwise than Being: Or Beyond Essence, trans. R.A. Cohen, Pittsburgh: Du-
quesne University Press, 1998.  p, 40.
territoriality" or even !utopia"), structures !an amphibological mutation from an 
event into an entity". 33
So that dwelling might perhaps be countenanced as being within Being but oth-
erwise than !being-in the world". And though it does not overcome the horror 
arising in relation to the il y a, it is able to structure a persistent postponement of 
the same. Such postponement acting, moreover, as an act of withdrawal that 
does not in fact deny a relation of self to the world, but formulates a !recollec-
tion" that is the constitution of an openness. 
And in so framing the condition of dwelling, might we then contend that the rela-
tion arising therein, the !relation with the Other who welcomes me in the Home, 
the discreet presence of the Feminine",34  is in fact an underwriting (without nec-
essarily  being a conflation) of the relation with oneself in the !freedom of the 
present"?35 That is, in allowing that the !I" is always bound to itself in terms of a 
!discernible duality"36 of subjectivity, the distancing of self from self remains yet a 
!dual solitude"37 that counter-resonates with the condition of dwelling as a condi-
tion of retreat without extrication (from the world). The difference perhaps being 
one of perspective, with the sense of enchainment to self emphasising the con-
dition of entrapment within existence and !nostalgia for escape",38 and the event 
of relation with difference in dwelling signalling a position from which !I can in-
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35 E. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 89.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid. p. 90.
38 Ibid.
deed recollect myself in the midst of my life, which is life from..."39  The latter, 
whilst not denying the condition of the former, positing a distance that is estab-
lished through !a relation with something I do not live from"40  (namely, the femi-
nine presence). Though in order that such withdrawal should not then simply 
structure a means of !possession" in relation to the extraneous, it also becomes 
necessary that a subject is able to relinquish, or indeed give, what he/she pos-
sesses. The same being achieved via a !paralysis of possession"41 achieved in 
the encounter with the face of the Other. 
Yet we might argue that the condition of withdrawal or retreat is still a comport-
ment towards, or an anticipation of, difference, giving rise to the notion of an 
unconditional hospitality, and should therefore be allowed an ethical inclination. 
The state of being !at-home-with-oneself" that occurs in dwelling is not a with-
drawal as such, but points rather towards the same as the place of desire to-
wards the transcendence of another. The condition of separation extant within 
such a context is in fact a mark of a proffered welcome and hospitality. The 
same could not exist without such a process of separation. 42 
So understood it is then perhaps readily apparent that the condition of dwelling 
or !domestic being" cannot exist as an insular concern, but is entirely  dependent 
upon its relation with difference to establish a sense of distance. And from its 
extraneous position such difference, constituted by the Other, is in turn able to 
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throw into question a subject"s specific engagement with the world (including its 
process of possession through withdrawal). The questioning of the same includ-
ing the unintentional consequences of the will"s labours, which in turn awaken 
the subject to the condition of its own arguable arbitrariness and phenomenality 
(the phenomenal world being understood as a situation within which things are 
made manifest in absence, where !phenomenality does not simply  designate a 
relativity of knowledge, but a mode of being where nothing is ultimate, where 
everything is a sign, a present absenting itself from its presence and in this 
sense a dream").43  So that it might be said that inasmuch as the subject of 
dwelling absents him/herself from his/her own activities within the world, he/she 
participates in the creation of meaning whilst undergoing a process of dissimu-
lation.
 
Between subject and difference, moreover, and configured in relation to the 
structuring of meaning, we can posit the condition of light. Light promulgates a 
subject"s taking possession of the world, being
the event of a suspension, an epoche, which consists in not compromising one-
self with the objects or the history with which one relates or which one realizes, 
in always remaining outside of those objects and that history, even outside of 
the history of the very being that suspends history. 44  
But the light of the phenomenal world is not independent of the approach of the 
Other, nor yet is it a product of the same. In fact the light, which is necessary for 
knowledge and representation, neither emanates from the subject of dwelling 
nor from the Other whom it presupposes (such presupposition therein preclud-
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ing the possibility of its originating within the same), but facilitates the question-
ing by the Other, however, of a subjective worldly appropriation. Light, simply, 
may perhaps then be most properly  understood as a characteristic of the 
world"s existence. 
And as intimated of course, the most significant condition of light is in fact its 
facilitation of knowledge and representation. And representation, we might con-
tend, is to be apprehended as interpreted and proffered knowledge. But whilst 
such a process (which could be aligned with the notion of !designation") should 
be understood as an appropriative movement, it is also an ethical gesture inas-
much as it constitutes a condition equally  of invitation, or perhaps of !gifting" (of 
contestable meaning) presented as response (to another"s questioning, or in 
anticipation of another"s questions). So that meaning is effectively  always rela-
tional. 
And to locate the same in respect of subject comportment within dwelling we 
might then connect such to an interval in the condition of consciousness, which, 
whilst evoking something of the condition of sleep as an adjunctive form of con-
sciousness, is perhaps to be framed more specifically as a retreat in thought, 
wherein extraneous influence compels a thought of thought or !knowing of 
knowing".45 Itself obliged, we might say, through extraneous response to subjec-
tive representation. The question from outside, as it were, or the anticipation of 
a questioning response, forcing a gap  in the !possessive" condition of represen-
tation as assertion.
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The notion of dwelling, then, could in fact be said to provide the organising or 
authorising point for representation - though the same is also preceded by an 
economy that gives rise to possession. Such possession itself being secondary 
to (and perhaps a consequence of) the recollection of dwelling. The extraneous 
world becoming a possession via the !grasping hand"46 that moves towards the 
world in order to assimilate the same (as possession rather than nourishment). 
And with possession then being understood as prior to the process of represen-
tation, we might frame such as the origin of a context of exchange grounded in 
the designation of the world held in possession. That is, through the proffering 
of meaning, or interpretation, a subject commits to the condition of negotiation 
which may lead to the fixing of values within a common currency. So that pos-
session might ultimately  be regarded as having two irreconcilable meanings - 
one as subject !belonging", and the other as exchangeable good with a value to 
be determined according to the need of the other. Such perspectives being re-
duced to a common currency via a representation in which an elision of the two 
views takes place.
As a means of apprehending the world, of course, and despite its movement 
towards the notion of negotiated or shared value, representation (particularly  as 
a phenomenological concern) could itself, for all that, be determined as a par-
ticular form of possession, appearing to be independent of the need governing 
the labour and exchange value of material possessions, whilst nevertheless 
presupposing the postponement of the il y a effected in labour. But here repre-
sentation as possession becomes additionally  a bearing witness to the expres-
sion of the subject in relation to difference and a sociality that is actually 
147
46 E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, p. 159.
grounded within a condition of exchange and negotiation, refuting the notion in 
fact of pure enjoyment and possession. And for representation, therefore, to be 
more than simply  another model of the same, it must seek to establish itself as 
!gift". In order to represent !I must know how to give what I possess". 47 
The notion of gift, however, has a complex process of realisation here, inas-
much as the apprehension of representation as gift must acknowledge a condi-
tion of morality  underpinning the activity of thought and language, whilst the 
ethical sense of !giving" is unable to exact a return if it is to avoid becoming sim-
ply a condition of the assimilatory (in becoming known or readable the subject 
of difference becomes assimilable. So that the otherwise must in theory remain 
consistently  unanticipatable and beyond the comprehensible). And framed in 
relation to dwelling, the idea of invitation, which we might itself then align with 
the idea of gift, must also by extension disavow its own propensity for a pre-
sumptive approach to difference (by its nature, the process of invitation - a giv-
ing of the status of guest to another - makes assumptive or anticipatory conclu-
sions about difference in order to operate hospitably, with the same inevitably 
inclining to the reduction of the !strangeness" of the stranger and their appre-
hension as something approaching the condition of the Same). So that it would 
appear impossible to extend an invitation, or to give a gift, in terms of a non-
assimilatory ethicality. 48
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But should hospitality then be necessarily regarded as absolutely restrictive? Or 
might it yet function ethically within such a context? And could a gift ever be 
given ethically via a condition equating to the unethical? In fact, the notion of 
representation, aligned with the sense of signification, could perhaps offer a 
way to comprehend such a position, wherein 
signification or goodness, allows us to understand goodness in another way 
than as an altruistic inclination to be satisfied. For signification, the-one-for-the-
other, is never an enough, and the movement of signification does not return. 49
But how more precisely to understand such a perspective? The notion we would 
foreground here is that of the !generative". The generative, it could be said, pur-
suing a deliberate movement !towards" (difference) - with such an approach 
constituting a condition of the unethical, or the ostensibly unethical, since its 
embarkation is a wilful approach towards definition and thematisation - whilst 
being unable to control its reception and application (which thereby facilitates a 
condition of the ethically unassimilable). 50
The sense of intentionality represented through the movement !towards" posing 
an impossibility, then, since the exteriority of the other allows the same to over-
flow the play of identification and resist such movement (though there are 
grounds to also claim a pointedly  ethical status for the same in any case, since 
non-movement could be said to suggest an absolutely oppositional position, 
which would in its turn envelop the other within a condition of totality and 
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thereby conceivably give definition, and thematisation, to difference through be-
ing countenanced as that which the self is not).
And played out as an ethical movement then, the generative condition (which 
we might posit a !creative/procedural" agency, inasmuch as the occurrence of 
representation might be understood as the initiation or authorisation of a proc-
ess but equally an obliged relinquishment of the same in terms of its subse-
quent application or interpretation) approaches a heteronomy that constitutes 
!an attitude that cannot be converted into a category, and whose movement 
unto the other is not recuperated in identification, [and] does not return to its 
point of departure".51 
Such generative movement might also be equated with the notion of an Abra-
hamic journey, a journey without return, in opposition (though again, not in ab-
solute terms) to the sense of an Odyssean journey which is a passage of circu-
larity and completion:
To the myth of Ulysses returning to Ithaca, we wish to oppose the story of Abra-
ham who leaves his fatherland forever for a yet unknown land, and forbids his 
servant to even bring back his son to the point of departure. 52
The former being characterised by a condition of closure and totalisation, the 
latter by  a preclusion of such possibility. The alignment of such with the move-
ment of consciousness, moreover, positing the condition of thought as both a 
returning !selfsameness" that constitutes a reduction of difference and the im-
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possibility of heteronomous experience, and a prohibition of return that facili-
tates such heteronomy. So that the advance !toward", the process of grasping, 
represents a comportment that promulgates non-ethical ethicality in its simulta-
neous assertion and affirmation of selfhood, and consequential and obliged re-
linquishment of authority.  
And in the apprehension of such, we might suggest that a condition of necessity 
attaches to the inherent violence of the assimilatory !movement towards" in or-
der to facilitate the ethical via the inflected. That is, in approaching the condition 
of difference in order to grasp it, a subject negates the condition of polarity 
which, as suggested, facilitates a particular moment of synthesis, and thereby 
creates the condition wherein alterity is able to evade envelopment through a 
submission to the same. The generative notion of instruction formulating a posi-
tion that becomes an authorising principle to lose authorship.
And understood in relation to the condition of dwelling and hospitality, we might 
consider the condition of invitation as an !impossible necessity". The supposition 
attending the same becoming a required violence through its facilitation of in-
flection for another. We are compelled to extend an invitation, itself perhaps 
casting doubt upon specific positions within the dyadic interplay of host and 
guest (does invitation render a host subject"s position questionable within such 
a schema, so that host becomes guest? Are we as host, in fact, invited to make 
an invitation?), with the thematising language of the same providing the very 
means via which difference, ostensibly denied the condition of alterity, achieves 
the status of absolute other? Difference !needing" the assimilatory invitational 
overture in order to transcend the same.  
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The movement towards writing and assertion, through reading, is an act of fe-
cundity. The reader of such text being the progeny of the writing. A reader might 
therefore acknowledge the vacillating condition of his/her own position between 
offspring and parent.
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Generative Theory.
A Prayer.
The !instant", of course, is a denial of duration. Or, that is, the notions of dura-
tion that frame  it as !mathematical", and measurable, or !real", and apprehensi-
ble as temporal flow which cannot be disrupted, whilst being available to expe-
rience only  through processes of intuition.1  Both of which could be counte-
nanced as authorising responses to potential difference, with the creative pro-
clivities of intuition, in fact, constituting !not so much... [an association] with the 
creation of the future as with the power to intuit futurity  within the present".2 The 
same positing a notion of melodic or indeed rhythmic continuity that overwhelms 
instantaneity and is preclusive of alterity. so that ![a]s notes in a melody, each 
instant is sonically penetrated by the others, thereby destroying the very idea of 
otherness".3  But how then to comprehend the condition of the instant, or the 
time of !non-time", in relation to time, the relation to Being (or the il y a), and the 
implications of the same for the musical orientation of the text?
The condition of the instant has to be understood in its relation with the solitary 
subject, and consists !in the mastery  the existent exercises on existence, but 
also in the weight of existence on the existent".4  That is, in the uptake of being 
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1 H. Bergson, The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics, New York: Kensington Pub-
lishing Corporation, 1946.
2 G. Peters, The Rhythm of Alterity: Levinas and Aesthetics in Radical Philosophy 82, March/
April 1997. p. 12.
3 Ibid. p. 13.
4 E. Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. A. Lingis, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 
1978. p. 76.
the subject opens in the present to the inherent potential offered by  the instant 
for the new, for the otherwise, for the alterity which might grant a means of sal-
vation, a means of non-definitiveness, whilst also discovering in the same mo-
ment the inescapable condition of his/her definitive status. The !gravity  of be-
ing"5 conceivably functioning as the hinge between joy in the freedom of move-
ment (as facilitated advance, as it were, towards the potential embrace of differ-
ence), and despair in the realisation of encumbrance (as a condition of en-
chainment within the definitive status of subjective being).
The desire for difference, then, as a source of deliverance,6 is equally a desire 
for the condition of time as the context wherein the societal might posit, in actu-
ality, the possibility  of such release. The instant, despite existing as the !ferment 
of time",7  ostensibly being unable to furnish the condition of the unsolicited, as 
the process of change, as the process of advancing temporality, since that 
could only be experienced in specific relation to the other.
 The notion here is of time as facilitator for rapture or ecstasy within the state of 
existence: 
[For] the happiness that a being that knows itself temporal can know is the hap-
piness of a new beginning that the future can bring, a new beginning of the be-
ing one is and has been - the strange happiness of the felix culpa. 8
155
5 Ibid. p. 78.
6 And it should perhaps be emphasized here that such !deliverance" is dependent upon the re-
sponsibility that the subject effects in relation to the Other. So that desire might be understood 
as the longing to serve another as well as the longing for (or the consequence of which is) the 
condition of escape. 
7 E. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 95.
8 A. Lingis, Translator!s Introduction in E. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. xxvi.
The blessed condition of the struggle within being is then the potential for exon-
eration and non-definitiveness proffered by the difference available through 
time. But we could perhaps equally extend such a condition of !fortunate suffer-
ing" to the condition of the instant in its persistent awakening of the solitary sub-
ject to hope for the new, to the continuous sensing of another chance for the 
now. The same, in its process of recurrence, being apprehended !not as a de-
terminate infinity of instants, but rather... [as] “infinition, [and] the ever recom-
mencing of the definitive".9 
And in so framing instantaneity, we might perhaps then posit its relation with 
time as something of a dichotomy, inasmuch as the instant is both of, and exte-
rior to, temporality. Classical conceptions would, of course, preclude the possi-
bility of the instant"s imitation of eternity !since it is essentially an evanescence... 
[and] even the negation of eternity"10  (the alignment with which would improp-
erly equate it with the condition of the divine). But it might equally be argued 
that the instant in fact functions at a remove from the condition of time (or time 
as duration), in its insistent move to denial of past and future, and therefore 
does evoke something therein of the very nature of the eternal. 
So that within the instant"s uptake of being (and, indeed, the uptake of the il y a 
as essential Being within existence), we might therefore posit a spatialised 
sense of !position" as interim, something even perhaps akin to aeviternity, the 
time or space of angels (the space, as it were, between the time of the human 
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9 Ibid.
10 E. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 73. The same as illustration of a classical conception 
rather than validation of course.
and the eternity of the divine).11  And as !angels of the instant" (perhaps our an-
gelic status being reinforced through the solitariness that precludes transgres-
sion against others?), we exist between states of hope and frustration, between 
states of desire and disappointment.
Such a space could additionally be compared, it might be argued, with the 
!meanwhile"12  advocated through the shattering encounter with manifest differ-
ence, within temporality, as a locus of !dead time".13  A  significant distinction, 
however, lays with the emphasis of such an interval as !pre-death" (and con-
ceivably continuous rehearsal for ultimate flight), whereas the understanding of 
solitary being"s instantaneity  or interim status signals a process of !re-birth" (that 
functions as both condition of hope and condition of anguish in its realisation of 
inescapable existence). 
To so read the condition of the instant, it should be said, however, is not to imply 
an absolute preclusion of difference. Nor is it to suggest, despite its furl of being 
and nothingness, that the il y a, within which the instant opens, might be an en-
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11 The most familiar description of the aevum, the space between eternity and the temporal, be-
ing found in the Suma Theologica of Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas identifies the aevum as the 
measure of the existence of beings that “recede less from permanence of being, forasmuch as 
their being neither consists in change, nor is the subject of change; nevertheless they have 
change annexed to them either actually, or potentially.” (see T. Aquinas, Suma Theologica, First 
Part, Question 10, Article 5, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican province, London: Burns, 
Oates & Washbourne, 1912).
12 E. Levinas, Reality and its Shadow in The Levinas Reader, ed. S. Hand, Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd, 1989. p. 151. The !meanwhile" constituting a parallel condition to the duration of 
the living, as an !eternal duration of the interval".
13 E. Levinas, Otherwise than Being: Or Beyond Essence, trans. R.A. Cohen, Pittsburgh: Du-
quesne University Press, 1998. p. 109. Levinas here overlaps the !meanwhile" and !dead time" 
as moments in living that occur between inspiration and expiration, and could perhaps be con-
strued as intimations of the infinite within existence. Blanchot speaks of !dead time" similarly, as 
being time without time, a space between actions where life is suspended, but temporality and 
spatiality are rendered porous and open (see M. Blanchot, The Space of Literature, trans. Ann 
Smock, Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1982. p. 31).
tity structured simply upon polarity. Rather, we might contend that the il y a de-
rives from an exteriority  that exceeds even such putatively  fundamental onto-
logical positions. Its status as conceivable inversion (indeed, a melodic transpo-
sition), wherein it potentially !mimes the transcendence it occludes",14  in fact 
constituting the means by which it might, in its form of insistent Being, be coun-
tenanced as a condition of !trace"15 or vestigial presence in absence that is also 
an overflowing of ascriptive attempts at determinacy. The il y a is always more 
than the definitions we might apply, always more than the conceptions we might 
entertain (hence the associative linguistic resonance of il y a and illeity).16 
And at its most basic, the il y a could be allowed perhaps a limitation, or even 
prohibition, of the authorising proclivities of subjective existence. Whilst extant 
as non-substantive, being neither locus of experience nor object (its acuteness 
being in fact constituted through its indeterminateness), it yet strives, as the 
!anonymous current of being",17 to affirm its own status as deficiency with regard 
to the condition of enjoyment within being, and thereby to promulgate the 
!heavy atmosphere"18 of its existence as interruption of subjective presumption. 
Here, in other words, as the !nothing [that] nothings",19  the il y a functions as in-
vasive movement of disruption in relation to the ascriptive powers of subjectivity. 
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14 E. Wyschogrod, Emmanuel Levinas: The Problem of Ethical Metaphysics, New York: Ford-
ham University Press, 2000. p. xiii.
15 !Trace" in Levinasean thought might be regarded as the trace of the divine within the absolute 
other that determines the ethical nature of the relation (see E. Levinas, The Trace of the Other 
in Deconstruction in Context, ed. M. Taylor trans. A. Lingis, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, pp. 345-359). 
16  !Illeity" being the term that Levinas uses, we might contend, as a pseudonym for God.
17 E. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 52.
18 Ibid. p. 53.
19 The phrase is Heidegger"s (see M. Heidegger, What is Metaphysics? in Basic Writings, ed. D. 
Farrell Krell, New York: Harper and Row, 1977. pp. 90-110).
Its evocation, we might contend however, is !shaped" by individual being (with 
the !horror" that informs the il y a, in fact, conceivably being drawn not only 
through the realisation of inescapability pertaining to Being, but also through the 
compelling sense of isolation, in relation to experiencing subjectivity, that sig-
nals the il y a as consistently unique experience. The process of !shaping", of 
course, functioning as testament to the same).20
The taking up  of existence, then, as a bearing of (and witness to) Being, effects 
a relationship  in the instant that would apparently  exclude reference to past or 
future, to any being or event situated within that past or future, yet in the nature 
of such a relation posits at the same time an inflected sense of an ethically 
charged !relation without relation".21  And taking then the possibility that a !rela-
tion" with difference is conceivably realisable within the presence of solitary sub-
jectivity (and accepting therein the possibility  of the il y a as an expression of 
both essential Being and intimation of otherwise than Being), we might wonder 
about a condition of !temporality" that could be emergent here with regard to the 
same (if we are to allow that difference is inevitably the agency through which 
time is to be made available). In relation to which, and whilst accepting the pre-
sent as !a halt, not because it is arrested, but because it interrupts and links up 
again to the duration to which it comes out of itself",22  we might also ask 
whether the condition of !instantaneous non-time" within time, as it were, should 
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20 The view expressed here is not intended as a specific contestation of the !self-contained" sub-
jectivity that Levinas would conceivably posit as an ethically inclined responsiveness to differ-
ence, but an indication of the anxiety and doubt that must attach to the solitary condition of the 
same.  
21 E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. A. Lingis, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969. 
p. 80. The term !relation without relation" is used by Levinas to describe the ethical nature of 
comportment towards another - but is here extended to the condition of essential difference of, 
indeed, perhaps illeity, wherein it is constituted as a relation without knowledge of relation.
22 E. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 71.
necessarily be countenanced as itself devoid of past or future. Might we not, in 
fact, speak of a retentive/protentive instantaneity (a temporality of !passive syn-
thesis")23 without denying the status of pure presence? 
The instant, we find, is of course an effectively compelled movement of !pure 
beginning"24 that spans an !inner distance",25  and is enfolded by !instantaneous 
maturity".26  All of which suggest a developmental condition of existence - but a 
developmental condition that is grounded, we should say, in the present. Such 
an apprehension thereby introducing a conception of temporality that exists in 
terms of immediacy, wherein each instantaneous moment of uptake is also a 
simultaneous conclusion, or indeed !accomplishment",27  demarcated by  hesita-
tion to begin (indolence) and diminution of effort (fatigue).
The notion of which might additionally be aligned with an aesthetic concern with 
process as the realisation of essence. So that we might contend !the motive... of 
reality is process not goal".28  The primary concern within such a context laying 
with instantaneous creativity, or indeed generative improvisation, in opposition 
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23 A. Lingis, Translator!s Introduction in E. Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. A. 
Lingis, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987. p. xxvii.
24 E. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 78.
25 Ibid. p. 76.
26 Ibid. p. 78.
27 Ibid. p. 74.
28 C. Olsen, The Special View of History, ed. A. Charters, California: Oyez Press, 1970. p. 49, 
quoted in T. DeLio, Circumscribing the Open Universe, New York; University Press of America, 
1984. p. 31.
to any a priori compositional determinacy or a posteriori objectification 29  (al-
ways accepting that composition is not a formation of !slowed down improvisa-
tion",30  or that process as a condition of improvisation is not the reverse). In re-
lation to which, we could perhaps in fact ascribe distinction in terms of the dif-
ference between states of !becoming" and !became", with the condition of im-
provisation opening to !streams of influence that can change from moment to 
moment",31  and composition, once finished at least, being !subject only  to the 
vagaries of performance and reception".32  Though we might also allow, in say-
ing that of course, that the condition of !fixed" composition could also be the 
very  agency through, or in relation to which, improvisation is in fact realised. 
Such a perspective affording emphasis to the condition of improvisation as 
emanation or intimation of an exteriority that !overflows" the compositional struc-
ture of the Same).
 
In evoking then the notion of a generative improvisational model of process with 
regard to the instant, and a condition of temporality  as the !time of non-time" in 
relation to the same, we might pursue the concern a little more closely still, in 
fact, with perhaps a particular emphasis being afforded here conceptions of the 
relation, already touched upon, to the (less definitively musical) act of !bearing 
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29 The linking of three musical forms here, the generative, the improvisatory and the processual, 
may perhaps be most expediently read beneath the rubric of the generative, in fact, with im-
provisation and process constituting facets of a generative momentum that might be ascribed to 
both the condition of existence and the condition of the text. The notion of the generative being 
drawn most specifically through the formulation of the same as it occurs in the practice and writ-
ing of Brian Eno, whose thoughts in this area were originally of course influenced by the linguis-
tic concerns of Noam Chomsky (see N. Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1965).
30 A. Schoenberg, Brahms the Progressive in Style and Idea in Music, ed. L. Stein, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1975. pp. 398-442. 
31 D. Toop, in interview conducted at his home in North London, November 2007.
32 Ibid.
witness". The alignment of the same positing a sense of subjective !gathering 
up", in both instances (of improvisation and testament), in order to generate an 
obliged movement towards futurity. With the consequential summation that in-
stantaneity, whilst still constituting the !present presenting", is also conceivably 
always a site of the retrospective and prophetic. That is, in taking the eruption of 
improvisation as an !obligated" movement (a response to a !summons" to enter 
into existence and to convey),33  in the same way that !witnessing" is a required, 
even indebted, bearing of or for (another) and bearing to (another), the occur-
rence must draw on that which is available to it, including historic knowledge 
and experience, that is then projected towards a future and the occasion of !be-
ing heard" (or, indeed, !justified"). The fact of the !returning", and testifying, reali-
sation of instantaneity (even as a !rebound movement"),34  leading to a moment, 
despite its generation of the continuously unanticipated, of reclamation that is 
additionally an opening to the future.
And in tying then a condition of bearing witness, or indeed responsibility, to a 
generative model of music, we might say that the movement forward, towards a 
making known, is continuously prompted in the instant by a compulsive obliga-
tion formulated in the past.35  In pressing the association, moreover, we might 
postulate that the moment of expression is a drawing out of that which is in-
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33 And we might apply such interpellation (applied here as a notion of the !called" self) both in 
terms of solo as well as group improvisation - the !summons" to the former being perhaps auto-
generated, however, but obligated as a condition of !need" in response to an audience that may 
or may not be present, may or may not be extant.
34 E. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 75.
35 And again, we might reiterate the notion of improvisation as a moment of the generative, 
bridging perhaps most specifically the creative/procedural and biological/emergent formations of 
the same, and, of course, encompassing a notion of the subject as !instrument" (which is a nec-
essary conception in the apprehension of generative music here, since we are applying the term 
as a notion of auto-production rather than technological rendering).
comprehensible to us, but that which is always already present to us, and that 
too to which we seek to bear testament. Our testimony constituting then both an 
attempt to reveal and to ultimately  rationalise our very  dumbfoundedness. The 
articulation, it could be said therefore, of our very speechlessness. The avail-
ability  of the same for another, within the context of the societal of course, be-
coming a further moment in the infinite !shaping" of the event of the music/
testament as the material inevitably evolves !through the will of the perceiving 
[or receiving] consciousness".36
The occurrence of the instant is then a moment, in pursuit of such thought, 
within which the uptake of being might be considered the uptake equally  of a 
responsibility that is engendered prior to the condition of existence (in allowing 
that "facing" may of course be the occasion of effectuation, and indeed testa-
ment, the condition of responsibility, as a primordial origination of responsibility 
for difference, is essentially extant before any moment of encounter and there-
fore predetermines the significance of engagement. The desire for another be-
ing the desire to realise responsibility  and, in so doing, to bear witness to the 
condition of the otherwise whilst enabling the possibility of deliverance or flight 
as a consequence of the same):
Responsibility for the other precedes every decision, it is before the origin...  
The infinite would not know how to enter into appearance - to become a phe-
nomenon - to become a theme without letting itself be contained, without ac-
cepting limits in immanence. This refusal to appear is thus, positively, the very 
responsibility for the other, anterior to every memorable present, coming from a 
past that was never present, that was never the freedom of a subject, ordering 
me to the other, to the first to come along, to the neighbour, without showing it-
self to me, but entering me by the simple effect of traumatism, by breaking and 
entering. My responsibility for the other is precisely this relation with an unthe-
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matizable Infinity. It is neither the experience of Infinity nor proof of it: it testifies 
to Infinity.37 
In relation to which, we might also claim two moments of responsibility"s !reali-
sation" and testament within the condition of existence. Facing, of course, is one 
instance, in the presence of the vital other, that shatters our self absorption and 
compels an awareness of the responsibility to which we are obligated. The re-
sponse to the notion of the il y a may be another. Here, however, the emanation 
of the same is always produced in relation to subjective isolation, within each 
subject"s own unique mode of expression, so that we are perhaps never abso-
lutely sure that we experience the same thing, or that the il y a is not simply  the 
product within each instant of our own imagining. Such imaginative constructs 
being, for all that, acts of testament to our own sensing of difference within be-
ing. Or that is, in allowing difference a conceivable presence, its realisation may 
be the consequence of individual imaginative leaps that are both !witnessings" 
to our own belief and our own destabilization in the face of such belief. Perhaps 
we might suggest that the il y a is, as a consequence therein, even testimony 
itself. 
We might understand the condition of testimony, moreover, as the improvisa-
tional eruption within the subject of the sincerity of Saying:
It is the Saying that, unencumbered by any possessions in being, achieves the 
extradition of sincerity. No Said recovers sincerity, and none is adequate to it. 
Saying without said, apparently a talking for nothing, a sign given to the other, 
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37 E. Levinas, Truth of Disclosure and Truth of Testimony in Basic Philosophic Writings, eds. A.T. 
Peperzak, S. Critchley and R. Bernasconi, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 1996. p. 103.
“as simple as !hello,"” and, within the Saying, a sign given of this giving of a sign 
- the pure transparency of a confession - testimony. 38
The improvisational moment of the generative being an instant within which a 
past authorisation (as inspiration?) is gathered into the present of being and di-
rected towards a future comprehension. The condition of improvisation originat-
ing in an otherwise, but an otherwise that we as subjects must Say:
The glory of the Infinite... commands me from my own mouth... A command-
ment pronounced from the mouth of the one it commands - exceptional struc-
ture, and certainly unique. The very exception to the rule of Being. 39
Here also, we might note that the condition of responsibility infuses the process 
of language (and by extension writing), since the taking up of language is al-
ways a condition of response. The movement of the same producing an ascrip-
tion to the self, as it were, in which the ego is set forth through the assertion of 
the !I" within hypostasis, whilst simultaneously complying with a call to embrace 
an obligated status in regard to the approach of difference, and which in turn 
compels a disruption and subjugation of the !I". But how then, in evoking such 
concern, to most precisely determine the condition of responsibility, or indeed 
the condition of a musically generative responsibility, as it is operative in relation 
to the theoretical text? As it is operative here?
In fact, the condition of difference to which we seek to bear witness in the con-
text of the theoretical is the condition of an !original" or !source" text (as itself the 
bearer of residual difference or trace). In the contingency of each interpreting 
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39 Ibid. p. 104.
instant, however, absolute fidelity to the same remains an impossibility (interpre-
tation, however precise, functioning always as a process of approximation, al-
ways in relation to a contingent cultural-historic horizon). And yet it is the very 
condition of such failure, somewhat perversely perhaps, that elicits the ethical 
inclination in relation to the same. That is, in the event of interpretation as, we 
might say, !invention" or generative eruption of improvisation, we structure a po-
sition in relation to a source that is inevitably  at a remove. And such remove in-
stills (an ethically inclined) sense of or for the unassimilable. Such !failure" then, 
as a moment of ethicality, could even be allowed a prerequisite of the interpre-
tive text, a !built-in" component or commentary that acknowledges its own in-
adequacy, its own appropriative intent, and yet in so doing indirectly propounds 
an appreciation of, and the exercising of responsibility  for, the difference per-
taining to the source material. Responsibility thereby having import not perhaps 
strictly in terms of fidelity  to meaning as such, but the ungraspable condition of 
difference that remains extraneous to interpretation. The ethical condition being 
effected not through wilful disregard, but a reflexive focus that acknowledges 
the impossibility of absolute accord, whilst in turn facilitating the source as pres-
ence in absence which, in its generative state of continuous becoming, is ren-
dered both identical with, and different from, itself. 
Operative here, moreover, are conditions of witnessing that might be read 
through the hinged condition of !reading" (as a process of reception and a proc-
ess of dissemination). The first a testimony of dumbfounding in the face of dif-
ference, which functions in terms of an uncomprehending receipt, the second a 
rationalisation of such dumbfounding, that in turn is a comprehension and inter-
pretation opening to assertion. The process of reading thereby functioning as a 
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!musically" derived condition that pursues both reception/listening (as 
incomprehension/rationalisation) and !playing"/performance (as improvised 
representation/assertion) within each instant, whilst also bearing witness 
through an inflected propensity, as suggested, to the !original" thought, as a pul-
sating underpinning that constitutes a particular condition of trace.
The responsibility attaching to such testimony being itself formulated, addition-
ally, in relation to a specific condition of rhythm or indeed recurrence and repeti-
tion that, in its generative mode of production, intimates the sense that respon-
sibility is without limit:
Responsibility is the way alterity touches me, has afflicted me from the start in a 
movement of unending appeal. Responsibility is the contact of the I with a di-
mension of Infinity. This character of responsibility too can be seen in the 
movement of language - in which the last word is never yet said. 40
In association with which the generative compulsion to move forward, from in-
stant to instant, calls for an emphasis of presence, of being inside the unfolding 
of the moment, rather than at a position of exteriority, or within the durational, 
which foster the assimilatory. Through the condition of responsibility, we might 
contend therefore, we are in fact summoned to observe the continuity of Saying 
in order that we should avoid conclusion and the petrification of difference within 
the condition of the definitive. 
And yet, the realisation of such movement"s continuity as it is framed in relation 
to theory, it should be observed, is in fact an impossibility. Or an impossibility  in 
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40 A. Lingis, Translator!s Introduction in Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. A. 
Lingis, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987. p. xxiii.
absolute terms. The conditions of Saying and Said are effectively written 
through each other, so that the moment of Saying will inevitably yield to the 
condition of the Said, which is itself in turn interrupted by the continuous asser-
tion of the new as Saying. No condition of the Said is indeed imaginable without 
an accompanying condition of the Saying since every text implies a performa-
tive address, and no Saying can function at length without being !repaired" 
within the fabric, as it were, of the Said, as itself the inclination to apply defini-
tive meaning.41
Here then, both emerge and give way within the instant. The rhythmic move-
ment of the same evoking perhaps a notion of respiration, where !the rhythm of 
the Saying and Said, the rhythm that the text is trying to perform, to improvise... 
is the rhythm of breath. The outgoing of breath, and the intaking of breath".42 
Each inhalation, as a condition of reception, constituting the uptake, we might 
say, of Being, exhalation the condition of assertion, the rationalisation of a life 
played out. 
#
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41  Levinas has, of course, himself employed the metaphor of knots along the length of a thread 
as indication of a continuously interrupted Said (see E. Levinas, Otherwise than Being: Or Be-
yond Essence, trans. A. Lingis, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, p. 170). 
42 S. Critchley, in an interview conducted at Chelsea College of Art, June 2008.
A reader might always bear in mind that his/her own reading, as interpretation, 
is a move to writing. The condition of facing within such a context is therefore 
always informed by the proximity of a third.
169
Bam Boom
Card Room, Chelsea College of Art & Design, November 2007.
3 minutes 32 seconds.
Disc 2 track 6. Please press play.
170
Conclusion as Introduction.
A Prayer.
This is a conclusion. That it is adjunctive to the dissertational text, or texts, and 
can in fact be read (as with preface or abstract) as antecedent, postscript or 
moment of simultaneity, means that it also functions extraneously to, or as 
overview of, the same work. Such distance establishing it, moreover, as per-
spectival take upon the !main" text, whilst yet conceding that it is of course the 
progeny of such text... But to understand it in such a way is to acknowledge that 
a conclusion is not an ending in any case, and that the designatory  movement 
of interpretation is merely  a beginning. An opening. A conjecture. What !conclu-
sions" are we then to draw about the theoretical text, and its relation moreover 
with a condition of performativity or reading (or, indeed, practice)?#
The research project here considers most pointedly  in fact the philosophic no-
tion of rhythm as it occurs in the work of a particular philosopher (the reluctance 
to name the same constituting both a continuation of the dissertational denial of 
assimilatory propensities and, in its relation to the process of !facing" presented 
through the textual address, the wilful undecidability  of addressee. Are !you" 
author of source text, reader of this text, or do we simply talk to ourselves?).1 
With such consideration being afforded particular emphasis in relation to the 
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1  The philosopher referred to, of course, is Emmanuel Levinas, and this dissertation is perhaps 
a response most directly to his 1947 work Existence and Existents. The process of naming here 
within a footnote (it is perhaps necessary to allow) conceivably determines the same, at least in 
the context of this work and the abstract aside, as the very particular moment of final assimila-
tory inevitability within the formulation of the text.
presentation of the !instant" as (we might argue) a generative condition of being, 
and the particular application of the same in relation to the theoretical.
#
The contention being that ethics within such a context might be underscored by 
an aesthetic condition (of generative musicality), in fact, that must in turn throw 
into question particular readings of the aesthetic as well as the nature perhaps 
of ethics per se. In relation to which, the dissertational concerns divide broadly 
into three areas: (1) rhythm as metaphysical concern (read most specifically in 
relation to the notion of the !instant"), (2) rhythm as generative continuity/
discontinuity in music, and the relationship  of the same as it might be applied in 
terms of the theoretical, and (3) the implications of the rhythmic !instant" as an 
ethical moment of language and text (including the relation to the notion of 
!trauma" as a condition of witnessing, and the possible impossibility  of evasion 
within the philosophic text).2 The question perhaps ultimately at stake here lay-
ing with the meaningfulness of such a rhythmic condition as it might be framed 
in relation to the exteriority of philosophical discourse... Does such rhythm, it 
might be asked, really afford access to the !beyond" of the discursive (as we 
would like to suggest) in any significant sense? And if so, how might we under-
stand (or, perhaps more appropriately, !mis/understand") this? The formulation 
of the text here, in relation to such, aiming at the assessment and effectuation 
of precisely that position. #
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2 The condition of !bearing witness" in fact occurring across a number of processes configured 
through the instant"s realisation within the theoretical. Witnessing occurring here in terms of tes-
tament to an original text, testament to our own condition of incomprehension in the face of 
such work (as well as the rationalisation of or testament to such incomprehension), and testa-
ment to an anticipation of difference. And equally, the notion of !bearing" is played out in the 
sense of !responsibility to" or !responsibility for" (an original text and reader) and the conditions 
of !conveyance" (between original text and reader) and !burden" (of or for such responsibility). 
And in specifically focusing upon a notion of practice in relation to the research, 
moreover, it is important to comprehend that a musical overlay obliges a spe-
cific contiguity between theory and practice, between textual receipt and textual 
production (or interpretation), between the notions of text as !score" and textual 
!performance" (notions of the constative and the performative). With the practice 
of !playing" (in relation to text) signalling a continuous attempt at interruption of 
textual propensity for closure. Such !playing" constituting an attempted articula-
tion of the condition of the immateriality of the il y a or !nothingness" (as we 
might determine it) that could be said to exist both within and beyond the text 
(and to which we would seek to ascribe the condition of difference to which aes-
thetic production in fact attempts to ultimately bear witness). 
Here the notion of musicality  overlaps with the philosophic in relation to time 
(duration), rhythm, silence and so on, with these things being foregrounded as 
particular formations embraced by both conditions of music and literature.3  In 
relation to which it is perhaps important to emphasise that in propounding a mu-
sical overlay for the research project, we have sought to ultimately preclude a 
theoretical exteriority. Theory does not exist here as an overarching schema in 
relation to the practice but is, rather, both the second part of a condition of mu-
sical reception (a rationalisation that follows an initial !dumbfoundedness") and a 
designating !score" to be interpreted or played by another in the same way that 
we !play" the score of the first (the processes of rationalisation and performance 
being played out in the condition of !reading" which functions as the hinge be-
tween musical reception - a dumbfoundedness followed by  comprehension - 
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3  The dissertation also prompting the question of where music, in fact, may begin and end. 
Might we not understand a score as itself music, or already music? And is the condition of musi-
cal reception (of reading) not itself a playing or performance of music?
and performance as assertion).4#So that reading, as aesthetic process (indeed, 
as instant), is at once unknowingness, rationalisation, designation and facilita-
tion. Practice within such a context (of reading) then, constitutes a realisation of, 
or perhaps more specifically a bearing witness to the realisation of, essential 
dumbfoundedness (in the face of the incomprehensible) and the postulation of a 
view that is in turn rendered available for another to read (or indeed misread). 
The move to writing (as the designatory mode of reading) prescribing an ethical 
bent in its generative repetition (saying the same thing in different ways), and in 
its condition of !scored" assertion - which in turn facilitates inflected reading for 
another.
In essence, then, the condition of !practice" embraces, or is written through, the 
process of theorisation. The notion of distance or distinction occurring between 
the moments of !unknowingness" and !knowingness" as they take place via the 
instant"s realisation within the theoretical text. The condition of unknowingness 
itself being literally framed (within the research) in terms of video"s propensity 
for the repetitive !bursting forth" of incessant novelty. That is, in terms of the 
successive filmic frames which insist always upon the sense of their own !now-
ness", and which constitute the initial stage of incomprehension in the process 
of interpretation, there occurs an eruption of the consistently new (as the re-
sponse of unknowingness) that moves to a position of rationalisation (or know-
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4  The sense here of !dumbfoundedness" being taken from Jean Francois Lyotard"s reading of 
the condition (J-F. Lyotard, Presence in The Language of Art History, ed. S. Kemall and I. Gas-
kell, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. pp. 26-27)  triggering artistic response 
(which itself parallels the Kantian response to the sublime), and which could be aligned with the 
view of listening to music propounded by Morton Feldman, amongst others, for whom we em-
ploy a process of uncomprehending hearing that is followed immediately by rationalisation or 
comprehension. Listening, in that sense, constituting a memory or witnessing of the initial mo-
ment of incomprehension. 
ingness), and that in turn becomes the vehicle or score for another"s inflected 
reading.
In effect, the musicality of the instant gives rise to the conditions of Saying and 
Said within the theoretical, with such processes being repeated in subsequent 
readings ad infinitum. Practice here being most ostensibly  determined, through 
a musical consideration of video work (in its interlaced status with the text), as 
the !uniquely  recurring" moment of dumbfoundedness that gives way to ration-
alisation (within the text) - which in turn itself becomes the designatory moment 
as vehicle for dumbfoundedness and rationalisation elsewhere. The moments of 
!recurrence", it should be emphasised however, are unique and also volitional, 
or at least generatively responsive (inasmuch as they are !obligated" responses, 
whilst being formally undeterminable), but give way to a condition of compre-
hended existence in the !rebounding" moment of rationalisation. 
Framed within a somewhat apposite notion of the filmic then, the theoretical 
might be regarded finally through the notion of the unrelenting zoom-in and the 
telescoping withdrawal of the zoom-out. From the furthest distance it appears a 
contained or even ossified formation. Move a little closer and it separates into 
pulsations of the comprehended and the non-comprehended. Closer still to the 
latter and a further division between the !thing in itself" and the presence in ab-
sence of that to which the same bears witness. Move back, towards the distant 
limits, and it solidifies, becoming then the object of the designatory. Yet further 
still, and it shatters. At once assertion and, in its taking up by another, vehicle 
again for incomprehension and the indeterminable. 
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